58(b) Simple mortgage.—Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself personally to pay the mortgage-money, and agrees, expressly or impliedly, that, in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called a simple mortgage and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee.

Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary, (2015) 5 SCC 622. Paragraph  20.2 Simple mortgage is a mortgage where property is mortgaged without delivering possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee.

58. (c) Mortgage by conditional sale.—Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property—on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee, a mortgagee by conditional sale: Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.

Ganpati Babji Alamwar v. Digambarrao Venkatrao Bhadke, (2019) 8 SCC 651. Paragraph 10. Whether an agreement is a mortgage by conditional sale or sale with an option for repurchase is a vexed question to be considered in the facts of each case. The essentials of an agreement, to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale, can succinctly be summarised. An ostensible sale with transfer of possession and ownership, but containing a clause for reconveyance in accordance with Section 58(c) of the Act, will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by conditional sale. The execution of a separate agreement for reconveyance, either contemporaneously or subsequently, shall militate against the agreement being mortgage by conditional sale. There must exist a debtor and creditor relationship. The valuation of the property, and the transaction value, along with the duration of time for reconveyance, are important considerations to decide the nature of the agreement. There will have to be a cumulative consideration of these factors, along with the recitals in the agreement, intention of the parties, coupled with other attendant circumstances, considered in a holistic manner. The language used in the agreement may not always be conclusive.

58 (d) Usufructuary mortgage.—Where the mortgagor delivers possession  of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and authorises him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage-money, the transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee.

Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary, (2015) 5 SCC 622. Paragraph  20.2 The mortgagor delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee and further authorises him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage money.

Narpatchand A. Bhandari v. Shantilal Moolshankar Jani, (1993) 3 SCC 351. Paragraph 7. A usufructuary mortgagee is a transfer of a right to possession of the mortgaged property and the right to receive the rents and profits accruing from such property. Tenanted premises, if is mortgaged by the landlord by way of usufructuary mortgage, the usufructuary mortgagee thereunder would become entitled to receive the rents and profits accruing from such property in his own right and on his own account

58(e) English mortgage.—Where the mortgagor binds himself to repay the mortgage-money on a certain date, and transfers the mortgaged property absolutely to the mortgagee, but subject to a proviso that he will re-transfer it to the mortgagor upon payment of the mortgage-money as agreed, the transaction is called an English mortgage.

Raj Kishore v. Prem Singh, (2011) 1 SCC 657 . Paragraph 21. A transaction to constitute an English mortgage the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (1) The mortgagor must bind himself to repay the mortgage money on a certain date. (2) The property mortgaged should be transferred absolutely to the mortgagee. (3) Such absolute transfer should be made subject to the proviso that the mortgagee shall reconvey the property to the mortgagor upon payment by him of the mortgage money on the date the mortgagor binds himself to pay the same. 22. It is only in cases where all the three requirements indicated above are satisfied that the transaction constitutes an English mortgage and not otherwise.

58(f) Mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.—Where a person in any of the following towns, namely, the towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and in any other town which the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immoveable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.

State of Haryana v. Narvir Singh, (2014) 1 SCC 105. Paragraph 13. Mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of documents of title to immovable property with the intention that those documents shall constitute a security which will enable the creditor ultimately to recover the money which he has lent. 14.2. No instrument is required to be drawn for this purpose. However, the parties may choose to have a memorandum prepared only showing deposit of the title deeds. In such a case also registration is not required. But in a case in which the memorandum recorded in writing creates rights, liabilities or extinguishes those, the same requires registration.

58(g) Anomalous mortgage.—A mortgage which is not a simple mortgage, a mortgage by conditional sale, an usufructuary mortgage, an English mortgage or a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds within the meaning of this section is called an anomalous mortgage.

Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, (1982) 1 SCC 237.  (as an example) Paragraph 2. Even though the mortgage was mortgage with possession, it was not a usufructuory mortgage but an anomalous mortgage in that the mortgagor had agreed to pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent and the mortgagee was liable to account for the income of the property earned as rent and if the mortgagee himself occupied the same he was bound to account for the rent at the rate of Rs 515 per annum.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Prabhakar vs The State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 138396/2020 decided on 10 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348668/1/WP138396-20-10-11-2020.pdf

Case details: – Respondent 4 contested and won the election to the office of Board of Management of a Co-operative Credit Society governed by the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. He submitted a caste certificate claiming to be ‘scheduled caste’. Writ Petition was filed seeking a writ of quo-warranto against him.

5. In addition to reiterating the various grounds urged in the petition and referring to the documents produced by the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought for by him in the petition, particularly when respondent No.4 is guilty of fraud in that he produced a fake caste certificate which was not at all issued by the Tahsildar as can be seen from the material on record. In support of his contentions, learned counsel places reliance on the following decisions:-University of Mysore vs. C.D.Govinda Rao – AIR 1965 SC 491; P.M.Parameshwara Murthy vs. State of Karnataka – W.P.No.4340/2012 dated 21.11.2012, Chairman & M.D., FCI vs. Jagadish Balaram Bahira – AIR 2017 SC 3271, Bharathi Reddy vs. State of Karnataka – W.A.No.5872/2017 c/w W.A.No.100657/2017 dated 04.12.2017, Bharathi Reddy vs. State of Karnataka – (2018) 6 SCC 162.

10.the genesis/basis for the respondent No.4 to file nomination, contest elections and get elected under the scheduled caste category was the alleged caste certificate which is clearly a fake certificate that was not issued by the Tahsildar. It is therefore clear that the entire election process commencing from filing of nomination and culminating in the election of respondent No.4 on the basis of a fake caste certificate is vitiated on account of the same being illegal and contrary to statutory provisions and Rules of procedure and consequently, availability of the remedy under Section 70 of the Act is not a bar for the present petition seeking quashing of the election results and for issuance a writ of quo warranto against the respondents.

14. The power of this Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is now well settled. In C.D.Govindra Rao’s case supra, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, while quoting Halsbury’s Laws of England held as under:- “An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolate writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office  or franchise might be determined.”

15. It follows there from that respondent No.4 is holding the post of an elected director of the Society without any legal authority and he is guilty of usurpation of the said post. Consequently, in view of the fact that the post held by the respondent No.4 is a public office and that the respondent No.4 got elected to the post based on a fake caste certificate which was never issued by the Tahsildar and that respondent No.4 is holding the post without any legal authority coupled with the fact that he is not able to show cause as to how and under which authority of law he is holding the post, I am of the considered opinion that as a consequence of setting aside the election results at Annexure H, it is just and proper to issue a writ of Quo Warranto against respondent No.4 directing him to be ousted from the post of elected director of respondent 3 society.

Compiled by Harsh Desai and S. Basavaraj, Advocates for Daksha Legal.

Judgment link

Click to access 4200_2019_36_1501_24718_Judgement_20-Nov-2020.pdf

K.T.Thimmaiah vs The General Manager and another. Writ Petition 11517/2018 decided on 9 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348998/1/WP11517-18-09-11-2020.pdf

Magnificent opening paragraph: To quote Shakespeare from fall of Wolsey, with a slight variation to suit the context “Had I served my God with half the zeal that I served my King, I would not have fallen in these days of impecuniosities”, is the cry of the petitioner in this petition seeking terminal benefits after having retired on attaining the age of superannuation twenty one years ago.

Para 20. KPTCL, is a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid act of leaving its employee in the lurch does not behove its status of being a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it is imperative to issue a mandamus for release of all the terminal benefits that are accrued in favour of  the petitioner along with interest and also mulct the KPTCL with exemplary costs for harassing and driving its employee to this Court time and again and now for release of terminal benefits. Therefore, the petitioner would be entitled to release of all terminal benefits along with interest at 9% p.a. from the date it fell due i.e., 01.08.1999 till the date of its payment.

