M/s. Jagadish Advertising vs. Designated Committee and others. Writ Petition 7801/2020 decided on 19 August 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/338063/1/WP7801-20-19-08-2020.pdf

HELD: The term “verify the correctness””in Section 126 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2019 and Rule 6 of the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme  Rules,  2019 cannot be stretched to mean that the Designated Committee can embark upon an adjudication regarding the entitlement or otherwise of the declarant. 

Relevant Paragraphs: 16, 18 & 24. The Parliament, with the object of bringing to an  end the disputes relating to the liability of service tax, enacted the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019. The object of the said Scheme was both Dispute Resolution and also Amnesty. The Scheme is basically designed to ensure minimum interface between the assessee and the Department and is designed in such a way that the dispute is resolved by the assessee by filing a declaration electronically and his tax liability is also determined electronically. Thus, basically a person whose liability to pay service tax was in dispute, such a person could avail the Scheme by making a declaration in the electronic form and the Designated Committee would verify the declaration and thereafter, issue a statement indicating the amount payable and on the said amount being paid, the person would be discharged of all liabilities i.e., both financial as well as penal.

31 & 33. The Circular dated 27.08.2019 issued by the Department categorically states that one of the objectives of the Scheme was to give an opportunity to those who had failed to correctly pay the tax. The  Circular states that to this extent the Scheme comprised of an Amnesty component. The Circular also clarified a few issues raised after the Scheme was notified. Thus, a reading of the said clause would clearly indicate that in certain matters when tax had been paid  by utilizing the input credit and the matter was under dispute, the tax already paid through input credit should be adjusted by the Designated Committee at the time of determination of the final amount payable under the Scheme. Therefore, even if there was a  dispute  regarding the tax paid through input credit, the Circular mandated that the Designated Committee should adjust the tax already paid through input credit. It, therefore, follows that the Designated Committee cannot embark upon an exercise of adjudication and state  that it was  not permissible for the declarant to claim that he had  paid the tax through input credit.

38.…. A plain reading  of the provisions would mean that the Designated Committee would be required only to examine the accuracy of the statement made in the declaration with reference to the records available with it and this would basically mean that the Designated Committee can only satisfy itself as to whether the Tax liability admitted by the declarant was accurate or not. The term “verify the correctness”” cannot be stretched to mean that the Designated Committee can embark upon an adjudication regarding the entitlement or otherwise of the declarant. 

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

VETINDIA PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER. CIVIL APPEAL NO.3647 OF 2020 decided on 6 November 2020.

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/5173/5173_2020_35_1501_24640_Judgement_06-Nov-2020.pdf

14. That brings us to the question of delay. There is no doubt
    that the High Court in its discretionary jurisdiction may decline
    to exercise the discretionary writ jurisdiction on ground of delay
    in approaching the court. But it is only a rule of discretion by
    exercise of self­restraint evolved by the court in exercise of the
    discretionary equitable jurisdiction and not a mandatory

requirement that every delayed petition must be dismissed on the
ground of delay. The Limitation Act stricto sensu does not apply
to the writ jurisdiction. The discretion vested in the court under
Article 226 of the Constitution therefore has to be a judicious
exercise of the discretion after considering all pros and cons of
the matter, including the nature of the dispute, the explanation
for the delay, whether any third­ party rights have intervened etc.
The jurisdiction under Article 226 being equitable in nature,
questions of proportionality in considering whether the impugned
order merits interference or not in exercise of the discretionary
jurisdiction will also arise. This Court in Basanti Prasad vs.
Bihar School Examination Board and others, (2009) 6 SCC
791, after referring to Moon Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Court, AIR
1967 SC 1450, Maharashtra SRTC vs. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 and State of M.P. and Others
vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, (1986) 4 SCC 566, held that if
the delay is properly explained and no third party rights are
being affected, the writ court under Article 226 of the
Constitution may condone the delay, holding as follows:

“18. In the normal course, we would not have taken
exception to the order passed by the High Court.
They are justified in saying that a delinquent
employee should not be permitted to revive the stale
claim and the High Court in exercise of its discretion
would not ordinarily assist the tardy and indolent
person. This is the traditional view and is well
supported by a plethora of decisions of this Court.
This Court also has taken the view that there is no
inviolable rule, that, whenever there is delay the
Court must refuse to entertain a petition. This Court
has stated that the writ court in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution may condone the delay in filing the
petition, if the delay is satisfactorily explained.”

