We use words “Judge” and “Justice” while addressing judges of trial courts and constitutional courts respectively.  Many of us do not know the exact reason for addressing them as such. Judges of Constitutional Courts are addressed with a prefix ‘Justice’ even after their retirement.  

During the birth centenary celebrations of former Chief Justice D.M. Chandrashekar on 26 September 2020 organised by Basava Samithi,  Shri. Shivarudra Swamiji of Belimutt, Bangalore  gave a new and beautiful dimension to this prefix ‘Justice’.

“Judges who discharge their duties in trial courts are often constrained by legislation, rules and precedents of higher courts. They decide lis between parties. However, a Constitutional Court Judge travels beyond these shackles to do complete justice to parties. The vision and aim of Constitutional Court Judge is to do justice no matter what. This is why they are called ‘Justice’. They are not bound by constraints. They are the very embodiment of the concept of Justice. This noble work undertaken by them does not stop with their retirement. They continue to do justice in all walks of life by enlightening the general public and bringing changes in society. The oath they take at the time of their appointment continues till they meet their Creator. In this way, they are Justices for life. This is why we call them ‘Justice’” even after their retirement” – Swamiji said.  

The article “The History, Meaning and Use of the Words Justice and Judge” by Jason Boatright, published in St. Mary’s Law Journal explains the terms Judge and Justice as follows.

“The words justice and judge have similar meanings because they have a common ancestry. They are derived from the same Latin term, jus, which is defined in dictionaries as “right” and “law.” However, those definitions of jus are so broad that they obscure the details of what the term meant when it formed the words that eventually became justice and judge. The etymology of jus reveals the kind of right and law it signified was related to the concepts of restriction and obligation. Vestiges of this sense of jus survived in the meaning of justice and judge.

Although justice and judge have similar meanings rooted in a shared ancestry, they are not quite the same. There are two reasons for this. First, they are constructed from the addition of different Latin suffixes to jus, and those suffixes had different meanings. Second, justice and judge entered the English language at different times; people began to use the word justice when England’s legal system was different from how it was when they started to use judge. Centuries ago, these two facts combined to make justice refer to one who embodies the law and judge to mean one who speaks the law.

There are more similarities than differences between the words justice and judge, but the differences are important. For example, justices may insist they are not judges, and judges sometimes correct people who call them justices. These distinctions can be difficult to keep straight. Trial and intermediate appellate court judges in most states and in the federal judicial system are called judges, while those on the highest courts are justices. But that is not the case in New York, where some trial judges are known as justices, or in Texas, where intermediate appellate judges are called justices, and some of the highest court judges are judges.

The similarities and differences between justices and judges are not just matters of title or courtesy, they are also important matters of law. A justice of a final court of appeal might make new law through a judicial decision, while another justice might consider this an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative power.”

Though the above explanation sounds logical, Swamiji’s explanation gives a new dimension imposing a larger social responsibility on the Constitutional Court Judges during and after their tenure. They continue to be torchbearers. If we look at the lives of Justice D.M. Chandrashekar and Justice Billappa of Karnataka High Court after their retirement, it is not very difficult to perceive the words of Swamiji in the right perspective.

S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal – raj@dakshalegal.com

ಕೃಷಿ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನ ವ್ಯಾಪಾರ ಮತ್ತು ವಾಣಿಜ್ಯ (ಉತ್ತೇಜನ ಮತ್ತು ಸೌಲಭ್ಯ) ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಹಾಗೂ ೨. ರೈತರ (ಸಬಲೀಕರಣ ಮತ್ತು ಸಂರಕ್ಷಣೆ) ಬೆಲೆ ಖಾತರಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದ ಮತ್ತು ರೈತ ಸೇವೆಗಳ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಇವೆರಡರ ಅಡಿ ರೈತ ಮತ್ತು ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿಗಳ ಮದ್ಯೆ ಉ೦ಟಾಗುವ ವಿವಾದಗಳನ್ನು ಬಗೆಹರಿಸುವ ಅಧಿಕಾರ ಸರ್ಕಾರಿ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳಿಗೆ ಕೊಟ್ಟಿರುವುದು ಸರಿಯಲ್ಲ ಎ೦ದು ನನ್ನ ಅನಿಸಿಕೆ.

ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ಉಚ್ಚ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಯಲಯದ ಇತ್ತೀಚಿನ ಪೂರ್ಣಪೀಠದ ತೀರ್ಪು ಅಸಿಸ್ಟೆ೦ಟ್ ಕಮೀಷನರ್ ಮತ್ತು ಡೆಪೂಟಿ ಕಮಿಷನರ್ ಇವರ ಮು೦ದೆ ಭೂ ಮಾಲೀಕರು ದಶಕಗಳ ಕಾಲ ಪರದಾಡುವ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಅತ್ಯ೦ತ ಖೇದ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಪಡಿಸಿದೆ. ಸರ್ಕಾರಿ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳ ಕೆಲಸದ ಒತ್ತಡ, ಮ೦ತ್ರಿಗಳ ಸಭೆ ಮತ್ತು ಅಧಿಕಾರಶಾಹಿಯ ಮೂಲಭೂತವಾದ ಅಸಡ್ಡೆಯಿ೦ದಾಗಿ ಸಾವಿರಾರು ರೈತರು ಕಚೇರಿಗಳಿಗೆ ಅಲೆಯುತ್ತಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಇ೦ತಹ ಸನ್ನಿವೇಶದಲ್ಲಿ ರೈತ ಹಾಗೂ ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿಗಳ ವಿವಾದಗಳನ್ನೂ ಈ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳಿಗೆ ವಹಿಸಿರುವುದು ಖ೦ಡಿತ ಸರಿಯಲ್ಲ. ಕಾಯಿದೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ವಿವಾದ ಬಗೆಹರಿಸಲು ಕಾಲಮಿತಿ ನಿಗದಿಪಡಿಸಿದ್ದರೂ, ಇದನ್ನು ಪಾಲಿಸುವುದು ಸಾದ್ಯವೇ ಇಲ್ಲ ಎ೦ಬುದು ನಮಗೆ ಅನುಭವದ ಮೂಲಕ ತಿಳಿದಿದೆ. ಈ ಎರಡು ಕಾಯಿದೆಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ವಿವಾದ ಪರಿಹಾರ ಕ್ರಮವನ್ನು ನೋಡೋಣ.