21. Before parting with the judgment it is necessary to remind the KPTCL that pension payable to its employees upon superannuation is a property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and it constitutes a fundamental right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The deprivation of even a part of this amount cannot be accepted, except in accordance with law, as pension is neither a bounty, charity or a gratuitous payment but an indefeasible right of an employee in terms of the Rules. Terminal benefits will enable a retired employee to live a life free from want, with decency, independence and self-respect. Depriving such right to livelihood, will leave a pensioner fall on the thorns of life and bleed.

Writ Petition allowed

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Vijay@Vijendra vs The State of Karnataka. Criminal Appeal 200141/2016 decided on 20 November 2020. Author, Justice P. Krishna Bhat.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348940/1/CRLA200141-16-20-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 18. Accused, as the evidence shows, has betrayed utter disdain to the inherent right of C.W.1 as a human; to her individual autonomy to choose who to love and to her right to choose a husband and even, to defer to the wishes of her parents in matters of significance in her life, which in itself is a conscious “choice”. This in essence is a fundamental right guaranteed to every individual under Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 of Constitution of India. To permit the accused to take a defence of ‘grave and sudden provocation’ in the facts and   circumstances   of   this   case   apart   from being “obnoxious”,  (Pawan  Kumar,   at  para-47)  [(2017) 7 SCC 780] will result in negation of the fundamental rights of the deceased under Articles 14, 19 (1) (a) and 21 of the Constitution of India and, as such, opposed to public policy.

19.While on this, we must hasten to add that we are not unmindful of the general position that fundamental rights not excluding those under Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 21 are all guarantees against actions of State and its instrumentalities and not against criminal offences by one citizen against another. We are even more conscious of the ‘felt necessities of the time’ that wherever text does not inhibit and context demands, ordinary laws of the land should be given such construction and, scope of defences available  so mapped that lofty principles enshrined under the above Articles are given full effect to and dehumanizing effect of the defences are suitably pruned without doing violence to the statute creating such defence while at the same time making it resonate with the current understanding of the concept of gender justice and dignity of the individual. ‘The Declaration of Independence’ of July 4, 1776 says in ringing tones, “……..we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, – That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and happiness “.

20. Life, Liberty and pursuit of Happiness is an entitlement and a right without which there cannot be a ‘right to life’ for an individual and shorn of the same, it will only be a creature existence. Thus viewed, extending the protective umbrella of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation to the accused, in the facts and circumstances of this case, will have the effect of robbing the victim of her right to express her `choice’. In other words, the defence of ‘grave and sudden’ provocation shall not avail an accused if the result of permitting such a defence is to dehumanise the person of victim, stultify her individual autonomy, agency and dignity.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

R. Basavaraj vs State of Karnataka and others. Writ Petition 11566/2020 decided on 19 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348982/1/WP11566-20-19-11-2020.pdf

Held: Paragraph 21..Alternate remedy -…Rule 15 (1) provides that the validity of the election of the President or the  Vice-President  may be called in question by a petition presented to the District Judge, within seven days from the date of declaration of the election, by any candidate at such election or by three or more Councillors joined together as petitioners. Clause (3) of Rule 15 provides that the petitioner  shall join as respondents to his petition where the petitioner in addition to claiming a  declaration that the election of the returned candidate is void and claims a further declaration that he himself    or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting  candidates  other  than  the petitioner, and when no such  further declaration  is claimed, only the Returning Officer as respondent. Rule 17(a)(ii)  enumerates  the grounds for declaring the election of the returned candidate as void, that being, non-compliance of the provisions of the Act or any of the Rules.

