Abhiram Goswami v. Shyama Charan Nandi, 1909 SCC OnLine PC 16 : (1908-09) 36 IA 148 : (1909) 6 All LJ 857 : (1909) 19 Mad LJ 530 : (1909-10) 14 CWN 1 – Besides, Anangamohini and her successors had paid rent under their lease up to 1902, and if the lease was void as ultra vires the grantor, they were at least tenants from year to year, and therefore no question of adverse possession could arise. A tenant could not while paying rent acquire an absolute proprietary tenure against his landlord.

Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Baldeo Singh, 1922 SCC OnLine PC 46 : ILR (1923) 2 Pat 38 : (1921-22) 49 IA 399: AIR 1922 PC 272 : (1923) 45 Mad LJ 460 : (1922-23) 27 CWN 925 – With regard to the claim by adverse possession, as already observed, the mahal had all along been heir in thika; the lessee collected the rents and paid a fixed sum to the proprietor. If the thikedar failed to collect the rent from any individual tenant it would not create adverse possession against the proprietor

Abdul Rahman v. Prasony Bai, (2003) 1 SCC 488 – 32. In this case, we are also satisfied that having regard to the fact that the appellant himself was the tenant of Mangal Singh, he could not have raised the plea of adverse possession. As a tenant he could not have questioned the title of Mangal Singh. The very fact that escheat proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State also points out that the State proceeded on the premise that Mangal Singh had the right title in relation to the land in question and as he died intestate without leaving behind him any legal heir/representative, the same vested in the State. The appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was allotted the land in question admittedly on the aforementioned premise, namely, Mangal Singh at the time of his death had title to the land in question or the suit property, but he died intestate. He, therefore, cannot be permitted to prevaricate from his stand at this stage.

G. Sathyanarayana Raj v. State of Karnataka, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 1446 : ILR 2012 KAR 1831 : (2012) 2 Kant LJ 498 : (2012) 2 AIR Kant R 581 : (2012) 1 KCCR 628 – Furthermore, adverse possession, by its very nature, must be open and hostile to the person against whom it is sought to be claimed. It is inherently illogical to accept a claim for adverse possession in circumstances where the claimant essentially bases his title on a conveyance from a person against whom adverse possession is claimed. For example, a tenant may remain in possession for decades without end, but his tenure would not metamorphosise or transform into ownership by adverse possession.

S.K. Lakshminarasappa v. B. Rudraiah, 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 3545 : ILR 2012 KAR 4129 : (2012) 4 AIR Kant R 424 : (2013) 1 KCCR 672 – 73. From the aforesaid stand in the written statement it is clear that, the case of the first defendant is he is in possession of the land as a tenant from the year 1950. He has filed an application for grant of occupancy rights. Now the matter is in Supreme Court. When a person gets into the possession of the land as a tenant, his possession is lawful at the inception and if he is continuing as tenant, his possession is lawful and therefore, such a tenant who according to him got into land under a tenancy continuing in possession as a tenant is not entitled to the plea of adverse possession.

G.M. Venkatareddy v. Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 7533 : ILR 2012 KAR 3168 : (2012) 3 AIR Kant R 527 : (2012) 3 KCCR 1999. – A person in possession of property without the authorisation or permission of the title holder/owner of that property for the period prescribed by law, attains recognition and protection of his possession on equitable considerations comes to enjoy the rights of adverse possession. This possession must be (a) continuous, (b) exclusive and (c) open, in the sense of being obvious and not covert, and most importantly (d) hostile to the title owner. In Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591 their Lordships have clarified that “possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession”. A tenant or licencee cannot claim adverse possession; but if he sets up a claim rivalling and challenging the title of the lessor/licensor and deliberately stops payment of rent/fee, his initial legal possession transforms into the illegal occupation of a trespasser. If the period of prescription, twelve years for a citizen and thirty years for the Government, elapses without the title owner initiating legal action for regaining possession from the trespasser, the latter’s adverse possession is protected. This doctrine may appear to favour the transgressor, but it is arguable that in actuality it respects the human right to enjoyment of property possessed, j improved and developed by the transgressor, against an indolent and careless owner. A presumption can also be drawn that the title holder is not interested in the property any longer. It need not be equated with stealth, since the possession of the trespasser has to be open and hostile to the title owner. As has been explained in Taylor v. Twinberrow (1930) All ER 342 and Fair Weather v. St. Marlebone Property Co (1962) 2 All ER 288 adverse possession “is a negative and consequential right effected only because somebody else’s positive right to access the Court is barred by operation of law”. Such rights are protective in character and akin to the doctrine of ‘part performance’ can be employed only as a shield and not as a sword. Expectedly therefore, a suit for declaration of ownership cannot be predicated on a plea of adverse possession, as has been held in Prem Nath Wadhawan v. Inder Raj Wadhawan 1993 (3) PLR 70 (Delhi Section) State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kuma (2011) 10 SCC 404, contains a detailed debate on the equities which arise whenever adverse possession is pressed into service. The preponderance if opinion is that the operation of adverse possession protects a trespasser or transgressor of the law and therefore ought not to be made available. References to the modern jurisprudence in America, United Kingdom and European Commission of Human Rights prefers the abolition or non-application of this principle