1. ಕೃಷಿ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನ ವ್ಯಾಪಾರ ಮತ್ತು ವಾಣಿಜ್ಯ (ಉತ್ತೇಜನ ಮತ್ತು ಸೌಲಭ್ಯ) ಕಾಯ್ದೆ-2020. Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 2020. ರೈತ ಮತ್ತು ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿ ನಡುವಿನ ವಹಿವಾಟಿನಿಂದ ಯಾವುದೇ ವಿವಾದ ಉಂಟಾದರೆ ಅವರು ಸಂಧಾನದ ಮೂಲಕ ಪರಸ್ಪರ ಸ್ವೀಕಾರಾರ್ಹ ಪರಿಹಾರವನ್ನು ಪಡೆಯಬಹುದು ಆದರೆ ಇದಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಅಂತಹ ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ Sub-Divisional Magistrate ಇವರಿಗೆ ಸಲ್ಲಿಸಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ ಈ ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಅವರೇ ನೇಮಕ ಮಾಡಿದ ಒಬ್ಬ ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಶ ಮತ್ತು ನಾಲ್ಕು ಸದಸ್ಯರಿರುವ ಒ೦ದು ಸಂಧಾನ ಮಂಡಳಿಗೆ ವರ್ಗಾಯಿಸುತ್ತಾರೆ.

ಸಂಧಾನ ಮಂಡಳಿಯ ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರು ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ ಇವರ ಕೈಗೆಳಗೆ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡುವ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಯಾಗಿರುತ್ತಾರೆ. ರೈತನ ಹಾಗೂ ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿಯ ಪರ ಸಮನಾಗಿ ಸದಸ್ಯರನ್ನು ಅವರ ಶಿಫಾರಸು ಮೇರೆಗೆ ನೇಮಕ ಮಾಡಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಏಳು ದಿನಗಳ ಒಳಗಾಗಿ ಶಿಫಾರಸ್ ಮಾಡದಿದ್ದರೆ ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ ಇವರೇ ಸದಸ್ಯರನ್ನು ನೇಮಕ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು.

ವಿವಾದವು ಸಂಧಾನ ಮಂಡಳಿಯ ಮು೦ದೆ ತೀರ್ಮಾನವಾದಲ್ಲಿ ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ಅನುಗುಣವಾಗಿ ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥದ ಜ್ಞಾಪಕ ಪತ್ರವನ್ನು ತಯಾರಿಸಿ ಸಹಿ ಮಾಡಲಾಗುವುದು. ಈ ರೀತಿ ಆದ ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥವು ಉಭಯ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳಿಗೂ ಖಡ್ಡಾಯವಾಗಿ ಅನ್ವಯವಾಗುತ್ತವೆ.

ಉಭಯ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳು ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಮೇಲೆ ಹೇಳಿದ೦ತೆ ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಪರಿಹರಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗದಿದ್ದರೆ ಅವರು ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ ಅವರಿಗೆ ಮತ್ತೆ ಮೊರೆಹೋಗಬೇಕು. ಆಗ ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ ಇವರು “ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ” “Sub-Divisional Authority” ಆಗಿ ಕಾರ್ಯ ನಿರ್ವಹಿಸಿ ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥ ಮಾಡಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ.

ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರವು ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ತ್ವರಿತ ರೀತಿಯಲ್ಲಿ summary manner ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥ ಮಾಡಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರವು ಉಭಯ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳಿಗೂ ತಿಳುವಳಿಕೆ ನೀಡಿ (೧) ವಿವಾದದ ಹಣ ವಸೂಲಿಮಾಡುವ, (೨) ದ೦ಡ ವಿಧಿಸುವ ಮತ್ತು (೩) ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿಯು ಇನ್ನು ಮು೦ದೆ ರೈತರ ಮಾಲುಗಳನ್ನು ಕಾಲಮಿತಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ವ್ಯವಹರಿಸದ೦ತೆ ನಿರ್ಬ೦ದ ಹೇರುವ, ಆದೇಶಗಳನ್ನು ಮಾಡಬಹುದು.

ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರದ ಆದೇಶದಿಂದ ಬಾದೆಗೊ೦ಡ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯು ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳ ಒಳಗೆ ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ ಅ೦ದರೆ (ಕಲೆಕ್ಟರ್ ಅಥವಾ ಹೆಚ್ಚುವರಿ ಕಲೆಕ್ಟರ್) ಮು೦ದೆ ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿ ಸಲ್ಲಿಸಬಹುದು. ಅ೦ತಹ ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿಯನ್ನು ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ವಿಲೇವಾರಿ ಮಾಡಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ ಅಥವಾ ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರದ ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಆದೇಶವು ಸಿವಿಲ್ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ತೀರ್ಪಿನ ಬಲವನ್ನು ಹೊಂದಿರುತ್ತದೆ ಮತ್ತು ಅದನ್ನು ಆ ರೀತಿ ಜಾರಿಗೊಳಿಸಬಹುದು ಮತ್ತು ಭೂ ಕ೦ದಾಯದ ಬಾಕಿ ಮೊತ್ತದ೦ತೆ ವಸೂಲಿ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು.

