Sarojamma vs R.Venkataramanaswamy. Criminal Petition 4338/2020 decided on 7 December 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351592/1/CRLP4338-20-07-12-2020.pdf

Relevant Paragraphs: 6. The only question which arises for consideration of this Court in this petition is: “Whether the insertion of Section 143A of the N.I. Act is having a  prospective  effect or can also be given retrospective effect?”

7. It is well settled proposition of law that always the substantive law which affects the rights of the parties will have prospective effect unless it has been given a retrospective effect expressly in the statute  itself.  …..in the case of  G.J.Raja Vs. Tejraj Surana 2019  SCC OnLine SC 989, the issue  came  up before  the Court directly with regard to interpretation of Section 143A of the N.I. Act and the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that Section 143A of the N.I. Act is having prospective effect in nature and confined to the cases where the offences were committed after the introduction of Section 143A of the N.I. Act. At paragraph-23 of the said decision, it has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-

“23. In our view, the applicability of Section 143A of the Act must, therefore, be held to be prospective in nature and confined to cases where offences were committed after the introduction of Section 143A, in order to force an accused to pay such interim  compensation.”

When the Hon’ble Apex Court has  interpreted and laid down the ratio holding that Section 143A of the N.I. Act is to be prospective in operation and is made applicable only in the cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after insertion of Section 143A in the statute.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Mr. S.P. Shankar, Senior Advocate, Bangalore