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & another. Criminal Appeal 707 of 2020 decided on 5 November 2020. Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice Hemant Gupta, Justice Ajay Rastogi

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/16256/16256_2020_35_1503_24580_Judgement_05-Nov-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 9. The long title of the Act is to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special Courts and Exclusive
Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and
rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.

10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of
the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected
to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and
harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well.
The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict
indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence
as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to
punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of
the society for the reason that they belong to a particular
community.

11. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act
can be classified as “1) intentionally insults or intimidates with
intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe and 2) in any place within public view. ”

12. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under
the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim
belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the
Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil
rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a
member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to
indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over
the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities,
humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their
remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his
family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that
respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then
the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the
procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that
respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.

13. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in
“any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in
public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the
judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through
Standing Counsel & Ors (2008) 8 SCC 435. The Court had drawn distinction
between the expression “public place” and “in any place within
public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then
the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the
contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some
members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.

17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged
to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhance
punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest
that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the
deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste.

18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap Singh & Ors.
v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr (2018) 13 SCC 612 held that there is no
prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part. In
a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is
required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for
prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

This is a win-win scenario for advocates and Daksha Legal interns. Law students from reputed colleges across the country join Daksha Legal as interns for a month. Due to covid, this year, it is only online internship. Hence I have opened this platform. It works like this.

1. Join Daksha Legal Facebook group by using this link: https://www.facebook.com/groups/1004611326222954/
2. Lawyers can ask purely legal questions in the comment of the post already shared in the group.
3. Our interns will answer the question by doing research on web and also using legal software.
4. This is available only for lawyers.
5. Frame proper question in English or Kannada or Hindi and post in the comment box.
6. Do not narrate facts of the case etc.
7. This platform is only temporary till internship is completed.  

Thanks. S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Dr. A. Rangaswamy vs The State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 44995/2016 decided on 10 October 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/340658/1/WP44995-16-10-09-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 6….The learned counsel for the petitioner would  place  reliance  on  the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Union of India through Govt. of Pondicherry and Another Vs. V. Ramakrishnan and Others stated supra and the learned counsel for the petitioner places  reliance  on  the  observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 32 and 35 to buttress his contention. “32. Ordinarily, a deputationist has no legal right to continue in the post. A deputationist indisputably has no right to be absorbed in the post to which he is deputed. However, there is no bar thereto as well. It may be true that when deputation does not result in absorption in the service to which an officer is deputed, no recruitment in its true import and significance takes place as he is continued to be a member of the parent service. When the tenure of deputation is specified, despite a deputationist not having an indefeasible right to hold the said post, ordinarily the term of deputation should not be curtailed except on such just grounds as, for example, unsuitability or unsatisfactory performance. But, even where the tenure is not specified, an order of reversion can be questioned when the same is mala fide. An action taken in a post-haste manner also indicates malice. (See Bahadursinh lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbai M. Kamalia SCC para 25.)” and would submit that no  reasons  have  been  assigned while repatriating the petitioner to his parent department.

7. From a reading of paragraph 32 it is apparent that recording of reasons is mandated by the  Hon’ble  Apex  Court where the deputation is  for  fixed  tenure.  In  the event of deputation without a fixed tenure, the order of repatriation or reversion can be questioned only when the order of reversion is malafide or is vitiated by legal malice. From a reading of the facts obtaining  in  the  citation  and the judgment cited supra, it is apparent that the Hon’ble Apex Court was primarily dealing with a case of  legal  malice, wherein the subsequent incumbent  was  promoted by the respondent-State in contravention of the rules. A reading of the paragraphs 27 to 31  clearly  demonstrates  that the issue, that was considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, was the malafide action of the Govt. in placing reliance on draft rules and further tinkering with Rules relating to promotion and the criteria prescribed under the existing rules.