ಯಾವುದೇ ಸಿವಿಲ್ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯವು ಯಾವುದೇ ಮೊಕದ್ದಮೆ ಅಥವಾ ವಿಚಾರಣೆಗೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಿಸಿದಂತೆ ನ್ಯಾಯವ್ಯಾಪ್ತಿಯನ್ನು ಹೊಂದಿರುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಆದ್ದರಿ೦ದ ಮೇಲೆ ಹೇಳಿದ೦ತೆ ಹೊರಡಿಸಲಾದ ಆದೇಶಗಳ ಮೇಲೆ ಉಚ್ಚ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯಕ್ಕೆ ಮಾತ್ರ ಸ೦ವಿದಾನದ ೨೨೬ ರ ಅಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ರಿಟ್ ಅರ್ಜಿ ಸಲ್ಲಿಸಬಹುದಾಗಿದೆ ಎ೦ದು ನನ್ನ ಅಭಿಪ್ರಾಯ.

2. ರೈತರ (ಸಬಲೀಕರಣ ಮತ್ತು ಸಂರಕ್ಷಣೆ) ಬೆಲೆ ಖಾತರಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದ ಮತ್ತು ರೈತ ಸೇವೆಗಳ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ2020– Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Act, 2020. ಪ್ರತಿ ಕೃಷಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದವು ಸಂಧಾನ ಪ್ರಕ್ರಿಯೆಯನ್ನು ಹೊ೦ದಿರಬೇಕು. ಒಪ್ಪಂದಕ್ಕೆ ಪಕ್ಷಗಳ ಪ್ರತಿನಿಧಿಗಳನ್ನು ಒಳಗೊಂಡ ರಾಜಿ ಮಂಡಳಿಯ ರಚನೆಯನ್ನೂ ನಮೂದಿಸಿರಬೇಕು. ರಾಜಿ ಮಂಡಳಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಪಕ್ಷಗಳ ಪ್ರಾತಿನಿಧ್ಯವು ನ್ಯಾಯಯುತ ಹಾಗೂ ಸಮತೋಲಿತವಾಗಿರಬೇಕು.

ಯಾವುದೇ ಕೃಷಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದದಿಂದ ಉಂಟಾಗುವ ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಮೊದಲು ಸಮಾಲೋಚನೆಗೋಸ್ಕರ ಕೃಷಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದದ ನಿಬಂಧನೆಗಳ ಪ್ರಕಾರ ರಚಿಸಲಾದ ಮಂಡಳಿ ಮು೦ದೆ ಬಗೆಹರಿಸಲು ಎಲ್ಲ ಪ್ರಯತ್ನವನ್ನು ಮಾಡಬೇಕು. ಈ ರೀತಿ ತೀರ್ಮಾನವಾಗುವ ವಿವಾದಗಳನ್ನು ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥದ ಜ್ಞಾಪಕ ಪತ್ರವನ್ನು ಅದಕ್ಕೆ ಅನುಗುಣವಾಗಿ ತಯಾರಿಸಿ ಸಹಿ ಮಾಡಬೇಕು. ಈ ರೀತಿ ಆದ ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥವು ಉಭಯ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳಿಗೂ ಖಡ್ಡಾಯವಾಗಿ ಅನ್ವಯವಾಗುತ್ತವೆ.

ಒ೦ದು ವೇಳೆ ಕೃಷಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದವು ರಾಜಿ ಪ್ರಕ್ರಿಯೆಯನ್ನು ಒಳಗೊ೦ಡಿರದಿದ್ದರೆ ಅಥವಾ ಸ೦ದಾನ ಶುರುವಾದ ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ರಾಜಿಯಾಗದಿದ್ದರೆ ವಿವಾದಗಳನ್ನು ಬಗೆಹರಿಸಲು ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳು ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರವಾಗಿರುವ ಸಂಬಂಧಪಟ್ಟ ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಮ್ಯಾಜಿಸ್ಟ್ರೇಟ್ ಅವರನ್ನು ಸಂಪರ್ಕಿಸಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಈ ರೀತಿ ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಸ್ವೀಕರಿಸಿದ ನಂತರ, ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರವು, ಅಂತಹ ವಿವಾದವನ್ನು ಬಗೆಹರಿಸಲು ರಾಜಿ ಮಂಡಳಿಯನ್ನು ನೇಮಕ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು ಅಥವಾ ತಾನೇ ತೀರ್ಮಾನ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು. ಸಮಂಜಸವಾದ ಅವಕಾಶವನ್ನು ನೀಡಿದ ನಂತರ ದಂಡ ಮತ್ತು ಬಡ್ಡಿಯೊಂದಿಗೆ ವಿವಾದದಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಮೊತ್ತವನ್ನು ಮರುಪಡೆಯಲು ಆದೇಶ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು ಮತ್ತು (೧) ಮೊತ್ತವನ್ನು ಪಾವತಿಸಲು ಪ್ರಾಯೋಜಕರು ವಿಫಲರಾದರೆ ದಂಡವನ್ನು ಒಂದೂವರೆ ಪಟ್ಟು ವಿಸ್ತರಿಸಬಹುದು (೨) ಮೊತ್ತವನ್ನು ಮರುಪಡೆಯಲು ರೈತನ ವಿರುದ್ಧ ಆದೇಶವಿದ್ದರೆ (ಮುಂಗಡ ಪಾವತಿ ಅಥವಾ ಒಳಹರಿವಿನ ವೆಚ್ಚ)  ಆಗ ಅಂತಹ ಮೊತ್ತವು ನಿಜವಾದ ವೆಚ್ಚವನ್ನು ಮೀರಬಾರದು. (೩) ಕೃಷಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದವು ಈ ಕಾಯಿದೆಗೆ ವಿರುದ್ಧವಾಗಿದ್ದರೆ ಅಥವಾ ರೈತನ ತಪ್ಪು ಕೈ ಮೀರಿದ ಕಾರಣಗಳಿ೦ದ (ಅತಿವೃಶ್ಟಿ, ಪ್ರವಾಹ, ಬರಗಾಲ ಇತ್ಯಾದಿ) ಆದಲ್ಲಿ ರೈತನ ವಿರುದ್ದ ಯಾವುದೇ ಆದೇಶವನ್ನೂ ಹೊರಡಿಸಬಾರದು.

ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರವು ಹೊರಡಿಸಿದ ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಆದೇಶವೂ ಸಿವಿಲ್ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ತೀರ್ಪಿನ ಬಲ ಹೊ೦ದಿರುತ್ತದೆ. ಮತ್ತು ಆ ರೀತಿಯೇ ಜಾರಿಗೊಳಿಸಬಹುದು. ಆದರೂ ಇದು ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿಗೆ ಒಳಪಟ್ಟಿರುತ್ತದೆ. ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರದ ಆದೇಶದಿಂದ ಬಾದಿತರಾದ ಯಾವುದೇ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯು ಕಲೆಕ್ಟರ್ ಅಥವಾ ಕಲೆಕ್ಟರ್ ನಾಮನಿರ್ದೇಶನ ಮಾಡುವ ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರಕ್ಕೆ ಆದೇಶದ ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳೊಳಗಾಗಿ ಮನವಿ ಸಲ್ಲಿಸಬಹುದು. ಇ೦ತಹ ಮನವಿಯನ್ನು ಮೂವತ್ತು ದಿನಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ತೀರ್ಮಾನಿಸಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರವು ಹೊರಡಿಸಿದ ಪ್ರತಿಯೊಂದು ಆದೇಶವೂ ಸಿವಿಲ್ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ತೀರ್ಪಿನ ಬಲ ಹೊ೦ದಿರುತ್ತದೆ. ಮತ್ತು ಆ ರೀತಿಯೇ ಜಾರಿಗೊಳಿಸಬಹುದು. ಆದೇಶದ ಹಣವನ್ನು ಭೂ ಕ೦ದಾಯದ ಬಾಕಿ ಮೊತ್ತದ೦ತೆ ವಸೂಲಿ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು.

ವಿವಾದಗಳನ್ನು ನಿರ್ಧರಿಸುವಾಗ ಉಪ-ವಿಭಾಗೀಯ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ ಅಥವಾ ಮೇಲ್ಮನವಿ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ ಸಿವಿಲ್ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ಎಲ್ಲಾ ಅಧಿಕಾರಗಳನ್ನು ಹೊಂದಿವೆ ಅ೦ದರೆ ಪ್ರಮಾಣವಚನಕ್ಕೆ ಸಾಕ್ಷಿಗಳ ಹಾಜರಾತಿಯನ್ನು ಜಾರಿಗೊಳಿಸುವುದು, ದಾಖಲೆಗನ್ನು ಹಾಜರಿಪಡಿಸಲು ಆದೇಶ ಇವನ್ನು ಹೊರಡಿಸಬಹುದು.

ಯಾವುದೇ ಕಾರಣಕ್ಕೂ ಹಣ ವಸೂಲಿಗಾಗಿ ರೈತನ ಕೃಷಿ ಭೂಮಿಯ ವಿರುದ್ದ ಯಾವುದೇ ಕ್ರಮ ಕೈಗೊಳ್ಳಬಾರದು.

ಇಷ್ಟೆಲ್ಲ ಇದ್ದರೂ ಸರ್ಕಾರಿ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳ ಬಳಿ ಮತ್ತೆ ರೈತರನ್ನು ಅಲೆಸುವುದು ಸರಿಯಾದ ಕ್ರಮವಲ್ಲ.

ಕೊನೆಯದಾಗಿ ಹೇಳುವುದೆ೦ದರೆ – ಕ೦ಪೆನಿಗಳ ವಿಚಾರದಲ್ಲಿ ಇರುವ ಸೆಬಿ, ಸ್ತಿರಾಸ್ತಿ ರಿಯಲ್ ಎಸ್ಟೇಟ್ ವಿಚಾರದಲ್ಲಿ ಇರುವ ರೇರಾ ಮತ್ತು ಗ್ರಾಹಕ ಸ೦ರಕ್ಷಣೆ ವಿಚಾರದಲ್ಲಿ ಇರುವ ಗ್ರಾಹಕ ವೇದಿಕೆ ಈ ರೀತಿ ಯಾವುದೂ ಕೂಡ ಕಾಯಿದೆಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಇಲ್ಲ. ಈ ರೀತಿಯ ಒ೦ದು ಪ್ರಬಲವಾದ ವೇದಿಕೆಗಳು ಜಿಲ್ಲಾ ಮಟ್ಟದಲ್ಲಿ ಖ೦ಡಿತವಾಗಿಯೂ ಬೇಕಾಗಿವೆ. ಮತ್ತು ಸರ್ಕಾರಿ ಅಧಿಕಾರಿಗಳ ಬಳಿ ಮತ್ತೆ ರೈತರನ್ನು ಅಲೆಸುವುದ೦ದು ಖ೦ಡಿತವಾಗಿಯೂ ತಪ್ಪಬೇಕಾಗಿದೆ.

ಎಸ್. ಬಸವರಾಜ್, ವಕೀಲ ದಕ್ಷ ಲೀಗಲ್, ಹಾಗು ಸದಸ್ಯ, ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್.

ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್ತಿನ ಹಿರಿಯ ಹಾಗು ಮಾಜಿ ಸದಸ್ಯರು, ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರು ಹಾಗೂ ಉಪಾದ್ಯಕ್ಷರುಗಳ ಕನಸಿನ೦ತೆ ಹಲವಾರು ವರ್ಷಗಳ ಹಿ೦ದೆ ಸ್ಥಾಪಿತವಾದ ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್ ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿಗೆ ಮತ್ತೆ ಚೈತನ್ಯ ತು೦ಬುವ ಕೆಲಸವನ್ನು ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್ತು ಕೈಗೊ೦ಡಿದೆ.

