K.P. Ravikumar vs The State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 9300/2020 decided on 28 September 2020.

Judgment Link http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/343172/1/WP9300-20-28-09-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that even though land was notified for acquisition in the year 1999, it has not been followed by issuance of final notification under Section 28(3) of ‘the Act’, 1966 till date. The impugned preliminary notification has lapsed by operation of law since the final notification which should have been issued within a reasonable time has not been issued till date.

10….The final notification will have to be issued within reasonable time, if period of limitation is not prescribed under the KIAD Act. In the instant case, even after a lapse of twenty years, final notification has not been issued. The decisions rendered in the case of M.N.Shivanna and Others supra and W.A.No.2402/2014 are squarely applicable to the case on hand. The impugned preliminary notification as such has lapsed by operation of law since the Respondents have abandoned the land from acquisition.

11. On the question of maintainability of the writ petition, learned counsel for KIADB has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case SHIV KUMAR & ANOTHER (2019) 10 SCC 229…..The view taken by the Apex Court was taken in the context of Section 11(3) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 which is akin to Section of 4 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . The said provision contains a prohibition that no person shall cause any transaction of land or create any encumbrance on the land specified in the preliminary notification without the prior permission of the competent authority.

12. ..Under the KIAD Act, there is no restriction for alienating the land specified in the preliminary notification. The Karnataka Land (Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1991 which imposes restriction on transfer of lands applies only to Bangalore Development Act, 1976 and Karnataka Urban Development Act, 1987. Even assuming that the act is applicable to the proposed acquisition under KIAD Act, it is only after publication of declaration under Section 28(3) of the Act, the land specified in said final declaration cannot be transferred without the permission from the competent authority. Further, there cannot be an indefinite embargo on the owner of the land to alienate his land.

Preliminary notification quashed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Master Bharath S vs The Secretary, Education Department and Others. Writ Petition 10051/2020 decided 9 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348186/1/WP10051-20-09-11-2020.pdf

Prayer in the Writ Petition – for direction to the second respondent-Examination Board to dispense with the requirement of final examination, treating his performance in the Preparatory Examination itself as the final one, since he is a chronic patient of “OSTEOGENESIS IMPERFECTA”, with 75% physically disability.

Relevant Paragraphs: 3(a) “OSTEOGENESIS IMPERFECTA” (OI) is explained by standard medical text books as a group of genetic disorders that mainly affect the bones; the term literally means an imperfect bone formation, since it  results  in bones that break easily; this is believed to be caused by defective genes that affect how the body makes collagen, a protein that is associated with the formation and strengthening of the bones;

3(c) ….Court cannot turn Nelson’s Eye to the suffering of the students who are struck with this tortuous disease that lasts for the life, medication for its mitigation arguably not yielding much relief; the authentic  medical  literature  which  the  counsel for the petitioner has produced warrants a soft approach to the students who are victimized by this disease; the Apex Court in STATE OF RAJASTHAN vs. OM PRAKASH, (2002) 5 SCC 745 has stressed the need for a sensitive approach when dealing with the matter relating to children; the Office Memorandum dated 26.02.2013 issued by the Government of India empowers the school/examination authorities to accord reprieve to such students by making appropriate provision.

3(d) The Government being the guardian of the citizens vide parens patria has shown an appreciable  gesture in formulating a humane policy through the said O.M.; consistent with this policy, the  authorities  responsible for conduct of examinations have to show relaxation and reprieve to the suffering students of  the  kind;

Writ of Mandamus issues to the second respondent to extend to the petitioner and other similarly circumstanced candidates the relaxation by elongating the duration of final examination of X Standard through additional two hours; discretion lies with the authorities to grant longer extension as well keeping in view the degree of disability, subject to the rider that this concession is not abused by the unscrupulous.