PDF File

Law of mortgages with special reference to Banking Law
Banking institutions, in India, are primarily supporting every commercial
transaction in aid of development of commercial enterprise. Howsoever well
possessed a man is, he would not convert his assets into liquid cash, for
purposes of investment in trade/commerce. He necessarily starts such
enterprises with borrowed funds. It is in this manner banking institution would
picture itself in trade and commerce. A banker is obviously a stranger to an
entrepreneur. Words of entrepreneur are taken as true and correct and on that
basis the banker would take up the proposal of the entrepreneur for processing
loan and the like. Risk–appetite is common to the banker and the
entrepreneur. The banker who deals with public money has greater
responsibility in marshalling its funds, channelizing the same for various
purposes and closely supervise utilization/application of funds by the borrower
and lastly, ensure recovery with interest and costs. The whole process is
complicated. Bankers have neither experience nor enterprise muchless
expertese in running the industry itself, should the repayment of borrowed
money is delayed or staggered. Entrepreneurs have often ended penniless,
midstream in their business. This aspect would destroy the confidence in the
entrepreneur and hopes of the banker besides affecting the security of the
depositors.
It is in the above background, collaterals and security for repayment of loan
with interest assumes primary importance. As stated earlier, bank deals with
funds of the depositor. Bank only manages such funds prudently and
economically so that besides serving the depositors, the bank should make
reasonable profit to take care of its administrative expenses and also provide
for accumulation of funds. Technical terms are avoided.
To strike a balance in the banking business, collaterals and securities for loan
would assume greater role. Even in the matter of obtaining security, bank has
to be prudent both in terms of getting the best security and loan processing is
less expensive. It is in this background, Law of Mortgages would picture itself
in the scenario. Mortgages of immovable properties and charges on them are
found and dealt with in chapter IV of Transfer of Property Act vide Sections
58-104. Kinds of Mortgages are dealt with in Section 58. They are simple
mortgage, Mortgage by conditional sale, Usufructuary mortgage, English
mortgage, Mortgage by deposit of title deeds and Anomalous mortgage. Of
several mortgages the one that facilitates the banker is the Mortgage by deposit
of title deeds.
Mortgage by deposit of title is also known as equitable mortgage. Subject
matter of Equitable mortgage is the “interest” of the mortgagor in the
mortgaged property, in contra distinction to “Right, Title and Interest” in the
property itself. The striking illustration in this behalf is the interest of lessee in
the mortgaged property, which could be merely the leasehold rights. This
aspect is further supported by Law vide Section 108(j) of T.P. Act. Section 108(j)
would empower and authorize lessees to transfer absolutely or by way of
mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his “interest” in the demised
property. Section 58(d) R/w Section 108 (j) would thus permit a situation
where a long term lessee may mortgage the lease hold rights and secure loan
from a bank. This comes by way of assignment of lease hold rights. The earliest
decision in this behalf is one rendered by five judges of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case reported in AIR 1952 SC 156. This decision is followed every
now and then, to sustain the banking transaction of loan advanced by a
banker on the security of lease hold rights.
Equitable mortgage is and shall not be a document containing terms of loan
like the amount lent, rate of interest or other terms and conditions of loan. An
equitable mortgage merely consists of a report or a writing by the borrower
affirming that he has deposited the title deeds, with the intent of securing loan
and creating a charge on his interest in the property and more importantly
recording the fact that he has delivered possession of deeds of title. The
significant and beneficial aspect of equitable mortgage is that property situated
anywhere in India can be subject matter of equitable mortgage at place other
than where the property is situate and in the authorized cities vide Section
58(d). Only a few cities in India are designated cities, where title deeds are
deposited. By fiction, equitable mortgage can be created by deposit of title
deeds of property situated elsewhere, in a designated city. This facility afforded
by the statute would augur well, in the matter of banking transactions. It does
not involve stamp duty as it is a mere report or memorandum evidencing
deposit of title deeds and delivery of those documents. It does not require
registration. The question as to whether equitable mortgage by deposit of title
deeds requires registration or not has been resolved by Apex Court in AIR 1950
SC 272, AIR 1965 SC 1591 and many more. High court of Karnataka in ILR
2000 Kar 1962 has held that memorandum accompanying the deposit of title
deeds containing only a statement that a deposit is made by way of security for
repayment of loan, does not need registration. The memorandum is only
evidence of the fact that the title deeds are deposited with the Mortgagee.
Documents of title could be mere patta of lands in mufassil areas. Document of
Mortgage is itself is a title of the mortgagee. An expired lease is a document of
title if it is renewed and kept valid. Share certificates could be document of
title. Where possession is given to vendee on the basis of agreement to sell,