ಸೆಪ್ಟೆ೦ಬರ್ ತಾರೀಖು 28 ರ೦ದು ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿಯ ವೆಬ್ ಸೈಟ್ ಮತ್ತು ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳ ಉದ್ಘಾಟನೆ ನಡೆಯಿತು. ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮದ ವಿಡಿಯೋ ಲಿ೦ಕ್ ಇಲ್ಲಿದೆ – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nt6j7eor_0o&t=92s

ಪರಿಷತ್ತಿನ ಅಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿಯು ಸ್ವ೦ತವಾಗಿ ರಾಜ್ಯಾ೦ದ್ಯ೦ತ ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ಮಾಡಲು ಅಧಿಕಾರ ಹೊ೦ದಿದೆ. ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿಯು ಒ೦ದು ಟ್ರಸ್ಟ್ ಆಗಿ ರೂಪಿತವಾಗಿದೆ. ವಕೀಲರ ಜ್ನಾನಾರ್ಜನೆಗೋಸ್ಕರ ಕ್ರಾ೦ತಿಕಾರಿ ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ಕೈಗೊಳ್ಳುವ ಯೋಜನೆ ಇದೆ.

ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿಯ ಹಾಲಿ ಟ್ರಸ್ಟಿಗಳು -(1) ಶ್ರಿ. ಗೌತಮ್ ಚ೦ದ್, ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರು,  (2) ಶ್ರಿ. ಪ್ರಭುಲಿ೦ಗ್ ಕೆ ನಾವದಗಿ, ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯದ ಅಡ್ವೋಕೇಟ್ ಜನರಲ್, (ex officio) (3) ಶ್ರಿ. ಎಸ್. ಬಸವರಾಜ್, (4) ಶ್ರಿ. ಆರ್. ರಾಜಣ್ಣ, (5) ಶ್ರಿ. ಮಾ೦ಗಳೇಕರ್ ವಿನಯ್ ಬಾಳಾಸಾಹೇಬ್, (6) ಪರಿಷತ್ತಿನ ಕಾರ್ಯದರ್ಶಿ (ex officio), (7) ಶ್ರಿ. ಸಿ.ಎಮ್. ಜಗದೀಶ್ ಹಾಗೂ (8) ಶ್ರಿ. ಸಿ.ಆರ್. ಗೋಪಾಲಸ್ವಾಮಿ ಈರ್ವರೂ ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್ತಿನ ಮಾಜಿ ಅಧ್ಯಕ್ಷರುಗಳು.

ಈಗ ಹಲವಾರು ಸೆಮಿನಾರ್ ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ಹಮ್ಮಿಕೊ೦ಡಿದ್ದು ವಕೀಲರು ಭಾಗವಹಿಸಬೇಕಾಗಿ ಕೋರಲಾಗಿದೆ.

ಈಗಾಗಲೇ ಹಲವಾರು ವಕೀಲರ ಕಲ್ಯಾಣ ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್ತು ಮಾಡಿದೆ. ಅವೆ೦ದರೆ;

1) 58 ವರ್ಷಗಳ ನ೦ತರ ತನ್ನದೇ ಆದ ಸು೦ದರ ಸ್ವ೦ತ ಕಚೇರಿ ಕಟ್ಟಡ ಹೊ೦ದಿರುವುದು.

2) ರಾಷ್ಟ್ರದಲ್ಲೇ ಅತ್ಯ೦ತ ಶ್ರೀಮ೦ತ ಕಲ್ಯಾಣ ನಿಧಿಯನ್ನು ಬೆಳೆಸಿ ಕಾಪಾಡಿಕೊ೦ಡು ಬ೦ದಿರುವುದು.

3) ಕಲ್ಯಾಣ ನಿಧಿಯ ಚೀಟಿಗಳಿಗೆ ಸ೦ಖ್ಯೆ ಅಳವಡಿಸಿರುವುದು.

4) ವಕೀಲರಿಗೋಸ್ಕರ “ನ್ಯಾಯ ಕವಚ” ಆರೋಗ್ಯ ವಿಮೆ.

5)ಕಲ್ಯಾಣ ನಿಧಿಯ ವಾರ್ಷಿಕ ಚ೦ದಾವನ್ನು ಆನ್ ಲೈನ್ ಮುಖಾ೦ತರ ತು೦ಬುವ ವ್ಯವಸ್ತೆ.

6) ಹಲವಾರು ಕಾರ್ಯಾಗಾರಗಳನ್ನು ರಾಜ್ಯಾದ್ಯ೦ತ ನಡೆಸಿರುವುದು.

7) ಮೊದಲ ಕ೦ತಿನಲ್ಲಿ 2010 ರ ನ೦ತರ ದಾಖಲಾದ ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ, ನ೦ತರ ಎಲ್ಲಾ ಮಹಿಳಾ ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ ಮತ್ತು ಈಗ 2010 ಕ್ಕೆ ಮು೦ಚೆ ದಾಖಲಾದ ಪುರುಷ ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ ರೂ. 5000 ಧನಸಹಾಯ ಮಾಡಿರುವುದು.

8) ನೂರಾರು ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ ನಿವೃತ್ತರಾದಾ ಗ, ನಿಧನ ಹೊ೦ದಿಗಾಗ ಹಣ ಬಿಡುಗಡೆ ಮಾಡಿರುವುದು.

9) ಕಾಯಿಲೆಯಿ೦ದ ಬಳಲಿದ ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ ಹಣ ಸಹಾಯ ಮಾಡಿರುವುದು.

10) ಕೋವಿಡ್ ಕಾಯಿಲೆಯಿ೦ದ ಬಳಲಿದ ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ ಹಣ ಸಹಾಯ ಮಾಡಿರುವುದು.

11) ಪರಿಷತ್ತಿನ ಹಣದಲ್ಲಿ ಅರ್ಹ ವಕೀಲರಿಗೆ “ಕೋವಿಡ್ ಸುರಕ್ಷಾ” ವಿಮೆ ಮಾಡಿಸಿರುವುದು.

12) ಹಲವಾರು ಕಾರ್ಯಾಗಾರಗಳನ್ನು ರಾಜ್ಯಾದ್ಯ೦ತ ನಡೆಸಿರುವುದು.

13) ಕೋವಿಡ್ ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಆನ್ ಲೈನ್ ಮುಖಾ೦ತರ ನೂರಾರು ವಕೀಲರನ್ನು ದಾಖಾಲಾತಿ ಮಾಡಿರುವುದು.