In paragraph 31 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “31. In terms of Article 16 of the Constitution, the employees similarly situated cannot be discriminated. Employees having the same qualification, thus, must be considered by a duly constituted DPC consisting of the Chairman/Member, UPSC, Chief Secretary and Secretary (Works). It is unfortunate that the Government of Pondicherry instead and in place of asking UPSC to constitute a DPC for consideration of the cases of all eligible candidates, passed the order (vide letter dated 28-9-2005) on the same day on which the new rules came into effect, requesting UPSC to regularise the services of R. Sundar Raju as Chief Engineer from the date of his ad hoc promotion. Such an act betrays a lack of bona fides on the part of a State which is required to be performed in a fair and reasonable manner. It smacks of favouritism. Having regard to the unauthorised purpose for which the action has been taken, the same would attract the principle of malice in law.”

9. Nextly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the ruling of the Co-ordinate  Bench of  this court rendered in the case of D. Shivalingaih Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others, in W.P. No.58744/2015 the Co-ordinate Bench after placing reliance on the case on the ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in V. Ramakrishnan case was pleased to allow the petition and quash the order of reversion. The case of the petitioner and the case of D. Shivalingaih stated supra  are  distinguishable.  In  the  case of D. Shivalingah the petitioner’s tenure was for a fixed period of three years ……Hence, the Co-ordinate Bench placing reliance on the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 32 concluded that there could not have  been  curtailment  of  the period of deputation without assigning any reasons. In the instant case, both the order of deputation …and notification fixing the terms and conditions …clearly stipulates that the deputation is until further orders from the Govt. In view of the above, the petition being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS. CIVIL APPEAL NO.3630 of 2020 decided on 5 November 2020

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/25048/25048_2018_34_1501_24598_Judgement_05-Nov-2020.pdf

18. Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure while
    commenting on Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code
    defined cause of action in following words:-
    “The expression ’cause of action’ has
    acquired a judicially settled meaning. In
    the restricted sense ’cause of action’
    means the circumstances forming the
    infraction of the right or the immediate
    occasion for the action. In the wider
    sense, it means the necessary conditions
    for the maintenance of the suit, including
    not only the infraction of the right, but
    the infraction coupled with the right
    itself. Compendiously the expression means
    every fact by which it would be necessary
    for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
    in order to support his right to the
    judgment of the Court……………….”
19. P. Ramanatha Aiyar in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd
    Edition, Volume 1, has defined the cause of action in
    following words:-
    “’Cause of action’ has been defined as
    meaning simply a factual situation the
    19
    existence of which entitles one person to
    obtain from the Court a remedy against
    another person. The phrase has been held
    from earliest time to include every fact
    which is material to be proved to entitle
    the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact
    which a defendant would have a right to
    traverse. “Cause of action” has also been
    taken to mean that particular act on the
    part of the defendant which gives the
    plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the
    subject matter of the grievance founding
    the action, not merely the technical cause
    of action.”
20. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the cause of
    action in following words:-
    “A group of operative facts giving rise to
    one or more bases for suing; a factual
    situation that entitles one person to
    obtain a remedy in court from another
    person…………”
21. This Court had occasion to consider the cause of
    action in context of Article 266 of the Constitution
    and has explained the expression “cause of action” in
    large number of cases. We may refer to a Three Judge
    Bench judgment of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
    Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., (1994) 4
    SCC 711 where in paragraphs 5 and 6 following has
    been laid down:-
    “5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with
    a non obstante clause — notwithstanding
    20
    anything in Article 32 — and provides that
    every High Court shall have power
    “throughout the territories in relation to
    which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue
    to any person or authority, including in
    appropriate cases, any Government, “within
    those territories” directions, orders or
    writs, for the enforcement of any of the
    rights conferred by Part III or for any
    other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article
    226 the High Court may exercise its power
    conferred by clause (1) if the cause of
    action, wholly or in part, had arisen
    within the territory over which it
    exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding
    that the seat of such Government or
    authority or the residence of such person
    is not within those territories. On a
    plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses
    of Article 226 of the Constitution it
    becomes clear that a High Court can
    exercise the power to issue directions,
    orders or writs for the enforcement of any
    of the fundamental rights conferred by
    Part III of the Constitution or for any
    other purpose if the cause of action,
    wholly or in part, had arisen within the
    territories in relation to which it
    exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding
    that the seat of the Government or
    authority or the residence of the person
    against whom the direction, order or writ
    is issued is not within the said
    territories. In order to confer
    jurisdiction on the High Court of
    Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a
    part of the cause of action had arisen
    within the territorial jurisdiction of
    21
    that Court. That is at best its case in
    the writ petition.
22. It is well settled that the expression
    “cause of action” means that bundle of
    facts which the petitioner must prove, if
    traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in
    his favour by the Court. In Chand
    Kour v. Partab Singh [ILR (1889) 16 Cal
    98, 102 : 15 IA 156] Lord Watson said:
    “… the cause of action has no
    relation whatever to the defence
    which may be set up by the
    defendant, nor does it depend upon
    the character of the relief prayed
    for by the plaintiff. It refers
    entirely to the ground set forth
    in the plaint as the cause of
    action, or, in other words, to the
    media upon which the plaintiff
    asks the Court to arrive at a
    conclusion in his favour.”
    Therefore, in determining the objection of
    lack of territorial jurisdiction the court
    must take all the facts pleaded in support
    of the cause of action into consideration
    albeit without embarking upon an enquiry
    as to the correctness or otherwise of the
    said facts. In other words the question
    whether a High Court has territorial
    jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
    must be answered on the basis of the
    averments made in the petition, the truth
    or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To
    put it differently, the question of
    territorial jurisdiction must be decided
    on the facts pleaded in the petition.
    22
    Therefore, the question whether in the
    instant case the Calcutta High Court had
    jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
    writ petition in question even on the
    facts alleged must depend upon whether the
    averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22,
    26 and 43 are sufficient in law to
    establish that a part of the cause of
    action had arisen within the jurisdiction
    of the Calcutta High Court.”
23. This Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State
    of Maharashtra and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640 had
    occasion to consider territorial jurisdiction of High
    Court under Article 226(2). Dealing with
    constitutional amendment made in Article 226(2), this
    Court laid down following in paragraph 37:-
    “37. The object of the amendment by
    inserting clause (2) in the article was to
    supersede the decision of the Supreme
    Court in Election Commission v. Saka
    Venkata Subba Rao [AIR 1953 SC 210] and to
    restore the view held by the High Courts
    in the decisions cited above. Thus the
    power conferred on the High Courts under
    Article 226 could as well be exercised by
    any High Court exercising jurisdiction in
    relation to the territories within which
    “the cause of action, wholly or in part,
    arises” and it is no matter that the seat
    of the authority concerned is outside the
    territorial limits of the jurisdiction of
    that High Court. The amendment is thus
    aimed at widening the width of the area
    23
    for reaching the writs issued by different
    High Courts.”
24. It was further held that the collocation of the
    words “cause of action, wholly or in part, arises”
    seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code
    of Civil Procedure. This Court also quoted the
    definition of “cause of action” given by Lord Esher
    in Read Vs. Brown in paragraph 39. In paragraphs 38,
    39 and 41, following was laid down:-
    “38. “Cause of action” is a phenomenon
    well understood in legal parlance.
    Mohapatra, J. has well delineated the
    import of the said expression by referring
    to the celebrated lexicographies. The
    collocation of the words “cause of action,
    wholly or in part, arises” seems to have
    been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of
    Civil Procedure, which section also deals
    with the jurisdictional aspect of the
    courts. As per that section the suit could
    be instituted in a court within the legal
    limits of whose jurisdiction the “cause of
    action wholly or in part arises”. Judicial
    pronouncements have accorded almost a
    uniform interpretation to the said
    compendious expression even prior to the
    Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as
    to mean “the bundle of facts which would
    be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,
    if traversed, in order to support his
    right to the judgment of the court”.
    24
25. In Read v. Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 :
    58 LJQB 120 : 60 LT 250 (CA)] Lord Esher,
    M.R., adopted the definition for the
    phrase “cause of action” that it meant
    “every fact which it would be
    necessary for the plaintiff to
    prove, if traversed, in order to
    support his right to the judgment
    of the court. It does not
    comprise every piece of evidence
    which is necessary to prove each
    fact, but every fact which is
    necessary to be proved”.
26. Even in the context of Article 226(2)
    of the Constitution this Court adopted the
    same interpretation to the expression
    “cause of action, wholly or in part,
    arises” vide State of Rajasthan v. Swaika
    Properties [(1985) 3 SCC 217] . A threeJudge Bench of this Court in Oil and
    Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar
    Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] observed that it
    is well settled that the expression “cause
    of action” means that bundle of facts
    which the petitioner must prove, if
    traversed to entitle him to a judgment in
    his favour. Having given such a wide
    interpretation to the expression Ahmadi,
    J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
    speaking for M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and
    B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., utilised the
    opportunity to caution the High Courts
    against transgressing into the
    jurisdiction of the other High Courts
    merely on the ground of some insignificant
    event connected with the cause of action
    taking place within the territorial limits
    25
    of the High Court to which the litigant
    approaches at his own choice or
    convenience. The following are such
    observations. (SCC p. 722, para 12)
    “If an impression gains ground
    that even in cases which fall
    outside the territorial
    jurisdiction of the court, certain
    members of the court would be
    willing to exercise jurisdiction
    on the plea that some event,
    however trivial and unconnected
    with the cause of action had
    occurred within the jurisdiction
    of the said court, litigants would
    seek to abuse the process by
    carrying the cause before such
    members giving rise to avoidable
    suspicion. That would lower the
    dignity of the institution and put
    the entire system to ridicule. We
    are greatly pained to say so but
    if we do not strongly deprecate
    the growing tendency we will, we
    are afraid, be failing in our duty
    to the institution and the system
    of administration of justice. We
    do hope that we will not have
    another occasion to deal with such
    a situation.”
27. In Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair Vs. Narayanan Nair
    and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 277, this Court explained the
    expression “cause of action” and has quoted with
    26
    approval the cause of action as defined by Halsbury’s
    Laws of England in paragraph 16 and 17:-
    “16. The expression “cause of action” has
    acquired a judicially settled meaning. In
    the restricted sense cause of action means
    the circumstances forming the infraction
    of the right or the immediate occasion for
    the action. In the wider sense, it means
    the necessary conditions for the
    maintenance of the suit, including not
    only the infraction of the right, but the
    infraction coupled with the right itself.
    Compendiously the expression means every
    fact which would be necessary for the
    plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
    to support his right to the judgment of
    the court. Every fact which is necessary
    to be proved, as distinguished from every
    piece of evidence which is necessary to
    prove each fact, comprises in “cause of
    action”.
28. In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th
    Edn.) it has been stated as follows:
    “‘Cause of action’ has been
    defined as meaning simply a
    factual situation the existence of
    which entitles one person to
    obtain from the court a remedy
    against another person. The phrase
    has been held from earliest time
    to include every fact which is
    material to be proved to entitle
    the plaintiff to succeed, and
    every fact which a defendant would
    have a right to traverse. ‘Cause
    27
    of action’ has also been taken to
    mean that particular act on the
    part of the defendant which gives
    the plaintiff his cause of
    complaint, or the subject-matter
    of grievance founding the action,
    not merely the technical cause of
    action.”
29. Another judgment which needs to be noticed is
    Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
    Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254 wherein this Court reiterated
    the meaning of cause of action in paragraph 6. This
    Court reiterated that even if a small fraction of
    cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of
    the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the
    matter. In paragraph 18, following was held:-
    “18. The facts pleaded in the writ
    petition must have a nexus on the basis
    whereof a prayer can be granted. Those
    facts which have nothing to do with the
    prayer made therein cannot be said to give
    rise to a cause of action which would
    confer jurisdiction on the Court.”
30. Another judgment which has been relied by learned
    counsel for the appellant is Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs.
    Union of India and Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 329. In the
    above case, the petitioner had filed a writ petition
    seeking various reliefs including disability
    28
    compensation and pecuniary damages. The petitioner
    approached the Patna High Court for grant of various
    reliefs. Although, he was declared unqualified by
    orders issued by the Shipping Department, Government
    of India, Mumbai. This Court held that Patna High
    Court has a jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
    Following was laid down in paragraph 17:-
    “17. We have perused the facts pleaded in
    the writ petition and the documents relied
    upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the
    appellant reported sickness on account of
    various ailments including difficulty in
    breathing. He was referred to hospital.
    Consequently, he was signed off for
    further medical treatment. Finally, the
    respondent permanently declared the
    appellant unfit for sea service due to
    dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle
    disease). As a result, the Shipping
    Department of the Government of India
    issued an Order on 12-4-2011 cancelling
    the registration of the appellant as a
    seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to
    the appellant at his native place in Bihar
    where he was staying after he was found
    medically unfit. It further appears that
    the appellant sent a representation from
    his home in the State of Bihar to the
    respondent claiming disability
    compensation. The said representation was
    replied by the respondent, which was
    addressed to him on his home address in
    Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for
    disability compensation. It is further
    evident that when the appellant was signed
    off and declared medically unfit, he
    returned back to his home in the district
    of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made
    29
    all claims and filed representation from
    his home address at Gaya and those letters
    and representations were entertained by
    the respondents and replied and a decision
    on those representations were communicated
    to him on his home address in Bihar.
    Admittedly, the appellant was suffering
    from serious heart muscle disease (dilated
    cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem
    which forced him to stay in his native
    place, wherefrom he had been making all
    correspondence with regard to his
    disability compensation. Prima facie,
    therefore, considering all the facts
    together, a part or fraction of cause of
    action arose within the jurisdiction of
    the Patna High Court where he received a
    letter of refusal disentitling him from
    disability compensation.”
31. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed
    reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Patna High
    court in Saryu Singh Vs. The Union of India and Ors.,
    2015(2) PLJR 256. The above was a case where the
    petitioner had claimed the due pensionary benefits
    whose grievance was that payment made to him was less
    payment. In the above context, the Division Bench in
    paragraphs 63, 64 and 66 laid down following:-
    “63. Recently pointed out the Supreme
    Court, in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of
    India, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329, that
    the question, whether or not cause of
    action, wholly or in part, has arisen
    within the territorial limit of any High
    Court, shall have to be decided in the
    30
    light of the nature and character of the
    proceedings under Article 226 of the
    Constitution of India. In order to
    maintain a writ petition, the petitioner
    has to establish that a legal right
    claimed by him has been infringed by the
    respondents within the territorial limit
    of the Court’s jurisdiction.
32. In the backdrop of the position of
    law, as discussed above, it needs to be
    noted that the writ petitioner was,
    admittedly, an employee of Coal India
    Limited and as per the terms and
    conditions of his employment, the writ
    petitioner, as an employee, is,
    admittedly, required to be paid his
    pension and pensionery benefits by his
    employer at Patna.
33. If, therefore, the writ petitioner is
    not paid the sum of money, which is due
    and payable to him as pension and
    pensionery benefits, at Patna, it becomes
    obvious that his right to receive due and
    payable pension and pensionery benefits,
    at Patna, is being denied; consequently
    the infringement of his right or his
    sufferance of injury is at Patna.”
34. The above judgment of the same High Court was
    relevant in the facts of the present case, which
    judgment although was delivered prior in time, but
    was not noticed by the learned Single Judge as well
    as the Division Bench.