Note: The Honorable Court made reference to: ‘No Child Left Behind Act of 2001’ and its improved version ie., ‘Every Student Succeeds Act, 2015’ enacted by the US Congress (Parliament), keeping with the Human Rights Jurisprudence; there are several international conventions which deal with Child Rights and more particularly differently  abled  juveniles;  the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 2006 is ratified by India; Article 24 of the same provides that education shall be without discrimination and shall be on the basis of equal opportunity and further that the Government shall ensure an inclusive education system at all levels; the UN Millenium Development Goal (MDGs) includes access to and completion of universal primary education by 2015 providing a basic policy framework for including the children with special needs and disabilities till the age of 18 years; in fact the Central Government through the Ministry of Human Resource Development has initiated a new scheme called ‘Integrated Education for Disabled Children in Secondary Schools’ (IEDSS) with the main objective of providing equal educational opportunities even for children with disabilities in the regular school system from 9th Std. to PUC; such protective measures ensure that the diseased/disabled children do not lag behind in the academic race, which neo educationists often brand as ‘mad rat race of life’.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Ms. X vs State of Karnataka and another. Criminal Petition 4598/2020 decided on 5 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348258/1/CRLP4598-20-05-11-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 8 &20 The Apex Court also in the similar circumstances in the case of Chandrakeshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar and Anr. in Criminal Appeal No.932/2016 and State of Bihar v. Md. Shahabuddin in Criminal Appeal No.933/2016 decided on 30.09.2016, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 443 held that the suppression of material facts before the Court regarding the several criminal antecedents of the accused while obtaining the order of bail makes the aforesaid order vitiated. No doubt, the State while considering the earlier bail petition did not bring it to the notice of this Court about the pendency of several cases against this petitioner. Merely registering of several cases against respondent No.2 is not a ground to invoke Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. While exercising the power under Section 439 (2) of Cr.P.C., the Court has to look into the material available on record.

23. Merely because the prosecution has failed to bring out the said cases which are pending against him while considering the bail petition, the same cannot be a ground for canceling the same. The Apex Court, in Neeru Yadav’s case taking note of the fact that he was a history-sheeter and involved in murder and dacoity cases, has invoked Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C.

24. To invoke Section 439 (2) of Cr.P.C., there must be material before the Court to show that there is violation of conditions of the bail order granted or the accused is coming in the way of trial. Mere filing of cases is not a ground to come to the conclusion that he is a habitual offender and he has to be tried and found material that he is having criminal antecedents and having considered the nature of cases registered against  him and the offences invoked against him, it requires full fledged trial to ascertain the truth. The judgments of Chandrakeshwar Prasad and Shahabuddin cases do not assist the case of the petitioner to invoke Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. When no such circumstances have been made out in the case on hand, this Court is not inclined to exercise powers conferred under Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C.

25. In the absence of any cogent material on record, the liberty of any person as envisaged under Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed on the mere ground of number of cases being pending against him. It is settled law that Section 439(2) of Cr.P.C. has to be invoked in exceptional cases when it causes miscarriage of justice, if it is not invoked and the same has to be exercised sparingly and not mere asking of the cancellation of bail.

Petition dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

U.M. Ramesh Rao and others vs Union Bank of India. Writ Petition 12461/2020 decided on 13 November 2020.

Judgments: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348187/1/WP12461-20-13-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 12. In the case of, United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tandon and others it is held that when a particular Legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of grievance, High Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

13.… it is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party when the law stands well settled. In financial matters, grant of ex parte interim orders can have deleterious effect. Loans from Financial Institution are granted by public money generated at tax payers’ expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan but retains its character of public money given in the fiduciary capacity.

Admittedly, Bank has initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act. Petitioners’ remedy lies in an appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. In view of this  settled position, this petition must fail and it is accordingly dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

K.C. Kondaiah and others vs The State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 7987/2020 decided on 13:11:2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348185/1/WP7987-20-13-11-2020.pdf

ORDER 1. We hold that in view of the Constitutional mandate of clause (3) of Article 243E, it is the mandatory duty of  the SEC to complete elections of a Grama Panchayat before its term is over;

2. It is only in very exceptional circumstances that the SEC can conduct elections after expiry of the term of Panchayat. Whether such exceptional circumstances exist or not is a matter within the exclusive domain of the SEC. The State Government plays no role in deciding whether  such exceptional circumstances are  in existence. For deciding whether such circumstances are in existence, it is always open for the SEC to  consult the Government on factual aspects;

3. We, therefore, direct the State Election Commission to finalize the schedule of elections of  Grama  Panchayats. The SEC shall announce the schedule of the Panchayat Elections within three weeks from today;

4. Needless to add that the State Government is under an obligation to provide necessary funds to the SEC for holding of Grama Panchayat elections;

5.The writ petition is partly allowed on the above terms.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

M.F.A. No. 6390/2019 and connected matters. Order dated 22.10.2020

Link to Order: https://karnatakajudiciary.kar.nic.in/noticeBoard/MFA%206390-2019-and-con.pdf

Guidelines Issued:

(i) The Registry shall not raise an objection (item no.11 in
Form No.14) regarding failure to mention the age of a party in
the cause title so long as the parties are described either as
“major” or “minor.” If a party wants to claim the benefit of being
a senior citizen, he/she must state the age;

(ii) The objection regarding non-compliance of item no.12
in Form No.14 shall not be raised;

(iii) The objection regarding item no.35 in Form No.14
shall not be raised if I.A for bringing on record or a supporting
affidavit contains a statement either mentioning the date of
death of a party, or that the applicant is not aware of the date of
death;

(iv) The objection regarding item no.29 in Form No.14
shall not be raised;

(v) The objection regarding item nos.37 and 40 of Form
No.14 shall not be raised;

(vi) When a case can be heard without a party rectifying
a particular non-essential objection, it is the duty of the Court to
waive such objection and proceed to hear the case on the
merits.

In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the Registrar (Judicial) will issue necessary directions to the Appeal Examiners and other staff members in the light of what we have laid down in this decision.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Fine Footwear Private Limited v. Skechers U.S.A. Inc. Writ Petition No. 23009 of 2019 (GM-CPC). Decided on July 15, 2019.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/280393/1/WP23009-19-15-07-2019.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 7. The contention of the respondent side that the commercial dispute is triable by ordinary civil court unless the specified value of its subject matter is not less than three lakh rupees, needs to be accepted because the suit of the respondents, going by the text & context of the plaint in general and its prayer columns in particular, is principally for an injunctive relief; that at paragraph No. 80 of the plaint, respondents have currently valued the subject matter of their suit at Rs. 2,000/- and have paid a Court Fee of Rs. 150/- presuraably under Section 26 of KCF & SV Act, 1958; apparently, they have not stated anything about specified value of the subject of the “Commercial Dispute”.

8. In KALLA YADAGIRI v. KHOTADAL REDILIY, 1999 (1) ALT 211 FB, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has crisply stated as under: “What decides the jurisdiction with regard to a particular case is the nature of claim as brought. The plaintiff is bound to assess the relief he claims on the basis of the benefit he seeks to obtain by filing the suit… In a suit for injunction simplicitor, it is the value of the relief claimed and not on the value of the property involved… suffice it to say that the proper method is to value for the Court fees first and take that value for the purpose of jurisdiction, for, value will control the matter for Court fees and jurisdiction. It is not the value of the thing affected that settles the value of relief sought, but it is the value of the relief sought, which determines the jurisdiction “Subject matter” is not the same thing as property. Subject matter is the substance for adjudication and it has reference to the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce and the valuation of the suit depends upon the value of the subject matter thereof…”

9. The High Court of Delhi in the case of MRS. SONI DHAWE v. TRANS ASIAN INDUSTRIES EXPOSITIONS PVT. LTD., AIR 2016 DELHI 186 at has observed as under: “The Commercial Courts has not been enacted to interfere with the Court Fees Act or Suits Valuation Act … Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act providing for determination of specified value as defined in Section 2(1)(i) thereof is not intended to provide for a new mode of determining the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fees. It would be incongruous to hold that while for the purpose of payment of court fees the deemed fiction provided in the Court Fees Act for determining the value of property is to apply but not for determining the specified value under the Commercial Courts Act… Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act has to be read harmoniously with the Court Fees Act & Suits Valuation Act…”

10. It has been a well settled position of law that the plaintiff being the dominus litis has the prerogative of choosing the Court and determine the valuation of the suit for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction, special jurisdiction or for computation of court fees; the opposing party cannot insist that the suit be tried before some other Court without establishing the lack of jurisdiction of the Court in which the cause is brought; the suit involves a commercial dispute, is true; but, there is no material placed on record to prima facie show that its specified value is Rupees Three Lakh or above, in terms of Section 2(1)(i) r/w Section 12 of the 2015 Act. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in RFA No. 1/2015 in the case of KIRLOSKAR AAF LIMITED v. AMERICAN AIR FILTERS COMPANY INC vide judgment dated 25.09.2018 at paragraph No. 8 observed “the twin requirements of this Act are that a dispute has to be a Commercial Dispute and secondly it must he of a certain pecuniary limit, namely Rupees Three Lakh or above…” In other words, the Commercial Courts have jurisdiction only in such matters which pass the Twin Test i.e., existence of a “Commercial Dispute” as defined under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) and the “Specified Value” as defined under Section 2(c)(i) r/w Section 12 of the 2015 Act. In the present writ petition, although the suit involves a Commercial Dispute, the subject matter of the suit is apparently less than the Specified Value. To put it succinctly, the commercial courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction if both the commercial dispute and specified value concur to exist and not just one of them, as rightly contended by learned Sr. Counsel for the respondent.