such agreement is a good security. Original probate of a will accompanied by
certified copy of redemption relating to the property, even if lost, can create
equitable mortgage. The list of title deeds is only illustrative.
Essential aspect is delivery of title deeds made by the borrower to the creditor
or his agent. Such delivery must be with intent to create security. The bank
would save cost of stamp duty and registration and would therefore facilitate
credit transaction. This would improve commercial enterprise, a positive aspect
of Law.
Mortgage is a transfer of an interest in immovable property. The immovable
property has to be and is always specific. Mortgage could be to secure existing
or future debts. Mortgage can be effected by co-owners, Pardanashian woman
or by beneficiaries under Trust. There could be mortgage in favour of a minor.
In Simple mortgage, possession remains with mortgagor. A mortgagor would
bind himself personally to pay if the security offered in inadequate. Mortgagee
shall have the right to sell or cause the mortgaged property to be sold for
recovery of dues.
Mortgage by conditional sale creates liability. This type of mortgage is
ostensible sale with personal liability on default of payment of mortgage money
on a given date. There is distinction between mortgage by conditional sale and a
sale with clause for repurchase. That stipulation/clause for repurchase should
be in the same document contemporaneously entered while taking the loan.
Distinction between sale and mortgage would itself be a subject matter of
serious discussion.
Usfructuary mortgage involves delivery of possession, right of mortgagee to
appropriate rents and profits. There is no personal liability of the mortgagor.
Time limit for redemption is stipulated. Distinction between usfructuory
mortgage and lease is apparent and should be clearly understood.
An English mortgage is one where personal liability exists. Transfer is absolute
and not conditional, in contrast. There can be a proviso for re-conveyance.
Possession of the property is given to mortgagee.
Anomalous Mortgage is one that does not come under any of the above
mortgages.
Rights and remedies of mortgagee are set out in Chapter IV vide Sections 67,
67A, 68, 69, 69A -79. Marshalling and contribution are also provided in
respect of security to the bank. Thus mortgage by deposit of title deeds would
make the transaction ( borrowing from and lending by banks to debtors) an
effective and economical mode from the point of view of the Banker and the
borrower.
In addition, the bank has now the support of DRT Act and Securitization Act.
Jurisdiction of civil courts is barred in respect of recovery of dues outstanding
to a bank. Separate Forum is created in these days of Tribunalisation.
Realising the rigors of civil litigation, accompanied by need to pay advolerm
court fee and unimaginable contest raised by the borrowers and the never
ending process of execution, Union of India enacted DRT Act and Securitization
Act giving power to the banking institution to recover debts in an
expeditious manner and in the most inexpensive procedure. The laudable
object of Union of India in enacting this enactment is set out in Mardia
Chemicals.
Bank has the right to sell the mortgaged property. Though this right to sell is
available in common law it has its own inhibitions. Securitization Act has made
the maters far easy and has stipulated several conditions against the borrower,
were he to indulge in procrastinating means and methods. Sections 13 to 17 of
Securitization Act serve as a Code by itself. Banks are authorized to sell the
mortgaged property, realize the dues and make the recovered amount available
for further advances. This perspective is laudable from the point of view of law
makers. In reality even these two enactments have been deprived of the
intended teeth and verve.
Law of mortgages obtaining in common law, has yielded in favour of relieving
the bank from rigors of unending litigation and has assisted the borrower in
reducing the cost of litigation. This is hardly realized by the borrowers
muchless by the institution of Courts.
Validity of Securitization Act and the special procedure for bank for recovery of
dues have been tested, to the relief of Bankers. The common law remedies
available to a borrower including one time settlement is not be applied to or
enforced on the bankers. One time settlement ( OTS) is a matter of discretion.
Circular of RBI confers discretion on the Bank but never confers a right on
borrower. Inspite of this undeniable statement of Law borrowers invoke Article
226 and keep the banks under strangle hold.
Yet, the society has witnessed large scale borrowings and un-pardonable
defaults on the part of celebrated borrowers like Vijaya Malya, Nirav Modi,
Subrotho Mukherji and the hallowed persons. Society has also evidenced public
authorities like Ministers pressurizing the bank to lend money to these
celebrated and favoured borrowers. It became the lot of court in England to
notice and highlight in extradition proceedings that huge loans to Vijaya Malya
was blessed by the then Finance Minister and Prime Minister. The other
illustration is that of Punjab National Bank and allied banking institutions as
well as Co-operative banks. It is time to rationalize banking practices and
secure the interest of depositors irreversibly.
RBI is the prime and Central Bank of India. It is enjoined under the Banking
Regulation Act 1949 and RBI Act to assume responsibility, impose banking
sanctions and help recover huge debts. No debt is less than 10 to 15 thousand
crores. Interest is accruing. It is time that the Reserve Bank of India takes the
role of monitoring and enforce fiscal discipline.
S.P. Shankar
4-12-2020 Senior Advocate