ಈ ಎಲ್ಲ ಸಾಧನೆಗಳ ಜೊತೆಗೆ ಮು೦ದೆಯೂ ಕೂಡ ವಕಿಲರ ಕಲ್ಯಾಣಕ್ಕೋಸ್ಕರ ಹಲವಾರು ಕಾರ್ಯಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ಪರಿಷತ್ತು ಮಾಡಲಿದೆ.

ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರಿಷತ್ತಿನ ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿಯನ್ನು ರಾಷ್ಟ್ರ ಹಾಗೂ ಅ೦ತರಾಷ್ಟ್ರ ಮಟ್ಟದಲ್ಲಿ ಬೆಳೆಸುವ ಹಾದಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಎಲ್ಲ ವಕೀಲರ ಸಹಕಾರವನ್ನು ಪರಿಷತ್ತು ಹಾಗೂ ಲಾ ಅಕೆಡೆಮಿ ಕೋರುತ್ತದೆ.

Beli Ram vs Rajinder Kumar and another, Civil Appeal 7220-7221 /2011. Decided on 23 September 2020. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul. Justice Aniruddha Bose. Justice Krishna Murari. Judgment link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2009/29334/29334_2009_36_1501_24048_Judgement_23-Sep-2020.pdf

Held: Held:  Para 1. The sole question of law for consideration in the present appeals is whether in case of a valid driving licence, if the licence has expired, the insured is absolved of its liability.

10. We have not been able to trace out any judgments of this Court but there are judicial pronouncements of the High Courts dealing with the issue.

14. ……. If the appellant was required to take adequate care and caution to verify the driving licence at the threshold, thereafter, the burden shifted on the insurance company to prove that such due care was not taken, could it be said that having, at the first blush verified the driving licence, the appellant was absolved of the responsibility of verifying whether the driving licence was kept renewed?

15. We are of the view that once the basic care of verifying the driving licence has to be taken by the employer, though a detailed enquiry may not be necessary, the owner of the vehicle would know the validity of the driving licence as is set out in the licence itself. It cannot be said that thereafter he can wash his hands off the responsibility of not checking up whether the driver has renewed the licence. It is not a case where a licence has not been renewed for a short period of time, say a month, as was considered in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh & Ors where the benefit was given to a third party by burdening the insurance company. The licence in the instant case, has not been renewed for a period of three years and that too in respect of commercial vehicle like a truck. The appellant showed gross negligence in verifying the same.

Following observations of the High Court are approved. “18. When an employer employees a driver, it is his duty to check that the driver is duly licensed to drive the vehicle. Section- 5 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that no owner or person incharge of a motor vehicle shall cause or permit any person to drive the vehicle if he does not fulfil the requirements of Sections 3 and 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The owner must show that he has verified the licence. He must also take reasonable care to see that his employee gets his licence renewed within time. In my opinion, it is no defence for the owner to plead that he forgot that the driving licence of his employee had to be renewed. A person when he hands his motor vehicle to a driver owes some responsibility to society at large. Lives of innocent people are put to risk in case the vehicle is handed over to a person not duly licensed. Therefore, there must be some evidence to show that the owner had either checked the driving licence or had given instructions to his driver to get his driving licence renewed on expiry thereof. In the present case, no such evidence has been led. In view of the above discussion, I am clearly of the view that there was a breach of the terms of the policy and the Insurance Company could not have been held liable to satisfy the claim.”

Compiled by: S.Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.

Mr. S. Basavaraj, Senior Advocate and Member, Karnataka State Bar Council has approached the Supreme Court for his intervention in the pending appeal of Bangalore Turf Club and seeking allotment of the area to Judiciary, Bar Council and Law Academy. Mr. Ankur Kulkarni, Advocate, Supreme Court represents the intervention applicant.

The appeal of Bangalore Turf Club before the Supreme Court challenges the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition 31200/2009 and connected maters disposed on 22^nd March 2010. By the said judgment, the Karnataka High Court directed Bangalore Turf Club to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises where the present race course is run to the State Government. The High Court further directed the Government to develop the entire area into a mini social forest. The area occupied by Bangalore Turf Club measures about 80 acres and is located right in middle of the City.

Contents of the application: – High Court. (1) The Karnataka High Court, the highest judicial institution of the State is crumbling for want of space. The principal bench building is suffering due to lack of space to meet some of the basic necessities such as Court halls, Judges’ chambers, offices and parking space. The vision of the then Chief Justice P.C. Jain and positive response from the then Government resulted in construction of a new block facing Cubbon Park. The extension of entire building was made in 1995 that spanned across an area of 2,40,508 sq.ft, built in the same style of architecture. However, to maintain architectural integrity, the new building was built almost as an exact replica of the old building without much provision for many aspects such as required number of Court halls, Judges Chambers, Offices etc. Even the basic requirement of parking at basement level could not be made since the design of the new building was to synchronise with the old one almost in all aspects.

(2). The Karnataka High Court is currently functional in Bangalore, Dharwad and Kalaburagi. The new benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi were inaugurated on 4 and 5 July 2008, respectively. Dharwad circuit bench became a permanent bench from 25 August 2013 and Kalaburagi circuit bench became a permanent bench from 31 August 2013. While the benches at Dharwad and Kalaburagi are spacious enough to meet the requirement, the principal bench at Bangalore is facing severe space crisis. 

(3). The sanctioned strength of the Karnataka High Court is now 62. As of now 45 Judges are appointed. Few more judges are likely to be appointed soon. Even the strength of the High Court is likely to be increased. The numbers of court halls as of now are 38 and the judges’ chambers are 40 as against the immediate requirement of 45 each. The High Court, to be fully functional, must have 62 Court halls and same number of Judges Chambers. Presently, it is impossible to add even a single Judge’s chamber let alone a court hall. One hall is cannibalised into two court halls and Judges chambers are used by rotation. About 60,000 sq.ft of area in basement is being used for various offices purposes. A public interest litigation is pending which questions usage of basement. If a decision were to be taken to vacate this area, the High Court needs another 60,000 sq.ft.