11. The jurisdiction of the Courts to try all suits of civil nature is very expansive as is evident from the plain language of Sec.9 CPC, 1908. This is because of the principle ubi jus ibi remedrum; it is only where cognizance of a specified type of a suit is barred by a statute either expressly or impliedly that the jurisdiction of the civil court would be ousted to entertain such a suit; the general principle is that a statute excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts should be construed stricto sensu; Zaw abhors ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts; the English and Indian decisions in this regard galore and need hardly to be mentioned.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Vijayalaxmi Shetty vs Kochu Shetty. Criminal Appeal 1141/2010 decided on 11 November 2020. Justice H.P. Sandesh.

Judgement Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348103/1/CRLA1141-10-11-11-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 68. The principles laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment in the case of Subramanian Swamy (supra) in respect of reputation is concerned, is aptly applicable to the case on hand. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sukhwant Singh (supra) is clear that the reputation of a  person is his valuable asset, and is a facet of his right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as held in the case of Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14. Making any allegation of unchastity against a woman amounts to bringing down the reputation of the womanhood, as held by the Madras High Court, Bombay High Court, Allahabad High Court and Calcutta High Court.

69 & 70. This Court would like to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Abdulla khan. The Apex Court in paragraph No.10 of the said judgment referring to provisions of Section 499 of IPC analyzed that to constitute an offence of defamation it requires a person to make some imputation concerning any other person. imputation must be made either with intention, knowledge, or having a reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of a person against whom the imputation is made. It is also observed that imputation could be by words, either spoken or written or by making signs or visible representation and imputation could be either made or published. It is also important to note that in the case on hand, though the same is not published in any paper, the accused made the imputation in the said letters addressing the same to the complainant and the Bank wherein the complainant was working. Hence, the very finding of the Appellate Court that there was no material before the Court for publication cannot be accepted.

It is clear that imputation could be either made or published and it is not necessary that there must be a publication and if anything is spoken or written or by making signs with intention, knowledge, having a reason to believe that such an imputation will harm the reputation of the person, that itself is enough to come to the conclusion that the same is made with an intention and knowledge to disrepute the reputation of a person. The Apex Court held that the essence of publication in the context of Section 499 of IPC is the communication of defamatory imputation to persons other than the persons against whom the imputation is made by referring the judgment in the cases of Khima Nand v. Emperor reported in 1936 SCC Online All 307 and Amar Singh v. K.S. Badalia reported in 1964 SCC Online Pat 186. Hence, it is clear that the  Appellate Court has committed an error in reversing the finding of the Trial Court in coming to the conclusion that there is no publication. The very approach of the Appellate Court is erroneous.

73. This Court has already referred the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Abdulla khan (supra) and particularly referred to paragraph No.10 and has observed that in order to invoke Section 499 of IPC, it is not necessary that it should be published, but if it is gone to the knowledge of any other person other than the complainant, that itself is enough to invoke Section 499 of IPC. Hence, the Appellate Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 499 of IPC. Hence, the judgment of the Trial Court has to be restored.

also see other paragraphs in the judgment.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Abudl Shukoor vs Samad Pasha and another. Writ Petition 204679/2018 decided on 18 October 2019.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/305024/1/WP204679-18-18-10-2019.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 8. Insofar as the legal contention urged by the petitioner is concerned, the issue is no more res integra in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rasiklal and Manickchand Dhariwal and Others vs. M.S.S.Food  Products (2012) 2 SCC 196 wherein a contention was advanced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Order IX Rule 7 of CPC do not take away the right of the defendants to participate in further proceedings of the case if the defendants appear on subsequent dates before pronouncement of the judgment. The said plea was advanced based on the decisions of the various High Courts, but the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.34 and 35 of the judgment negated the contentions and held as under:

’34. The contention, at the first blush, appears to be attractive but has no substance at all. In the first place, once the hearing of the suit is concluded; and the suit is closed for judgment, Order IX Rule 7 of the Code has no application at all. The very language of Order IX Rule 7 makes this clear. This provision pre- supposes the suit having been adjourned for hearing. The courts, time out of number, have said that adjournment for the purposes of pronouncing judgment is no adjournment of the ‘hearing of the suit’. On March  17,2005, the trial Court in the present case did four things namely, (i)closed the evidence of the Plaintiff as was requested by the plaintiff; (ii) ordered the suit to proceed ex-parte as Defendants failed to appear on that date; (iii) heard the arguments of the Advocate for the Plaintiff; and (iv) kept the matter for pronouncement of judgment on March 28, 2005. In view of the above, Order IX Rule 7 of the Code has no application at all and it is for this reason that the application made by the defendants under this provision was rejected by the trial Court.