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351465/1/CRLP101414-20-30-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 9.…The petitioner has a reasonable apprehension of his arrest by the respondent-police. The petitioner is presently working as Police Inspector in the Police Commissionerate, Hubballi-Dharwad. There are no previous complaints or remarks against him. Petitioner has undertaken to abide by the conditions which may be imposed by this Court. As such, this Court is of the view that the arrest and detention of the petitioner/accused is not warranted and he may be directed to appear before the Investigating Officer/respondent-CBI and co-operate with the investigation of the case.

10. It is well settled that law of bails dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one hand, the requirements of shielding the society from the hazards of those committing crimes and potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail and on the other hand absolute adherence of the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence regarding presumption of innocence of an accused until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual liberty. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached to the arrest and it would lead to many serious consequences. Usual anxiety of investigating agency is to ensure that an accused should fully co-operate with them and be available as and when they require him. An order of anticipatory bail does not in anyway, directly or indirectly, takeaway from Investigating Officer his power and right to fully investigate into charge made against an accused. In the instant case when the petitioner has already appeared and co-operated with the respondent, whenever called upon to do so, then custodial interrogation is not warranted. Hence, the relief sought by petitioner/accused can be granted by imposing suitable conditions.

Petition for anticipatory bail allowed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi, 1909 SCC OnLine PC 16 : (1908-09) 36 IA 148 : (1909) 6 All LJ 857 : (1909) 19 Mad LJ 530 : (1909-10) 14 CWN 1 – Besides, Anangamohini and her successors had paid rent under their lease up to 1902, and if the lease was void as ultra vires the grantor, they were at least tenants from year to year, and therefore no question of adverse possession could arise. A tenant could not while paying rent acquire an absolute proprietary tenure against his landlord.

Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Baldeo Singh, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 46 : ILR (1923) 2 Pat 38 : (1921-22) 49 IA 399: AIR 1922 PC 272 : (1923) 45 Mad LJ 460 : (1922-23) 27 CWN 925 – With regard to the claim by adverse possession, as already observed, the mahal had all along been heir in thika; the lessee collected the rents and paid a fixed sum to the proprietor. If the thikedar failed to collect the rent from any individual tenant it would not create adverse possession against the proprietor

Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai, (2003) 1 SCC 488 – 32. In this case, we are also satisfied that having regard to the fact that the appellant himself was the tenant of Mangal Singh, he could not have raised the plea of adverse possession. As a tenant he could not have questioned the title of Mangal Singh. The very fact that escheat proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State also points out that the State proceeded on the premise that Mangal Singh had the right title in relation to the land in question and as he died intestate without leaving behind him any legal heir/representative, the same vested in the State. The appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was allotted the land in question admittedly on the aforementioned premise, namely, Mangal Singh at the time of his death had title to the land in question or the suit property, but he died intestate. He, therefore, cannot be permitted to prevaricate from his stand at this stage.

G. Sathyanarayana Raj v. State of Karnataka, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 1446 : ILR 2012 KAR 1831 : (2012) 2 Kant LJ 498 : (2012) 2 AIR Kant R 581 : (2012) 1 KCCR 628 – Furthermore, adverse possession, by its very nature, must be open and hostile to the person against whom it is sought to be claimed. It is inherently illogical to accept a claim for adverse possession in circumstances where the claimant essentially bases his title on a conveyance from a person against whom adverse possession is claimed. For example, a tenant may remain in possession for decades without end, but his tenure would not metamorphosise or transform into ownership by adverse possession.

S.K. Lakshminarasappa v. B. Rudraiah, 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 3545 : ILR 2012 KAR 4129 : (2012) 4 AIR Kant R 424 : (2013) 1 KCCR 672 – 73. From the aforesaid stand in the written statement it is clear that, the case of the first defendant is he is in possession of the land as a tenant from the year 1950. He has filed an application for grant of occupancy rights. Now the matter is in Supreme Court. When a person gets into the possession of the land as a tenant, his possession is lawful at the inception and if he is continuing as tenant, his possession is lawful and therefore, such a tenant who according to him got into land under a tenancy continuing in possession as a tenant is not entitled to the plea of adverse possession.