22. …A plain reading of the above provisions, do not envisage or invest powers with the District Judge to go into the question of the validity of reservation  notification.  Rule  17 invests power in the District Judge, in a duly constituted Election Petition, to declare the election of the returned candidate to be void, if in the opinion of the District Judge the ‘result’ of the election has been materially affected by any non- compliance with the provisions of the Act  or  of any of the Rules. A plain reading of the said provision would mean and refer to the action and conduct of the returned candidate in not complying with the provisions of the Act or the Rules. By any stretch of imagination, these provisions cannot be interpreted in a manner that the law invests powers in  the  District  Judge, while dealing with an Election Petition, to declare a notification issued under Rule 13 and  13-A  of the Rules as void or illegal.

23. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court  in  the case of Mr.Ravindra Nayak Vs. Karnataka  State Election Commission and Others reported in ILR 2019 KAR 1409, while considering the question of alternate remedy in the matter of reservation and rotation of seats arising out of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, but while dealing with similar provisions of law, noticed the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bharati Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka and Others (2018) 12 SCC 61. The Apex Court in the case of Bharati Reddy has held that judicial review is a part of basic structure and therefore  the  exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be said to be  an  absolute  bar, though it is left  to the  discretion of the Court as  to whether such power is to be exercised in a 65 particular case. While interpreting Section 35 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, which appears to state that the election petition could be preferred to redress a grievance where there has been non-compliance of the  provisions of the Act or Rules, or orders made thereunder,  the co-ordinate Bench has held that the principle of rotation as envisaged by the Guidelines is not merely a private right of a contestant but is a statutory requirement and such grievance if left open to be raised by every individual contestant subsequent to the  announcement  of  results would not only be impractical, but an illusory alternative remedy, and in fact no remedy at all in the light of the  discussion therein.  This Court is  in respectful agreement of the decision of the co- ordinate Bench. Therefore, in the matter of reservation of the Offices of President and Vice- President and for that matter to post of Councillors, Election Petition as provided under Rule 15 of the Rules is not a remedy.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

K.A. Ananda vs Gangadhara. Criminal Appeal 1191/2011 decided on 3 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348769/1/CRLA1191-11-03-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 13 & 14. Negotiable Instruments Act are three in numbers- Promissory note, bill of exchange and cheque. The very commencement of the word in the definition states that cheque is a bill of exchange. As a  matter of provision of law even certain gaps are permitted to be filled in by the drawee so long it does not cause prejudice to the drawer in the matter of date, amount, signature and related. In this connection any part of alteration that effects the very nature of the cheque would be a material alteration that renders the cheque invalid.

15. The plain reading of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reveals that the instrument may be either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument. Thus, even if a blank promissory note is given it cannot be taken as a defence to avoid a decree based on such instrument, once it is found that the document produced before the court satisfies the requirements of a promissory note within the meaning of the Act. In this connection I am guided by Judgment of this court in the case of H.Maregowda Vs Thippamma reported in AIR 2000 Kant 169.

Appeal allowed. Accused convicted.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

The Deputy Commissioner, Mysore District another vs M/s Kushal Enterprises. Writ Petition 2715/2020 and connected matters decided on 3 August 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/337740/1/WP2715-20-03-08-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 11….Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under section 22B(1) of the LSA Act is conferred with both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions; and Permanent Lok Adalat is invested with the power and jurisdiction to pass an award on merits as provided under sub-section (8) of section 22C after observing or following the procedure prescribed under section 22C of the LSA Act. Sub- section (8) of section 22C specifically provides that, “Where the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the dispute.”

12. The Act is silent as to whether Permanent Lok Adalat could proceed to decide the dispute ex-parte in the absence of the parties. But a conjoint reading of section 22C and section 22D of the Act which deals with the procedure of Permanent Lok Adalat, makes it evident that while conducting the conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under the Act, Permanent Lok Adalat shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. There is nothing in the amended Chapter VIA to suggest that if any of the parties fail to respond to the notice or fail to participate in the proceedings, Permanent Lok Adalat is disabled to decide the dispute or pronounce the order. The only requirement laid down under section 22D of the amended Act is that while deciding the dispute, Permanent Lok Adalat shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice and nothing more. The Act does not prohibit Permanent Lok Adalat from passing any ex-parte award. If such restriction is read into the Act, it would frustrate the very object of constituting Permanent Lok Adalat, as the respondent in every case who is invariably interested in defeating the claim of the petitioner, may thwart the impending action or decision by Permanent Lok Adalat, by successfully evading service of notice or remaining absent during the conduct of the proceedings. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for petitioners that Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to pass exparte award does not find support from any provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder.