Dalmiya Cement Venture Limited vs The State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 104140/2013 decided on 22 August 2017.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/183184/1/WP104140-13-22-08-2017.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 7. It is significant to note that the respondent No.4 admitted the excess stamp duty paid by the petitioner.

9 . The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries  Ltd  V/s  Union  of  India,  reported  in  (1997)  5 Supreme Court Cases 536, has held thus; “Any provision appearing or trying to bar recovery of illegally collected tax is violative of Article 265 of the Constitution and must be struck down. Once it is established that more than what is payable under the statute has been collected from the taxpayer, the taxpayer automatically gets a right to get back the whole amount. If the right is sought to be effectively taken away by imposing conditions, then the law imposing these conditions must be declared to be bad and ultra vires the Constitution. There is another aspect of this matter. The Exercise Officer cannot tax more than what is permitted by the statute. If the levy is in excess of the statute, then its retention by the State is unauthorised by law. What is being retained is not in enforcement of the charging section but something else. Such illegally collected tax the money has to be utilised by the State and is not within the disposing power of the State. If the money has to be utilised by the State, the State has to find out some legitimacy for having possession of the money. Protection under Article 265 afforded to the citizens from State oppression in financial matters. Article 265 must be implemented in letter and spirit as it stands and all the tax laws and all Government actions to realise and retain tax must be tested on the anvil of this guarantee. The courts should jealously guard against any attempt to whittle down or do away with any of the guarantees given under the Constitution to the citizens. If any law is passed for retention of illegal levy, it must be struck down. If the Court comes to the conclusion that a levy of tax is unlawful, the Court will direct the Government to return the tax. It is not for the Court to enquire how the taxpayer has managed his affairs after payment of the unlawful levy. The Court cannot, by torturing the language of Article 265 or by any other means, construe it so as to give it a meaning which it does not naturally bear.”