G.M. Venkatareddy v. Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 7533 : ILR 2012 KAR 3168 : (2012) 3 AIR Kant R 527 : (2012) 3 KCCR 1999. – A person in possession of property without the authorisation or permission of the title holder/owner of that property for the period prescribed by law, attains recognition and protection of his possession on equitable considerations comes to enjoy the rights of adverse possession. This possession must be (a) continuous, (b) exclusive and (c) open, in the sense of being obvious and not covert, and most importantly (d) hostile to the title owner. In Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591 their Lordships have clarified that “possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession”. A tenant or licencee cannot claim adverse possession; but if he sets up a claim rivalling and challenging the title of the lessor/licensor and deliberately stops payment of rent/fee, his initial legal possession transforms into the illegal occupation of a trespasser. If the period of prescription, twelve years for a citizen and thirty years for the Government, elapses without the title owner initiating legal action for regaining possession from the trespasser, the latter’s adverse possession is protected. This doctrine may appear to favour the transgressor, but it is arguable that in actuality it respects the human right to enjoyment of property possessed, j improved and developed by the transgressor, against an indolent and careless owner. A presumption can also be drawn that the title holder is not interested in the property any longer. It need not be equated with stealth, since the possession of the trespasser has to be open and hostile to the title owner. As has been explained in Taylor v. Twinberrow (1930) All ER 342 and Fair Weather v. St. Marlebone Property Co (1962) 2 All ER 288 adverse possession “is a negative and consequential right effected only because somebody else’s positive right to access the Court is barred by operation of law”. Such rights are protective in character and akin to the doctrine of ‘part performance’ can be employed only as a shield and not as a sword. Expectedly therefore, a suit for declaration of ownership cannot be predicated on a plea of adverse possession, as has been held in Prem Nath Wadhawan v. Inder Raj Wadhawan 1993 (3) PLR 70 (Delhi Section) State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kuma (2011) 10 SCC 404, contains a detailed debate on the equities which arise whenever adverse possession is pressed into service. The preponderance if opinion is that the operation of adverse possession protects a trespasser or transgressor of the law and therefore ought not to be made available. References to the modern jurisprudence in America, United Kingdom and European Commission of Human Rights prefers the abolition or non-application of this principle

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

Vikesh Kumar Gupta & Anr. vs The State of Rajasthan & Ors. Civil Appeal Nos.3649–3650 of 2020 decided on 7 December 2020. Justice L. NAGESWARA RAO, Justice HEMANT GUPTA, Justice AJAY RASTOGI.

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/28550/28550_2019_35_1501_24973_Judgement_07-Dec-2020.pdf

HELD: 11. Though re-evaluation can be directed if rules
permit, this Court has deprecated the practice of reevaluation and scrutiny of the questions by the courts
which lack expertise in academic matters. It is not
permissible for the High Court to examine the question papers and answer sheets itself, particularly when the
Commission has assessed the inter se merit of the
candidates (Himachal Pradesh Public Service
Commission v. Mukesh Thakur & Anr.) Courts have
to show deference and consideration to the
recommendation of the Expert Committee who have the
expertise to evaluate and make recommendations [SeeBasavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr. H.L. Ramesh & Ors.) Examining the scope of judicial review with regards to reevaluation of answer sheets, this Court in Ran Vijay
Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

12. In view of the above law laid down by this Court, it
was not open to the Division Bench to have examined
the correctness of the questions and the answer key to
come to a conclusion different from that of the Expert
Committee in its judgment dated 12.03.2019 held
that court should not re-evaluate or scrutinize the
answer sheets of a candidate as it has no expertise
the matters and the academic matters are best left to
academics.

13. A perusal of the above judgments would make it
clear that courts should be very slow in interfering with
expert opinion in academic matters. In any event,
assessment of the questions by the courts itself to arrive
at correct answers is not permissible. The delay in
finalization of appointments to public posts is mainly
caused due to pendency of cases challenging selections
pending in courts for a long period of time. The
cascading effect of delay in appointments is the
continuance of those appointed on temporary basis and
their claims for regularization. The other consequence
resulting from delayed appointments to public posts is
the serious damage caused to administration due to lack
of sufficient personnel.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

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Writ Petition filed online today challenges establishment of Karnataka Veerashaiva Lingayat Development Board.

The contention of the petitioner is that establishment of the Board is unconstitutional apart from destroying the very foundation of the secular philosophy profounded by 12^th century social reformist Basava. The Government Order isolates one of the outstanding secular philosophy founded by Basava. The Government order violates secularism which is a basic feature of the Constitution of India. Read the Writ Petition below.

PDF of the Petition

M/s. Networth Stock Broking Limited vs Shanthala. Criminal Appeal 335/2017 decided on 23 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351239/1/CRLA335-17-23-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 8. Complainant claims that it was liasioning between the accused and share broker. Further the transaction according to complainant and accused is not the first one which is one among umpteen number of transactions entered into between the complainant and the accused. It is not disputed that in the past there are instances wherein the shares were sold and made to purchase through mediation of the accused and also payments were made for choice.

9 & 13. The rule of agency is based on two principles (1) whatever a person can do by himself he can do through another. (2) He who does an act through another does it by himself. Certain regular transactions involving a person who is being represented, person representing the former and the third parties may very well be akin to agency when the binding nature of the liability/duty on the person who is so presented by his representative. Thus the person so represented is principal and who represents is agent.

15. Agency may be expressed or implied agency. Expressed agency is one wherein two parties agree for transaction where one will be acting as agent of another and person so acting as agent for valid acts bind the principal. When agent exercises authority or enters into transaction it will be authority by virtue of authority given by principal and benefit or loss principal is entitled to. Infact many of the principles are similar to that of law of partition. As a matter of fact contract of agency is considered as very partnership is concerned as extension of partnership and the implied authority of an agent.

Appeal allowed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

Criminal Procedure Code. Section 438

Chandru vs State of Karnataka. Criminal Petition 6734/2020 decided on 4 December 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351161/1/CRLP6734-20-04-12-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 4. Admittedly, at the initial stage, this petitioner was granted bail in the present case subject to conditions. It is also admitted that the petitioner has not appeared before the trial Court as directed by the Court while granting bail. It is also admitted that the proclamation under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. is already issued and NBW is pending against the petitioner. Now the question arises as to whether at this stage, the petitioner once again can invoke Section 438 of Cr.P.C. seeking anticipatory bail in this regard. It is relevant to mention the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Sharma reported in (2014) 2 SCC 171 wherein, the Court referred to its earlier judgment in the case of Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 730 extracted paragraph 12 therein and held as under:

“16. Recently, in Lavesh v.  State (NCT of Delhi), this Court (of which both of us were parties) considered the scope of granting relief under Section 438 vis-à-vis a person who was declared as an absconder or proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code. In para 12, this Court held as under:

12. From these materials and information, it is clear that the present appellant was not available for interrogation and investigation and was declared as ‘absconder’. Normally, when the accused is ‘absconding’ and declared as a ‘proclaimed offender’, there is no question of granting anticipatory bail. We reiterate that when a person against whom a warrant had been issued and is absconding or concealing himself in order to avoid execution of warrant and declared as a proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.

7. It is clear from the above decision that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.”In view of the above, the position of law is clear on the subject. The petitioner was already granted bail and he had not complied with the conditions imposed in the said order. The petitioner is already proclaimed as an absconding accused and NBW is issued against him. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to seek the discretionary relief of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. at this stage.

Hence, the petition is dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

M Shivaraju and another vs The State of Karnataka and another. Writ Petition 10216 OF 2020 (LB-BMP) PIL C/W Writ Petition 11077 OF 2020 (LB-BMP) PIL and Writ Petition 1892 OF 2020 (LB-BMP) PIL decided on 4 December 2020.

Judgment Link https://karnatakajudiciary.kar.nic.in/noticeBoard/WP-10216-of-2020-%20BBMP-Elections.pdf

ORDER (i) We direct the State Government to publish the final
notification of reservations as per clause (c) of sub-section
(1) of Section 21 of the said Act of 1976 for 198 Wards as
per the delimitation notification dated 23rd June, 2020. We
grant time of one month from today to publish the final notification, though, as per the assurance given by the
Government, as recorded in the order dated 22nd
September 2020, the same was to be published within two
weeks from 22nd September 2020;

(ii) We direct the State Election Commission to hold election of
BBMP as expeditiously as possible by publishing the
election programme within a maximum period of six weeks
from the date on which final reservation Notification is
published;

(iii) We make it clear that elections shall be held for 198 Wards
as per the notification of delimitation of Wards already
published on 23rd June, 2020;

(iv) The petitions are allowed on the above terms with no
orders as to the costs.