14. …..No doubt the statute does not expressly require Permanent Lok Adalat to give reasons in support of its decision, but having assumed the jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes touching upon the rights and liabilities of the parties, failure to give reasons would render the decision invalid for the added reason that the appellate or the revisional authority would be deprived of the opportunity to test the correctness or validity of the order passed by Permanent Lok Adalat.

Compiled by S.Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal,

B.K. Padmanabha Reddy vs State of Karnataka. Criminal Petition 5775/2020 decided on 12 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348823/1/CRLP5775-20-12-11-2020.pdf

Relevant portion: Para. 1. The present petition is filed by accused .. under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. praying to release him on bail …for the offences punishable under Section 306 of IPC.

5. SPP submits…that the deceased has left a death note by mentioning the name  of the petitioner-accused No.1 and the said death note itself is self-explanatory to show that it is the petitioner- accused No.1 who is responsible for the death of the deceased.

7. But when the financial transactions have taken place in the year 2002 and on 28.7.2020 there was some conversation between the petitioner-accused No.1 and  the deceased, the same was not disclosed as to when exactly and at what time the petitioner-accused No.1 told the deceased to die or whatever she wants to do  she could do. In the absence of any specific period, it cannot be inferred that the deceased was not abetted by the petitioner-accused No.1 and because of such abetment said to have been made by the petitioner-accused No.1, the deceased has committed suicide by hanging herself. There is no clarity in mentioning the timings as to when exactly she called the petitioner-accused No.1 and who in turn told her to die. Be that as it may, even it is the specific case of the prosecution  that the deceased has  left a death note. Even though she has not informed the complainant about the factual matrix of the case, while writing the death note, at least she could  have  mentioned as to when exactly and at what time the petitioner-accused No.1 told her to die or whatever she wants to do she could do. In the absence of  any  particular material in the death note, it cannot  be  inferred that it is the petitioner-accused No.1  who  abetted the deceased and because of the same, the deceased has committed suicide. The death note and other aspects which have been intended to be  relied  upon by the prosecution are the matters which have to   be considered and appreciated during the course of trial.

Petition allowed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Jerry Paul vs State of Karnataka. Criminal Petition 5963/2020 decided on 11 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/348806/1/CRLP5963-20-11-11-2020.pdf

Held: 9. On close reading of Section 41A of the Act, it indicates that where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 41 of Cr.P.C., then the notice could be got issued to the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or suspicion exists for having committed a cognizable offence to appear before him and it also makes it clear that it is the duty of the person to comply the terms of the notice and when the said person complies and continues to comply with notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless for the reasons to be recorded. The police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested and in that regard he has to pass an order.

10. On going through the said provision and the records, admittedly a notice has been got issued under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. When once notice has been issued under Section 41A of Cr.P.C., that itself makes it clear that the arrest of the petitioner is not required. Be that as it  may. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on 10.09.2020 at about 9.30 p.m. he has been taken to custody and was there till 14.09.2020. In  that event, if police wanted to arrest him, definitely they could have done so. Not arresting and issuing notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. and sending him, goes to show that in terms of the provisions of Section 41A of Cr.P.C., they do not want to apprehend or arrest the petitioner.

11. …there is no apprehension of arrest of the petitioner-accused. Petition for anticipatory bail rejected.

Section 41A.       (1) Notice      of      appearance before police officer.The police officer shall in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub- section (1) of section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.

(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice.

(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the  notice  unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of  the opinion that he ought to  be arrested.

(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of  the  notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by the competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.