Anjanappa and another vs United India Insurance Company Ltd and others. Writ Petition 6098/2014 decided on 8 October 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/346289/1/WP6098-14-08-10-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 7. Chapter XII of MV Act, 1988 deals with Claims Tribunals. Section 166 relates to Application for Compensation and Section 173 relates to Appeals. There is no provision of review. Even though some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is provided however, Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC is not reflected in Rule 254. Therefore, one has to draw inference that MACT has no power to review its own order.

9,10,11 Union of India Vs. Smt.Shamim and others reported in 2009 ACJ (4) 2785, Uttara Soni and others Vs. Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd., and  others  reported in 2009 ACJ (1) 276, D.P.Sharma Vs. State Transport Authority reported in  the  ILR  1987 KAR 3255, Naresh Kumar and Others Vs. Government (NCT of  Delhi)  reported in (2019) 9 SCC, (2007) 5 SCC 85 in the case of Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) BY LRs. v. State of U.P. and  Others. 416 referred to.

12. Therefore in the absence of any provision to review judgment and award, MACT has erred in reviewing its own judgment and award.

Compiled by S.Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

M. Suresh vs Mahadevamma and others. Regular First Appeal 1560/2011 decided on 23 October 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/347178/1/RFA1560-11-23-10-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 20. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 (‘Act’ for short) has been amended by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 by Act No.18 of 2018, whereby Section 20 of the Act has been substituted inter alia doing away with the wider discretion of the Courts to grant specific performance introducing substituted performance of contract. In terms of the amended Act, the  concept of the jurisdiction to decree specific performance, which was discretionary, is no more available to the cases seeking relief for the breach of contracts etc., The old Section 20 of the Act has been substituted by the new amended Section 20 by Act No.18 of 2018 with effect from 01.10.2018 vide SO  4888(E)  dated  19.09.2018. 

22.The effect of the phrase ‘substitution’ has been subjected to judicial scrutiny in catena of judgments  of  the  Hon’ble  Apex  Court  and  this  Court. The same is collated to analyze the effect of the Amendment Act 18 of 2018 by way of substitution with effect from 01.10.2018, in particular to decide whether the amended Act is applicable to the pending matters.

23, 24. 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31 Judgments in Shamrao V. Parulekar  vs.  District  Magistrate, Thana, Bombay AIR 1952 SC 324, C. Gupta Vs. Glaxo-Smithkline Pharamaceuticals Limited (2007) 7 SCC 171, Shyam  Sunder  and  others  vs.  Ram Kumar   and   another (2001) 8 SCC 24, Govardhan M vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2013) 1 Kant LJ 437, Adhunik Steels Ltd., vs. Orissa ManganeseandMinerals(P)Ltd (2007) 7 SCC 125, Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd., vs. P. Gopirathnam(dead)and others Civil Appeal No.13516/2015 (D.D. 12.10.2020), Girdhar Das Anandji and another vs. Jivaraj Madhavji Patel and others 1970 SCC Online Patna 10, Moulvi Hossain Mian vs. Raj Kumar Haldar AIR 1943 Calcutta 417, State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh (1955) 1 SCR 893 referred to.

33. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that ordinarily, the effect of amendment by ‘substitution’  is  that,  the  substituted  provision  stands repealed and the amended provision is substituted in the place of earlier provision from the date of inception of the enactment, but it is not absolutely applicable in all circumstances. If the amendment Act expressly specifies that the substituted provision shall come into force from a particular date subsequent to the date of amendment/the date the amendment come into force, the said amendment is prospective in nature notwithstanding such amendment is by way of ‘substitution’.   The   intention   of   the   legislature   being clear, no retrospective effect could be given from the date of inception of the statute. There may not be any cavil on this legal proposition relating  to  substantial law. It is well settled that the interpretation  of provisions must depend on the text and context. The  real intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the text and context. The amendment Act contemplates that  the  said  amendment  by  way  of  ‘substitution’  would come into force on such day the Central  Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act, 1st October 2018 is the date appointed for the amended provisions to come into effect.