(4) The annexe building of the High Court facing Cubbon Park is a new building. However, technically it is not possible to construct any additional floors on the new annex building. As of now, only ground and first floor are constructed to synchronise with the old building. High Court building lacks built up area even for basic necessities.

(5) Karnataka State Bar Council: The Bar Council which was established in 1961 has been in search of place/building for last more than 50 years. Hitherto KSBC occupied a portion of KGID building. Even now, it does not have a space of its own forget about a standalone building. It was only in 2019 the old Election Commission building adjacent to KGID building was given to KSBC that too subject to condition that KSBC should shift when alternate accommodation is provided by the government. Being the premier most statutory body representing more than 1 lakh lawyers, KSBC must have its own building with chambers, offices and auditoriums. There is no place for Academy to conduct its programmes. Even the Bar Council enrolments are being done in the premises of the existing building in a constrained atmosphere.   

(6) The Karnataka State cabinet has already decided to shift Bangalore Turf Club. The entire land area is 85 acres and it belongs to Government. Shifting of Bangalore Turf Club is imminent. The entire area is available for a planned development with greenery ensured. The entire area can be given to Judiciary for construction of Judicial Complex. The Judicial Complex can have about 1crore square feet built-up area and the entire judicial establishments in the City of Bangalore can be accommodated in the building. The building can be a state-of-the-art structure with all judicial establishments in the city of Bangalore including High Court, Civil Court, Criminal Court, Labour Court, Family Court and all judicial establishments, auditoriums, meetings halls, chambers for lawyers, Judicial Academy, Karnataka State Bar Council, Advocates Academy, Advocates Association etc.

(7) As of now, the judicial establishments are scattered all over the city of Bangalore. To reach from one court to another is professional nightmare. A comprehensive, combined and consolidated judicial complex will be a permanent solution. If all the judicial establishments are shifted to the new Judicial Complex, about 20,00,000 square feet presently occupied by judicial establishments in the city can be made available for the Government. The Attara Kacheri can be converted as museum and the building facing Cubbon Park can be used for Law Ministry and other departments.

(8) The institution of judiciary has to be provided with own standalone buildings with sufficient space and infrastructure. It’s time to overcome constraints of Attara Kacheri with vertical construction or shift to Bangalore Turf Club area. The applicant has sought for suitable direction to the State of Karnataka to allot the area now occupied by the Bangalore Turf Club for construction of a Judicial Complex to accommodate all judicial establishments like High Court, all judicial establishments presently scattered all over the city, Karnataka State Bar Council, Law Academy and other institutions.

The Karnataka High Court (Justice Krishna Dixit and Justice P. Krishna Bhat) holds that though contracting a second marriage by a Muslim may be lawful, but is more often than not, causes enormous cruelty to the first wife justifying her claim for divorce .

“There is no dispute that Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 recognizes ‘cruelty of conduct of the husband as a ground for the dissolution of marriage at the instance of aggrieved ‘woman married under Muslim law’. It needs to be stated that ‘marital cruelty’ as a concept, by its very nature defies definition; courts have emphasized that in the backdrop of spousal relationship, words, acts or conduct constituting cruelty are infinitely variable with the increasing complexities of modern life; no attempt at defining likely to succeed fully; merely because an act is lawful, it does not per se become justifiable in married life; for example, of course subject to all just exceptions, smoking and drinking are not unlawful; snoring too, is not, but still in certain circumstances they may amount to cruelty to a sensitive spouse; on the same analogy though contracting a second marriage by a Muslim may be lawful, but it more often than not, causes enormous cruelty to the first wife justifying her claim for divorce.” observes the High Court.

The High Court refers to and extracts from the judgment of Kerala High Court, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Shahulameedu vs Subaida Beevi 1970 K.L.T. 4 on the right of a Muslim to practise polygamy under the Sheriat as follows: “It follows from these passages that the Koranic injunction has to be understood in the perspective of prevalent unrestricted polygamy and in the context of the battle in which most males perished, leaving many females or orphans and that the holy prophet himself recognised the difficulty of treating two or more wives with equal justice and, in such a situation, directed that an individual should have only one wife. In short, the Koran enjoined monogamy upon Muslims and departure therefrom as an exception. That is why, in the true spirit of the Koran, a number of Muslim countries have codified the personal law wherein the practice of polygamy has been either totally prohibited or severely restricted. (Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Pakisthan, Iran, the Islamic Republics of the Soviet Union are some of the Muslim countries to be remembered in this context.)”

The High Court also refers to and extracts from the Judgment of the Kerala High Court in Saidali K.H. vs V. Saleena, Mat Appeal No. 94/2007 disposed on 22:10:2008 (Justice Harun Ul Rashid ) ““The practice of having more than one wife, though not totally prohibited, is discouraged by imposing stringent conditions making it almost impossible to keep more than one wife at a time. These stringent conditions were imposed on the man even during the life time of Prophet Mohammed. The concept of polygamy, limited to four, with restrictions was permissible during that time due to unavoidable facts and circumstances prevalent during the said period. Going by Quranic versions, permission to marry more than one woman, but not more than four was given at a time when there were lots of orphans, widows and captives of war who were unable to lead a dignified life and their strength was far more than the men which gave rise to social problems in the  society. Appeal to the people to marry orphans, widows and captives of war was necessitated on account of social inequality, economic distress and like conditions to which women were put to suffer. The mandate issued by Prophet Mohammed was intended to save the destitute and to protect their belongings . Even after fifteen centuries, some people of our country seem to be very particular in following the aforesaid tenets of Islam unmindful as to whether such circumstances exist or not. People of the community contract more than one marriage mostly for their personal pleasure. There is no system in our country to ascertain and decide whether such persons are eligible to contract more than one marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. We have seen women and children standing in the verandah of courts who are either divorced women or second, or third or fourth wife of such persons seeking maintenance from their husbands. Unrestricted freedom to marry women of their choice was enjoyed by men and subsequently to casually pronounce talaq according to their whims and fancies. The indiscreet conduct of such persons in marrying and keeping more than one wife is continuing without any restriction. Most of such marriages are illegal since they are against Quranic injunctions.”

The judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Itwari vs Smt. Asghari, AIR 1960 Allahabad 684 is referred and the relevant portion reproduced: “Muslim Law as enforced in India has considered polygamy as an institution to be tolerated but not encouraged, and has not conferred upon the husband any fundamental right to compel the first wife to share his consortium with another woman in all circumstances. A Muslim husband has the legal right to take a second wife even while the first marriage subsists, but if he does so, and then seeks the assistance of the Civil Court to compel the first wife to live with him against her wishes on pain of severe penalties including attachment of property, she is entitled to raise the question whether the court, as a court of equity, ought to compel her to submit to co-habitation with such a husband. In that case the circumstances in which his second, marriage took place are relevant and material in deciding whether his conduct in taking a second wife was in itself an act of cruelty to the first.“

The High Court also refers to 150 year old Privy Council judgement in Moonshee Bazloor Ruheem vs Shamsunnisa Begum (11 MIA 551) that “Indian law does not recognise various types of such as ‘Muslim’cruelty, ‘Christian’cruelty ‘Jewish’ cruelty, and so on, and the test of cruelty is based on the universal and humanitarian standards, that is to say, conduct of the husband which would cause such bodily or mental pain as to endanger the wife’s safety or health. The onus is on the husband who takes a second wife to explain his action and prove that his taking a second wife involved no insult or cruelty to the first, and in the absence of cogent explanation the Court will presume under modern conditions that the action of the husband in taking a second wife involved cruelty to the first, and it would be inequitable for the Court to compel her against her wishes to live with such a husband.”

The High Court upheld the Judgment of the family court Vijayapura which decreed the first wife’s suit for dissolution marriage.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/339311/1/MFA201154-18-17-08-2020.pdf

MFA 201154/2018 disposed on 17 August 2020. Yusufpatel vs Ramjanbi

S.Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal. raj@dakshalegal.com

Indian Penal Code. Cheating and Forgery. When the issue regarding genuineness of the document is pending consideration before the civil court, Criminal proceedings cannot continue on the same issue. It would prejudice the interest of the parties understand or taken by them in the civil suit. Criminal proceedings quashed.

Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel and others vs State of Gujarat and others. (2020) 3 SCC 794

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(2020) 3 SCC 794

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. Once an insolvency professional is appointed to manage company, erstwhile directors cannot litigate on behalf of the company. also see Party violating the interim order. Court may refuse to hear him on merits of the case. Karnataka High Court 4:9:2020.

M/s Alpine Wineries Pvt Ltd vs M/s. Pridhvi Asset Reconstruction. Writ Petition 1631 /2020. Decided on 4 September 2020. Justice P.S. Dinesh Kumar. Judgment link: https://karnatakajudiciary.kar.nic.in/noticeBoard/wp-1631-2020right-of-audience.pdf

Held:  Para 16. In the case of INNOVENTIVE INDUSTRIES LIMITED Vs. ICICI BANK AND ANOTHER (2018) 1 SCC 407, relied upon by Shri Jagadeesh, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that once the insolvency professional is appointed, the erstwhile Directors who are no longer in Management could not have maintained the appeal before the Supreme Court of India by holding thus:

“11. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties, we find substance in the plea taken by Shri Salve that the present appeal at the behest of the erstwhile Directors of the appellant is not maintainable. Dr. Singhvi stated that this is a technical point and he could move an application to amend the cause title stating that the erstwhile Directors do not represent the Company, but are filing the appeal as persons aggrieved by the impugned order as their management right of the Company has been taken away and as they are otherwise affected as shareholders of the Company. According to us, once an insolvency professional is appointed to manage the Company, the erstwhile Directors who are no longer in management, obviously cannot maintain an appeal on behalf of the Company. In the present case, the Company is the sole appellant. This being the case, the present appeal is obviously not maintainable. However, we are not inclined to dismiss the appeal on this score alone. Having heard both the learned counsel at some length, and because this is the very first application that has been moved under the Code, we thought it necessary to deliver a detailed judgment so that all Courts and Tribunals may take notice of a paradigm shift in the law. Entrenched managements are no longer allowed to continue in management if they cannot pay their debts.”

20. In PRESTIGE LIGHTS LTD., VS . STATE BANK OF INDIA (2007) 8 SCC 449, it is held that an order passed by competent court -interim or final – has to be obeyed without any reservation. If such order is disobeyed, court may refuse the party violating such order to hear him on merits. In that case, the order of the Court was not complied with by the petitioner therein. In this case, petitioner has given repeated assurances but not fulfilled them.

21. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, keeping in view the conduct of the petitioner and the law laid down in INNOVENTIVE INDUSTRIES LIMITED, in the opinion of this Court, petitioner is not entitled for the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Compiled by: S.Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.

Recently I saw a video where a Police Officer was seen removing a flag on car bonnet and replacing it with national flag. The flag “resembles” Islamic flag.

There was large scale presence of flags during Rahul Gandhi campaign in Kerala and the brouhaha followed thereafter also requires to be explained.

Please note, Islamic flag is a flag either representing Islamic denomination or religious order, civil society, or other entity associated with Islam. Islamic flags have a distinct history due to the Islamic prescription. Since the time of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, flags with certain colors were associated with Islam according to the traditions.

Since then, historical Caliphates, modern nation states, certain denominations as well as religious movements have adopted flags to symbolize their Islamic identity.

Pakistan has adopted Islamic flag with little variation to symbolise it’s Islamic identify. The national flag of Pakistan was adopted in its present form during a meeting of the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, just three days before the country’s independence, when it became the official flag of the Dominion of Pakistan. It was afterwards retained by the current-day Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The flag is a green field with a white crescent moon and five-rayed star at its centre, and a vertical white stripe at the hoist

Therefore waving Islamic flag shall not be considered/confused as one’s affiliation to Pakistan.

S.Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal. raj@dakshalegal.com