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

Vikesh Kumar Gupta & Anr. vs The State of Rajasthan & Ors. Civil Appeal Nos.3649–3650 of 2020 decided on 7 December 2020. Justice L. NAGESWARA RAO, Justice HEMANT GUPTA, Justice AJAY RASTOGI.

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/28550/28550_2019_35_1501_24973_Judgement_07-Dec-2020.pdf

HELD: 11. Though re-evaluation can be directed if rules
permit, this Court has deprecated the practice of reevaluation and scrutiny of the questions by the courts
which lack expertise in academic matters. It is not
permissible for the High Court to examine the question papers and answer sheets itself, particularly when the
Commission has assessed the inter se merit of the
candidates (Himachal Pradesh Public Service
Commission v. Mukesh Thakur & Anr.) Courts have
to show deference and consideration to the
recommendation of the Expert Committee who have the
expertise to evaluate and make recommendations [SeeBasavaiah (Dr.) v. Dr. H.L. Ramesh & Ors.) Examining the scope of judicial review with regards to reevaluation of answer sheets, this Court in Ran Vijay
Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

12. In view of the above law laid down by this Court, it
was not open to the Division Bench to have examined
the correctness of the questions and the answer key to
come to a conclusion different from that of the Expert
Committee in its judgment dated 12.03.2019 held
that court should not re-evaluate or scrutinize the
answer sheets of a candidate as it has no expertise
the matters and the academic matters are best left to
academics.

13. A perusal of the above judgments would make it
clear that courts should be very slow in interfering with
expert opinion in academic matters. In any event,
assessment of the questions by the courts itself to arrive
at correct answers is not permissible. The delay in
finalization of appointments to public posts is mainly
caused due to pendency of cases challenging selections
pending in courts for a long period of time. The
cascading effect of delay in appointments is the
continuance of those appointed on temporary basis and
their claims for regularization. The other consequence
resulting from delayed appointments to public posts is
the serious damage caused to administration due to lack
of sufficient personnel.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

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Writ Petition filed online today challenges establishment of Karnataka Veerashaiva Lingayat Development Board.

The contention of the petitioner is that establishment of the Board is unconstitutional apart from destroying the very foundation of the secular philosophy profounded by 12^th century social reformist Basava. The Government Order isolates one of the outstanding secular philosophy founded by Basava. The Government order violates secularism which is a basic feature of the Constitution of India. Read the Writ Petition below.

PDF of the Petition

M/s. Networth Stock Broking Limited vs Shanthala. Criminal Appeal 335/2017 decided on 23 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351239/1/CRLA335-17-23-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 8. Complainant claims that it was liasioning between the accused and share broker. Further the transaction according to complainant and accused is not the first one which is one among umpteen number of transactions entered into between the complainant and the accused. It is not disputed that in the past there are instances wherein the shares were sold and made to purchase through mediation of the accused and also payments were made for choice.

9 & 13. The rule of agency is based on two principles (1) whatever a person can do by himself he can do through another. (2) He who does an act through another does it by himself. Certain regular transactions involving a person who is being represented, person representing the former and the third parties may very well be akin to agency when the binding nature of the liability/duty on the person who is so presented by his representative. Thus the person so represented is principal and who represents is agent.

15. Agency may be expressed or implied agency. Expressed agency is one wherein two parties agree for transaction where one will be acting as agent of another and person so acting as agent for valid acts bind the principal. When agent exercises authority or enters into transaction it will be authority by virtue of authority given by principal and benefit or loss principal is entitled to. Infact many of the principles are similar to that of law of partition. As a matter of fact contract of agency is considered as very partnership is concerned as extension of partnership and the implied authority of an agent.

Appeal allowed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal

Criminal Procedure Code. Section 438

Chandru vs State of Karnataka. Criminal Petition 6734/2020 decided on 4 December 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351161/1/CRLP6734-20-04-12-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 4. Admittedly, at the initial stage, this petitioner was granted bail in the present case subject to conditions. It is also admitted that the petitioner has not appeared before the trial Court as directed by the Court while granting bail. It is also admitted that the proclamation under Section 82 of Cr.P.C. is already issued and NBW is pending against the petitioner. Now the question arises as to whether at this stage, the petitioner once again can invoke Section 438 of Cr.P.C. seeking anticipatory bail in this regard. It is relevant to mention the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Pradeep Sharma reported in (2014) 2 SCC 171 wherein, the Court referred to its earlier judgment in the case of Lavesh vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 8 SCC 730 extracted paragraph 12 therein and held as under:

“16. Recently, in Lavesh v.  State (NCT of Delhi), this Court (of which both of us were parties) considered the scope of granting relief under Section 438 vis-à-vis a person who was declared as an absconder or proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code. In para 12, this Court held as under:

12. From these materials and information, it is clear that the present appellant was not available for interrogation and investigation and was declared as ‘absconder’. Normally, when the accused is ‘absconding’ and declared as a ‘proclaimed offender’, there is no question of granting anticipatory bail. We reiterate that when a person against whom a warrant had been issued and is absconding or concealing himself in order to avoid execution of warrant and declared as a proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.

7. It is clear from the above decision that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.”In view of the above, the position of law is clear on the subject. The petitioner was already granted bail and he had not complied with the conditions imposed in the said order. The petitioner is already proclaimed as an absconding accused and NBW is issued against him. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to seek the discretionary relief of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. at this stage.

Hence, the petition is dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

M Shivaraju and another vs The State of Karnataka and another. Writ Petition 10216 OF 2020 (LB-BMP) PIL C/W Writ Petition 11077 OF 2020 (LB-BMP) PIL and Writ Petition 1892 OF 2020 (LB-BMP) PIL decided on 4 December 2020.

Judgment Link https://karnatakajudiciary.kar.nic.in/noticeBoard/WP-10216-of-2020-%20BBMP-Elections.pdf

ORDER (i) We direct the State Government to publish the final
notification of reservations as per clause (c) of sub-section
(1) of Section 21 of the said Act of 1976 for 198 Wards as
per the delimitation notification dated 23rd June, 2020. We
grant time of one month from today to publish the final notification, though, as per the assurance given by the
Government, as recorded in the order dated 22nd
September 2020, the same was to be published within two
weeks from 22nd September 2020;

(ii) We direct the State Election Commission to hold election of
BBMP as expeditiously as possible by publishing the
election programme within a maximum period of six weeks
from the date on which final reservation Notification is
published;

(iii) We make it clear that elections shall be held for 198 Wards
as per the notification of delimitation of Wards already
published on 23rd June, 2020;

(iv) The petitions are allowed on the above terms with no
orders as to the costs.

Eight seventy five benches, taken up cases 2,31,365, disposed cases 1,15,938, settlement amount Rs. 357,71,94,758 – all this in a single day via video conferencing. This is the success story of Mega Lok Adalat held on 19 September 2020.

The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is aimed to provide free and competent Legal Services to the weaker sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities and to organize Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on a basis equal opportunity; to promote an inclusive legal system in order to ensure fair and meaningful justice to the marginalized and disadvantaged sector; creating legal awareness, legal aid and settlement of disputes through amicable settlement are the main functions of the Authority.

The physical Lok-Adalat was held on 8 February 2020. The total number of benches were 906. Taken up cases 1,86,980. Disposed cases 70,822 and settlement amount was Rs. 256,25,06,636.

However, the real challenge was to arrange a Lok Adalat with equal magnitude during Covid-19 scenario. Hundreds of Judicial Officers, court staff, learned Advocates and Honorable Judges of Karnataka High Court took up the task of holding the Lok Adalat via video conferencing.

The statistics show E-Lok Adalat achieved better results. This is not to in anyway undermine earlier achievements.

Technology coupled with strong determination to achieve speedy justice has made KSLSA’s ‘Success Story of 2020’.

The next Mega E-Lok Adalast is scheduled to be held on 19 December 2020. Details of the event will be shared soon.

• 

Legal awareness programmes are taken up for empowerment of legal knowledge to all the citizens in general and to the weaker sections of the society in particular. Various activities are taken up to reach the vulnerable sections of the society such as SC/ST, Women, Industrial Labourers etc.

The Authority provides legal aid by way of providing the services of able efficient services of Lawyers. Any person, who fulfills the criteria, is entitled for the legal Aid.

Lok Adalats organized by the Authorities and the Taluk Committees help the disputing parties to come to settlement through conciliation and such settlement reached before a Lok Adalat becomes a record having equal status as that of a judgment/decree of the Court.

Karnataka State Legal Services Authority is a Statutory Body constituted under a Central Legislation “Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987”. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of India is the Patron-in-Chief of National Legal Services Authority. Sr. Judge of the Supreme Court of India is the Executive Chairman of the National Legal Services Authority. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of High Court of Karnataka is the Patron-in-Chief of Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, Bangalore. Sr. Judge of High Court of Karnataka is the Executive Chairman of Karnataka State Legal Services Authority.

The Chief Justice of India is the Patron-in-Chief of National Legal Services Authority. The Chief Justice, High Court of Karnataka, is the Patron-in-Chief of Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, Bengaluru and Senior most Judge, High Court of Karnataka, is the Executive Chairman of Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, Bengaluru. State Legal Services Authority is working through the Member Secretary and monitoring and guiding the District Legal Services Authorities and Taluka Legal Services Committees in the State in achieving the aims and objectives of the Act. There are 30 District Legal Services Authorities in the State of Karnataka. 150 Taluka Legal Services Committees are functioning under District Legal Services Authorities in the State. District Legal Services Authority is headed by Principal District & Sessions Judge as Chairman, Sr. Civil Judge cadre Officer or Principal CJM of the District as the Member Secretary. Taluka Legal Services Committees are headed by the jurisdictional Principal Senior Civil Judge as Chairman and the Principal Civil Judge as the Member Secretary. There are three High Court Legal Services Committees i.e., at Bengaluru, Dharwad and Kalaburagi which are chaired by the sitting Judge of the High Court of Karnataka. Hon’ble Mr. Justice L. Narayana Swamy, Judge, High Court of Karnataka is the Chairman of High Court Legal Services Committee, Bengaluru. The general public who need any legal help / legal aid may contact the concerned Taluka Legal Services Committee / District Legal Services Authority, High Court Legal Services Committees or Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, as the case may be.

S. Basavaraj, Member, Karnataka State Bar Council

Husensab vs Basayya and another. Civil Revision Petition 100033/2019 decided on 30 September 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/342240/1/CRP100033-19-30-09-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 5. On the basis of the submissions made by Sri.Mrutyunjay Tata Bangi, learned counsel for the petitioner, the questions which would arise for determination are: (1) Whether the Plaintiff is free to value the Suit in any manner it deems fit and just, by making payment of the court fee could such a plaintiff change the jurisdiction of the Court? (2) Whether in a suit for specific performance, it is only the value of the property shown in the said agreement that would have to be considered for the purpose of jurisdiction or would any other item like cost of issuance of legal notice be included so as to increase the valuation. (3) What would be the role of the Court in the event of an artificial increase in the valuation altering the jurisdiction of the Court?

Provisions of Order VII Rule 10 & 10A, 10B, Civil Procedure Code, Section 40 and 50 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act are noticed.