35. Accordingly, we are of the view that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 would apply to the case on hand. As discussed earlier, the right or privilege accrued to the defendant/s under the unamended Act is a substantive right. Indisputably, such rights/privileges vested with the defendants at the time of breach of contract alleged, while filing the suit. Appeal is continuation of original suit. Thus, in our considered opinion, amendment to Section 20 being prospective in nature enforceable with effect from 01.10.2018, the same is not applicable to the pending proceedings governed and continued under the unamended provisions.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Arshad Ispat and Others vs Union of India and others. Writ Appeal 395/2020 decided on 10 July 2020. Author Justice M. Nagaprasanna.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/335508/1/WA395-20-10-07-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 13. …..Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is always equitable and discretionary. In this appeal, we are testing an order made in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226. Therefore, the conduct of the appellants who invoked the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is very relevant.

18. If the prayers sought in writ petition Nos.9687- 89/2017 are juxtaposed with the prayers sought in W.P. No.51184/2017, it becomes unmistakably clear that the reliefs sought in both the writ petitions were substantially the same. In the garb of raising a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 6(c) of the Amendment Act of 2012, the relief sought was to quash the order of the District Magistrate dated 16^th October 2017 and confirmation of sale in favour of 6^th respondent dated 24^th August 2016. The prayer (d) in earlier W.P.Nos.9687-89/2017    and   the   prayer   (a)   in   the   later W.P.No.51184/2017 are one and the same.

20. The Amendment Act of 2012 was promulgated on 3^rd January 2013. The 1^st writ petition in W.P.Nos.9687- 89/2017 was filed by the appellants on 2^nd March 2017. This ground of challenge to the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act of 2012 was always available when they filed a writ petition at the earliest point of time.

21. Now, after all the aforestated sequence of events, entertaining this appeal will be opposed to the principles of public policy. It is in the interest of public at large that a finality should attach to the decisions pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction and is also in public interest that none should be vexed twice over the same kind of litigation. Parties should not be permitted to bring fresh litigations because of new views that they may entertain every time. If this were permitted, litigations would have no end except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. The appellants filing another writ petition substantially for the same relief, substantially on the same allegation cannot be permitted, as the previous decision of this Court which has became final cannot be reopened in the present case as the earlier order passed will govern the rights and obligations of the parties.

Writ Appeal Dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

Shashidhara T.D. vs Dr. G. Vishwanatha. Contempt of Court Case 362/2020 decided on 3 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/347023/1/CCC362-20-03-11-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 3. As can be seen from the order dated 4^th December 2019, it is an ex parte ad interim order by which, stay was granted to the order dated 17^th September 2019. There is no specific  order passed by the learned Single Judge of reinstatement of the complainant into service.

4.…The job of the complainant comes to an end after bringing to the notice of this Court the alleged incident of breach. Whether an action is to be initiated under the said Act of 1971 is a matter to be decided by the Court. The Court always retains a discretion in such matters.

6. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF J & K vs MOHD. YAQOOB KHAN AND OTHERS (1992) 4 SCC 167 extracted. “5. We find great  force  in  the  argument  of Mr Salve that so long the stay matter in the writ petition was not finally disposed of, the further proceeding in the contempt case was itself misconceived and no orders therein should have  been passed. Mr Bhandare appearing on behalf of  the writ petitioner, who is respondent before us, has strenuously contended that the orders passed in the contempt proceedings should be treated to have disposed of the stay matter in the writ petition also.  He laid great emphasis on the fact that the counsel for the respondents in the writ petition had been heard before the orders were issued. He invited our attention to the merits of the claim. It is argued that the order dated March 19, 1990 must, in the circumstances, be treated to have become final and, therefore, binding on the State and the High Court was right in issuing the further direction by way of implementation of earlier order. 6. We do not agree. The scope of a contempt proceeding is very different from that of the pending main case yet to be heard and disposed of (in future). Besides, the respondents in a pending case are at a disadvantage if they are called upon to meet the merits of the claim in a contempt proceeding at the risk of being punished. It is, therefore, not right to suggest that it should be assumed that the initial order of stay got confirmed by the subsequent orders passed in the contempt matter.”

7. Paragraph 4 of the decision of the Apex Court in MOHD. IQBAL KHANDAY vs ABDUL MAJID RATHER  (1994) 4 SCC 34 extracted. – “4. The law of contempt is based on sound public policy by punishing any conduct which shakes the public confidence in the administration of justice. The order dated 21-9-1992 while directing notice also required the appellant to accord promotion to the respondent as Associate Professor. It requires to be noticed here that is the main prayer in the writ petition itself. In such circumstances, the correctness of such an interim order is open to serious doubt. For a moment, it is not to be understood that the court has no power to pass such an order but the question is whether while granting such interim reliefs the discretion of the court has been correctly exercised?  If the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the respondent would have gained an undue advantage of getting a promotion undeservedly. But we are not on the merits of the interim order.”

8. Apart from the interim order dated 4^th December 2019 of stay, there is no specific order passed for reinstatement of the complainant. This is a case where it is unjust to initiate contempt proceedings without giving an opportunity to the respondents to contest the prayer for interim order in the writ petition. The order of which the breach is complained of is an ex parte order. Therefore, this is not a fit case to initiate the proceedings under the said Act of 1971.

Compiled by S.Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

R. Hanumatha Singh vs State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 54571/2018 decided on 23 October 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/347019/1/WP54571-18-23-10-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record, and on analysis thereof the following questions arise for my consideration: (a) Whether the petitioner is entitled to pension inclusive of qualifying service rendered in the armed forces (b) Whether the claim of the petitioner is to be turned down on account of delay and laches?

Question (a) 20 & 23. On a cumulative reading and analysis of the afore-extracted Regulations and its interpretation would lead to an unmistakable conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to the service he rendered in the Indian Air Force and the same has to be reckoned for the purposes of counting the qualifying service to determine the amount of pension that the petitioner would be entitled to. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to addition to the qualifying service to the maximum of 5 years in terms of the Regulation 183 of the said Regulations.

Question (b) 28. UNION OF INDIA Vs. TARSEM SINGH reported in (2008) 8 SCC 648, relied on. In terms of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforestated judgment, a pensioner cannot be shown a closed door of this Court on the ground that he has bought his cause belatedly but cannot be granted arrears for the entire period from the date of retirement to the date of filing the petition. In terms of the Judgment of the Apex Court arrears are restricted to 3 years before filing the writ petition.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Lanson Brijesh Colaco vs Rajeev Gandhi University of Health Sciences and others. Writ Petition 10935/2020 decided on 6 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/346985/1/WP10935-20-04-11-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 3(a) It is a matter of common knowledge that a Degree Certificate at hands is worth ten in the cupboard of the Campus, since gaining entry to portals of higher education  and for securing employment, within the country or abroad, normally depend upon the award of degrees by the universities; this Court also takes notice of some foreign universities insisting on the production of original Degree Certificates for admission to higher courses, and of their non- production possibly resulting in the loss of a valuable seat in their campus; the same is true of public employment, as well.

6(c)…..The word “convocation” is derived from the Latinword   ‘convocare’   meaning   “to   call/come together”; in the functioning of a University, the convocation ceremony is an event of conventional significance where outgoing students after completion of their academic courses, formally assemble for receiving their Degrees/Diplomas ordinarily at the hands of the dignitaries of repute who on invitation of the said University address the gathering, throwing light on the long way the students have to move  on after leaving the  campus;  it is a special day in the academic life of students who after years of hard work and dedication, secure the Degree Certificates as a token of their great accomplishment; the awardees donning traditional academic regalia walk up the stage in front of their colleagues, friends and family members who have supported them in their endeavour of acquiring knowledge; it is a defining moment in every student’s life and it gives a big boost to his/her self-esteem; in some Universities, black hats are tossed in air and the sky is filled with euphoria for complementing the glorious ceremony; it is the coming of age, the arrival of maturity, of course followed by responsibility; the ceremony makes heart go aflutter; this ceremony having a grand purpose to serve, has it’s own variants too; be that as it may.

6(d) The above statute of the respondent-university appears to have been structured for giving a formal cognition to the Ceremonial Convocation, which normally is a pre- condition for awarding degrees; the enormous significance attached to such ceremonies cannot be disregarded only for the convenience of a few students like the petitioner who may have arguable hardship in waiting for such ceremonies that  are ordinarily organised with a fair degree of regularity; however, at times their regularity & periodicity become difficult to  adhere,  because  of  the  conspiracy  of circumstances such as COVID-19 pandemic or the like, that are beyond the control of university authorities; however, the aggrieved students cannot be asked to wait in militant silence for an indefinite period of time since such waiting will have many repercussions such as, time bar of the admission to the course, non-compliance of conditions of recruitment and age bar for employment, or the like; some viable alternative has to be devised by the universities in their accumulated experience & wisdom for mitigating the likely hardship/difficulty their students/alumni are put to,  in  such  circumstances  because of delayed ceremonial convocation.

6(e) Learned Panel Counsel for the university fairly submits that although there is a provision in the statutes for handing the graduates a Provisional Degree Certificate, followed by award of degree in the convocation, a specific text may be introduced into the Provisional Degree Certificate  itself or by way of an annexure thereto, to the effect that the Provisional Degree Certificate shall be treated on par with the Award of Degree, for all practical purposes; this fair stand of the university would ease the difficulty faced by the students like the petitioner who at times indefinitely await the convocation ceremony; in addition, this court fondly hopes that the university authorities when so requested by the students/alumni, shall address  appropriate  communication to other universities/colleges/employers for easing the difficulty or doubt pending award of Degrees in the ensuing convocation ceremonies; it hardly needs to be stated  that  such graceful acts, if done timely, would add to their stature and grandeur.

In the above circumstances, this writ  petition succeeds in part; a Writ of Mandamus issues to the respondent- University to hand the petitioner a Provisional Degree Certificate of the course in question with a specific certification to the effect that the same shall be treated on par with the award of degree concerned, for  all  practical purposes.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

M/s. Jagadish Advertising vs. Designated Committee and others. Writ Petition 7801/2020 decided on 19 August 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/338063/1/WP7801-20-19-08-2020.pdf

HELD: The term “verify the correctness””in Section 126 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2019 and Rule 6 of the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme  Rules,  2019 cannot be stretched to mean that the Designated Committee can embark upon an adjudication regarding the entitlement or otherwise of the declarant. 

Relevant Paragraphs: 16, 18 & 24. The Parliament, with the object of bringing to an  end the disputes relating to the liability of service tax, enacted the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019. The object of the said Scheme was both Dispute Resolution and also Amnesty. The Scheme is basically designed to ensure minimum interface between the assessee and the Department and is designed in such a way that the dispute is resolved by the assessee by filing a declaration electronically and his tax liability is also determined electronically. Thus, basically a person whose liability to pay service tax was in dispute, such a person could avail the Scheme by making a declaration in the electronic form and the Designated Committee would verify the declaration and thereafter, issue a statement indicating the amount payable and on the said amount being paid, the person would be discharged of all liabilities i.e., both financial as well as penal.

31 & 33. The Circular dated 27.08.2019 issued by the Department categorically states that one of the objectives of the Scheme was to give an opportunity to those who had failed to correctly pay the tax. The  Circular states that to this extent the Scheme comprised of an Amnesty component. The Circular also clarified a few issues raised after the Scheme was notified. Thus, a reading of the said clause would clearly indicate that in certain matters when tax had been paid  by utilizing the input credit and the matter was under dispute, the tax already paid through input credit should be adjusted by the Designated Committee at the time of determination of the final amount payable under the Scheme. Therefore, even if there was a  dispute  regarding the tax paid through input credit, the Circular mandated that the Designated Committee should adjust the tax already paid through input credit. It, therefore, follows that the Designated Committee cannot embark upon an exercise of adjudication and state  that it was  not permissible for the declarant to claim that he had  paid the tax through input credit.

38.…. A plain reading  of the provisions would mean that the Designated Committee would be required only to examine the accuracy of the statement made in the declaration with reference to the records available with it and this would basically mean that the Designated Committee can only satisfy itself as to whether the Tax liability admitted by the declarant was accurate or not. The term “verify the correctness”” cannot be stretched to mean that the Designated Committee can embark upon an adjudication regarding the entitlement or otherwise of the declarant. 

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

VETINDIA PHARMACEUTICALS LIMITED vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER. CIVIL APPEAL NO.3647 OF 2020 decided on 6 November 2020.

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/5173/5173_2020_35_1501_24640_Judgement_06-Nov-2020.pdf

14. That brings us to the question of delay. There is no doubt
    that the High Court in its discretionary jurisdiction may decline
    to exercise the discretionary writ jurisdiction on ground of delay
    in approaching the court. But it is only a rule of discretion by
    exercise of self­restraint evolved by the court in exercise of the
    discretionary equitable jurisdiction and not a mandatory

requirement that every delayed petition must be dismissed on the
ground of delay. The Limitation Act stricto sensu does not apply
to the writ jurisdiction. The discretion vested in the court under
Article 226 of the Constitution therefore has to be a judicious
exercise of the discretion after considering all pros and cons of
the matter, including the nature of the dispute, the explanation
for the delay, whether any third­ party rights have intervened etc.
The jurisdiction under Article 226 being equitable in nature,
questions of proportionality in considering whether the impugned
order merits interference or not in exercise of the discretionary
jurisdiction will also arise. This Court in Basanti Prasad vs.
Bihar School Examination Board and others, (2009) 6 SCC
791, after referring to Moon Mills Ltd. vs. Industrial Court, AIR
1967 SC 1450, Maharashtra SRTC vs. Balwant Regular
Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 and State of M.P. and Others
vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, (1986) 4 SCC 566, held that if
the delay is properly explained and no third party rights are
being affected, the writ court under Article 226 of the
Constitution may condone the delay, holding as follows:

“18. In the normal course, we would not have taken
exception to the order passed by the High Court.
They are justified in saying that a delinquent
employee should not be permitted to revive the stale
claim and the High Court in exercise of its discretion
would not ordinarily assist the tardy and indolent
person. This is the traditional view and is well
supported by a plethora of decisions of this Court.
This Court also has taken the view that there is no
inviolable rule, that, whenever there is delay the
Court must refuse to entertain a petition. This Court
has stated that the writ court in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution may condone the delay in filing the
petition, if the delay is satisfactorily explained.”

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & another. Criminal Appeal 707 of 2020 decided on 5 November 2020. Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice Hemant Gupta, Justice Ajay Rastogi

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/16256/16256_2020_35_1503_24580_Judgement_05-Nov-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 9. The long title of the Act is to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special Courts and Exclusive
Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and
rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto.

10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of
the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected
to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and
harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well.
The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict
indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence
as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to
punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of
the society for the reason that they belong to a particular
community.

11. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act
can be classified as “1) intentionally insults or intimidates with
intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe and 2) in any place within public view. ”

12. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under
the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim
belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the
Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil
rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a
member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to
indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over
the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities,
humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their
remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his
family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that
respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then
the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the
procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that
respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste.

13. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in
“any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in
public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the
judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through
Standing Counsel & Ors (2008) 8 SCC 435. The Court had drawn distinction
between the expression “public place” and “in any place within
public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then
the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the
contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some
members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view.

17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged
to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhance
punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest
that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the
deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste.

18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste.

23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap Singh & Ors.
v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr (2018) 13 SCC 612 held that there is no
prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part. In
a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is
required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for
prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

This is a win-win scenario for advocates and Daksha Legal interns. Law students from reputed colleges across the country join Daksha Legal as interns for a month. Due to covid, this year, it is only online internship. Hence I have opened this platform. It works like this.

1. Join Daksha Legal Facebook group by using this link: https://www.facebook.com/groups/1004611326222954/
2. Lawyers can ask purely legal questions in the comment of the post already shared in the group.
3. Our interns will answer the question by doing research on web and also using legal software.
4. This is available only for lawyers.
5. Frame proper question in English or Kannada or Hindi and post in the comment box.
6. Do not narrate facts of the case etc.
7. This platform is only temporary till internship is completed.  

Thanks. S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.