10. In the light of the said judgment, it can be held that no unjust enrichment can be appreciated, as recovery or accepting the duty in excess of what is authorised by law would be against the mandate of Article 265 of the Constitution of India. No amount received in excess than what is stipulated chargeable can be retained by the authorities. The same would be construed as the amount collected without authority of law which is wholly unsustainable. There is no question of petitioner being charged. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner paid excess stamp duty to an extent of 1%, the same cannot be retained by the authorities, despite the application made by the petitioner for the refund of the excess amount within the period stipulated under section 44 of the Act. The authorities are bound to refund the excess stamp duty collected in terms of section 44 (2) of the Act.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Late Laxman Lakkappa Durgannavar by lrs. vs Yellawwa and others. Regular Second Appeal 2221/2005 decided on 12 March 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/333167/1/RSA2221-05-12-03-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: …17. The Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 creates an embargo on transfer of land within 15 years from the date of the order of Land Tribunal. The language used in Section 61 of the Act would also disclose that the legislature has imposed a restriction on transfer of land. Erstwhile tenant, who has become occupant of land, is prohibited from selling land within 15 years from the date of final order passed by the Tribunal. Sale made in contravention of prohibition being invalid, would invite the State Government to resume the land free from all encumbrances, for granting same to other landless persons eligible for occupancy.

21. The law on the subject has been recently stated by Justice B.R. Gavai in NARAYANAMMA AND ANOTHER VS. GOVINDAPPA AND OTHERS 2019 AIAR(Civil) 1031. The Apex Court at paragraph 23 has held that the transaction i.e., agreement for sale is nothing short of a transfer of property. Under Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, there is a complete prohibition of transfer of land for a period of 15 years from the date of grant. I respectfully agree with the statement of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

23. I, come therefore, to the conclusion that the agreement for sale is hit by Section 61 of the Karnataka Land   Reforms   Act,   1961.      Accordingly,   the   second substantial question of law is answered.

25. Section 53-A (of the Transfer of Property Act) was first enacted in 1929 by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929, and imports into India a modified form of the equity of part performance as developed in England in Maddison Vs Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas 467. The Section has been described by the Privy Council in PIR BUX, khan Bahadur Mian V. MOHOMED TAHAR, Sardar reported in AIR 1934 PC 235 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MANEKLAL MANSUKHBHAI VS HONNUUSJI JAMSHEDJI reported in AIR 1950 SC 1, as a partial importation of the English equitable doctrine of part performance. By virtue of Section 53-A of Transfer of property Act, part performance does not give rise to an equity, as in England, but to a statutory right. This right is more restricted than the English equity in two respects, (1) there must be a written contract, and (2) it is only available as a defence. So far as India is concerned, the section creates rights which were not in existence before the enactment was passed. These rights to retain possession rest on the express provisions of the statute. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act insists upon proof of some acts having been done in furtherance of the contract. The acts claimed to be in part performance must be unequivocally referable to the pre-existing contract, and point in the direction of the existence of contract.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

28. But, I have no doubt in my mind that the doctrine of part performance could have no place in the present case as defendant is seeking protection of his possession on the basis of an agreement for sale which is hit by Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. All said and done, a prospective purchaser cannot utilize the agreement for sale (with possession) as protection of possession under section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act. A transfer in contravention of Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 being void, Section 53- A of the said Act cannot be invoked in such a case.