35. Secondly, once the suit is closed for pronouncement of judgment, there is no question of further proceedings in the suit. Merely, because the defendants continued to make application after application and the trial Court heard those applications, it cannot be said that such appearance by the Defendants is covered by the expression “appeared on the day fixed for his appearance” occurring in Order IX Rule 7 of the Code and thereby entitling them to address the Court on the merits of the case.  The judgment of Bombay High Court  in Radhabai Bhaskar Sakharam AIR (1922) Bom 345 on which reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, does not support the legal position canvassed by him. Rather in Radhabai Bhaskar Sakharam AIR (1922) Bom 345, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that if a party did not appear before the suit was heard, then he had no right to be heard. This is clear from the following statement in the judgment:….….Until a suit is actually called on, a party is entitled to appear and defend. It may be that he is guilty of delay and if that is the case he may be mulcted in costs. But if he does not appear before the suit is heard, then he has no right to be heard….”

9. Even in this decision the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arjun Singh’s case has been reiterated in paragraph No.41 and the proposition laid down therein has been reproduced as under:

41. ….On the terms of Order IX, Rule 7 if the Defendant appears on such adjourned date and satisfies the Court by showing good cause for his non-appearance on the previous day or days he might have the earlier proceedings recalled- “set the clock back” and have the suit heard in his presence. On the other hand, he might  fail in showing good cause. Even in such a case he  is not penalized in the sense of being forbidden to take part in the further proceedings of the suit or whatever might still remain of the trial, only he cannot claim to be relegated to the position that he occupied at the commencement of the trial. Thus every contingency which is likely to happen in the trial vis-à-vis the non- appearance of the defendant at the hearing of a suit has been provided for and Order IX Rule 7 and Order IX, Rule 13 between them exhaust the whole gamut of situations that might arise during the course of the trial. If, thus, provision has been made for every contingency, it stands to reason that there is no scope for the invocation of the inherent powers of the Court to make an order necessary for the ends of justice. Mr. Pathak, however, strenuously contended that a case of the sort now on hand where a Defendant appeared after the conclusion of the hearing but before the pronouncing of the judgment had not been provided for. We consider that the suggestion that there is such a stage is, on the scheme of the Code, wholly unrealistic. In the present context when once the hearing starts, the Code contemplates only two stages in the trial of the suit: (1) where the hearing is adjourned or (2) where the hearing is completed. Where the hearing is completed the parties have no further rights or privileges in the matter and it is only for the convenience of the Court that Order XX, Rule 1 permits judgment to be delivered after an interval after the hearing is completed. It would, therefore, follow that after the stage contemplated by Order IX, Rule 7 is passed the next stage is only the passing of a decree which on the terms of Order IX, Rule 6 the Court is competent to pass. And then follows the remedy of the party to have that decree set aside by application under Order IX, Rule 13. There is thus no hiatus between the two stages of reservation of judgment and pronouncing the judgment so as to make it necessary for the Court to afford to the party the remedy of getting orders passed on the lines of Order IX Rule 7……

In the light of the above settled proposition, the first contention urged by the petitioner is liable to be rejected.

Compiled by S.Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Navid vs The State of Karnataka. Criminal Petition 201277/2019 decided on 16 October 2019.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/302987/1/CRLP201277-19-16-10-2019.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is ready and willing to execute personal bond in a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- with two solvent sureties. However, to furnish a local surety is not feasible since  the  petitioner  is   from  Gulbarga.   

7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dataram Singh vs. State of Uttar  Pradesh  and  another  reported  in (2018) ACR 178 has held that conditions for grant of  bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of compliance thereby, making grant of bail illusory. The Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-7 of the said judgment has observed as under:

“7. However, we should not be understood to mean that bail should be granted in every case. The grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the discretion of the judge hearing the matter and though that discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and in a humane manner and compassionately. Also, conditions for  the  grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of compliance, thereby making the grant of bail illusory.”

8. The learned Sessions Judge has already directed the petitioner to execute personal bond in a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- with two solvent sureties and also imposed other conditions. In view of the same, directing the petitioner to furnish a local surety may not be necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case.