9.5 ….a party cannot by artificially inflating the valuation or undervaluing the Suit be allowed to file a particular suit before a Court which would in the absence of such incorrect valuation not have any jurisdiction to try the matter. Merely because the Plaintiff is willing to pay higher court fee by inflating the valuation, he cannot be permitted to do so since the hierarchy of the Court dictates that particular Suit with particular valuation would have to be filed and tried by a particular Court, thus, giving rise to a vested right to the defendant that the Suit of particular nature of particular valuation would be tried by that particular Court only and not by any other Court.

Paragraphs 10.2, 10.3, 10.4 & 10.5 … where the Suit is for a specific performance of contract of sale, the fee shall be computed on the amount of consideration. In the present case, apart from the valuation made as regards the consideration under the agreement of sale, the Plaintiff has added another item, namely the cost of issuance of legal notice to totally value the Suit at Rs.5,01,000/-. It is only by the addition of the relief, in this instance, towards legal notice, namely Rs.1,000/- that the valuation came to be increased in such a manner that the jurisdiction of the Court itself came to be changed. This in my considered opinion is not permissible.

Paragraphs 11.1 & 11.2 The Court would have to carefully examine the mode and methodology of the valuation made by the Plaintiff, more particularly when such a valuation would have the impact of altering the jurisdiction of the Court. The court cannot merely on the basis of the of the Plaintiff being willing to make payment of the court fee permit such a plaintiff to value the Suit at his whims and fancies and make payment of the stamp duty on that basis. The Court while dealing with the same and more so on an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC would have to determine the valuation. The Court would also have to separate the main relief from the ancillary relief in order to ascertain the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction and that for payment of court fee separately and come to a finding that it is competent to take up the matter and that the Suit has been filed in a proper and competent court.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.

Abhijeet vs Ramachandra and another. 100125/2018 decided on 28 August 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/339894/1/CRP100125-18-28-08-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contends that because the challenge is not just  to  the  sale deed but also to the power of attorney executed by  the first respondent, it would tantamount seeking cancellation of the power of attorney as well as the sale deed and therefore the suit should be valued under Section 38 of the KCF & SV Act as per the consideration for which the sale deed is executed.

9. The learned counsel for the  petitioner elaborates canvassing that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satheedevi Vs. Prasanna and Another 2010 AIR SCW 3754 has held that  the expression “value of the subject matter of the suit” as found in the provisions of Section 40 of the Kerala Court- Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (which is pari materia with Section 38 of the KCF & SV Act) should be understood as the ‘value for which the document is executed’. As such, the expression ‘market value’ as found in Section 7(2) of the KCF & SV Act should also, wherever the provisions of Section 38 thereof apply, should be read as “value for which the document is executed” as interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act.

11. The entire controversy  as  regards  the valuation of the suit and the payment of proper court fee will have to be examined from the perspective of the nature of the subject property which is in lis between the petitioner and the respondents.

12.The provisions of Section 7 of the KCF & SV Act stipulate that where the fee payable under this Act depends on the ‘market value’ of any property, such value shall be determined as on the date of presentation of the suit; and insofar as the land which forms part of the  estate paying permanently settled annual revenue to the Government, the market value of the land for the different suits mentioned therein shall be twenty-five times the revenue payable. This different mode of determining the market value insofar as the agricultural land under Section 7 of the KCF & SV Act is applicable  not only to  the reliefs that will have to be valued under Section  24 and other provisions of the KCF & SV Act but also under Section 38 of the KCF & SV Act.

14…..the case on hand before this Court could be distinguished insofar as the applicability of the enunciation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision inasmuch as the significance of a separate mode for valuation in cases of lands which are assessed to annual revenue as provided under Section 7  of the KCF & SV Act was not a subject matter for decision by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. The subject matter in this case is admittedly  an agricultural land. The provisions of Section 7(2) of the KCF & SV Act provide for a separate mode for valuation for different suits insofar as agricultural lands which are assessed for annual revenue. This modes applies to even a suit for cancellation as is obvious from the provisions of Section 7 (2) of the KCF & SV Act of sale deed; and the interpretation the expression market value as found in Section 7 of the KCF & SV Act should be read as the valuation for which a document is executed will amount to rendering the provisions of Section 7(2) of the KCF & SV Act, and therefore the entire scheme thereunder, otiose. This would be against the settled canon that an interpretation which renders a statutory provision otiose should be avoided while interpreting a provision of the statute.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.