Rakesh vs The State of Karnataka and others. Criminal Petition 2072/2020 & connected cases decided on 22 October 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/346590/1/CRLP2972-20-22-10-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: Paragraph 10. On close reading of the Post Mortem Report, it indicates that the deceased has suffered with 16 serious injuries inflicted on his body and contents of the complaint clearly goes to show that the petitioner/accused No.2 and other police officials went to the house of the complainant and brought him along with them and intimated the complainant that after an enquiry within few minutes, they will send back the deceased to her house. Even on the next day, the deceased was not sent back and when the complainant went to the police station, the deceased was being assaulted and the complainant was also abused by taking the name of her caste. The police officials went and took the deceased to their custody and the deceased has suffered with so many injuries. Under such circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the deceased was in police custody, at that time, he was inhumanly assaulted and was caused with multiple injuries. Though, it is contended during the course of the argument that the deceased himself tried to run away and fell into the well. As rightly pointed out by the learned High Court Government Pleader that specification of the well where the deceased is said to have jumped, is not a usual well and it is covered with bush. Under such circumstances, it cannot be even unimagined held that it is an accidental fall, when he was running from the custody of the police station. If really, the deceased was trying to run away from the Police Station, there are so many other alternatives available for the police to prevent him from running away. Without using such methods, they have taken a defence of he jumping into the well. Be that as it may. The police officials have not made any efforts to prevent him from jumping into the well. Even there is no explanation abut 16 injuries found over the body of the deceased that too when he was in Police custody. Under such circumstances, it creates doubt on the submission made by the learned counsel that he tried to run away from Police Station and in that light, he fell into the well. Though, it is contended by the learned counsel for petitioner Nos.4, 5 and 6 that no serious overt acts  have been alleged against them and they were not SHO or Station in-charge as per Section 167 of Cr.P.C but the deceased was in the police custody and specific allegations have been made as against each of the accused persons for having assaulted the deceased. I have also perused statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. which has been made available by the Investigating Officer and there also it is found that some overt acts have been alleged as against the petitioners/accused Nos.2, 4, 5 and 6. Under such circumstances, it is considered to be a serious act. Being the police officials they cannot take law into their own hand and assault a person who is taken to the police custody. If the persons who are there to protect the rights and interest of general public and if they do such activities, ultimately it has resulted into death of an innocent person. The act of the Police Officials is like “fence itself eating the crop”, then under such circumstances, it cannot be taken lightly and it cannot be held that the petitioners/accused are not involved in the alleged offence that too they have come up before this Court under the pretext of seeking anticipatory bail.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Gangamma vs Rangaiah and others. Writ Petition 15209/2015 decided on 21 October 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/346526/1/WP15209-15-21-10-2020.pdf

Facts: In a suit for declaration, the plaintiff wanted to produce unregistered release deed in which there was an admission regarding the will under which the plaintiff claimed ownership. The trial court rejected the prayer.

Relevant Paragraphs: 11. It is trite law that any document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish  any right, title or interest, in respect of an immovable property having a value of more than one hundred  rupees is compulsorily required to be registered as envisaged under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

17. As could be seen from Section 49 of the Act, any document which is required to be registered under  Section 17 of the Act shall have no effect on any immovable property nor will it confer any power  to  adopt.

18. Sub-section (c) of Section 49 of the Act bars receiving a document which is not registered  as  evidence, if it is required to be compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Act or under the provisions of   the Transfer of property Act.

19. Section 17 of the Act mandates that documents relating to gift of immovable property or non testamentary instruments which create a transfer of interest in an immovable property having a value  of  more than Rs.100/- will have to be compulsorily registrable.

21. However, Sub-section (c) of Section 49 of the Act is subject to the proviso that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the Act or by the Transfer of Property Act to be registered can be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act. The said proviso also states that an unregistered document can be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.

22. In other words, an unregistered document which normally cannot be received in evidence  can  nevertheless be received as evidence of any collateral transaction, which by itself, is not required to be effected by way of a registered instrument. To put it differently, if an unregistered document contains two transactions, one of which is required to be effected by means of a registered instrument and another transaction which is not required to be effected by any registered instrument, then the said unregistered instrument can be received as evidence of that collateral transaction. It is  therefore clear that only to this limited extent, an unregistered instrument can be received in evidence i.e., to evidence   a collateral transaction which by itself is not required to be effected by a registered instrument.

26. In my view, since the sub-section (c) of Section 49 of the Act and its proviso consciously uses the phrase ”evidence of any transaction affecting such property” and “evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument” it will have to be held that the only possible interpretation is that an unregistered document can be received as evidence in respect of any other fact which does not involve a  transfer of property (which would otherwise require registration    compulsorily).        In other words, an unregistered document can be received as evidence of some other fact which does not relate to a transfer of an interest in an immovable property.

28. Thus, if an unregistered instrument is to be  received in evidence, then, the document  can  be received in evidence only for the limited extent  of  proving a transaction or a fact which does not relate to a transfer of an interest in an immovable property.

29. I may, however, add that the Court, while receiving the said unregistered document would have to  necessarily specify that the document was  being  received only for the purpose of proving some other fact which was unrelated to the transfer of interest in an immovable property and the Court should specifically mark only that portion of the unregistered document and also specify the purpose for which it was being marked. The Court should also specifically record that the document cannot and should not be used as proof of anything connected to the transfer of an immovable property.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal