Pricewaterhouse Coopers Service vs Mohan Kumar Thakur. Miscellaneous First Appeal 8750/2019 decided on 5 November 2020. Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351911/1/MFA8750-19-05-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 18. Whether a defendant would lose the right to seek for reference of the  parties to arbitration, if the application for referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act, is filed  along with the written statement?

22 & 23. A plain reading of the provision  (Section 8) would indicate that a party to an arbitration agreement is entitled to seek for a reference to arbitration if the other party to the agreement has brought an action before a judicial authority in respect of a matter which is the subject of   an arbitration agreement. This entitlement is however subject to two riders: Firstly, that the party applies for reference before  he files his first statement of defence on the substance of the dispute and Secondly, that the application for reference should be accompanied by the original arbitration  agreement or a certified copy of the arbitration agreement.

23. The intent behind this provision is manifestly clear, which is, to ensure that once an agreement has been entered into which provides for resolution of any dispute that may arise between the parties during the working of the contract, the parties to the agreement, should seek for resolution of that dispute only through the medium of arbitration, a mode which they had voluntarily agreed to resort to at the time of entering into the agreement.

29. Thus, the key ingredient to be examined while considering whether an application for referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act is to be granted is to determine whether the defendant had unequivocally submitted to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority before whom an action has been  brought,  which in our country, would be the Civil Court before whom a suit has been filed by a party to an arbitration agreement.

33. The Apex Court in the case of Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited and Another Vs. Verma Transport Company – (2006) 7 SCC 275 has observed at paragraphs 36 and 42 as under:

“36. The expression “first statement on the substance of the dispute” contained in Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act must be contradistinguished with the expression “written statement”. It employs submission of the party to the jurisdiction of the judicial authority. What is, therefore, needed is a finding on the part of the judicial authority that the party has waived its right to invoke the arbitration clause. If an application is filed before actually filing the first statement on the substance of the dispute, in our opinion, the party cannot be said to have waived its right or acquiesced itself to the jurisdiction of the court. What is, therefore, material is as to whether the petitioner has filed his first statement on the substance of the dispute or not, if not, his application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act, may not be held wholly unmaintainable. We would deal with this question in some detail, a little later.

Waiver of a right on the part of a defendant to the lis must be gathered from the fact situation obtaining in each case. In the instant case, the court had already passed an ad interim ex parte injunction. The appellants were bound to respond to the notice issued by the Court. While doing so, they raised a specific plea of bar of the suit in view of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Having regard to the provisions of the Act, they had, thus, shown their unequivocal intention to question the maintainability of the suit on the aforementioned ground.

34. What is discernable from the above decision is that  a Court before which an application under Section  8 of the Act is made will have to record a finding as to  whether the defendant had waived his right or acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Court and  this  waiver of the right to seek for reference to arbitration must be gathered from the fact situation obtaining in  each case.

36..……even if a party submits his written statement and  thereafter,  seeks for reference and the same is not objected to by  the other side, the Apex Court has held that there would be no bar on the Court to refer the parties to arbitration. This clearly leads to the conclusion that a Court is required to give effect to the intent of the  parties to resort to the mode of resolving their disputes in the manner that they had originally agreed to.

38. ……what is to be considered while determining an application under Section 8 of the Act is as to whether the defendant has exhibited his intention to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court and has waived his right to seek for reference to arbitration.

40. ….. a party to the arbitration agreement should have indicated his clear intention to submit to the jurisdiction  of the Civil Court and should have expressly waived his right to seek for reference to arbitration and only if such  a situation existed, the judicial authority could reject the request for reference to arbitration.

45. It is in this background that the act of defendant filing its written statement is required to be viewed and not in isolation. The fact that the defendant expressly indicated that it was not submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court was manifestly evident by the act of defendant filing an application under Section 8 of the Act along with the written statement. The filing of application under Section 8 of the Act at the  very outset also makes it  clear that the defendant was not waiving its right to seek for reference to arbitration.

46.If, however, the defendant had filed its written statement and had participated in the proceedings and had then made an application seeking for reference,  then, an argument could have been advanced that the defendant had waived its right to seek for reference to arbitration.

48. We are of the view that the term ‘not later than’ used in Section 8 (1) of the Act permits the filing of an application seeking for reference of the parties along the written statement and the filing of the written statement and application for reference under Section 8 simultaneously cannot and should not lead to  an inference that the defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and had waived its right to seek for reference to arbitration as provided under  Section 8 of the Act.

Appeal allowed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.

Narayanaswamy vs The District Commissioner and others. Writ Appeal 3855/2019 decided on 6 November 2020. Chief Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/303237/1/WA3855-19-06-11-2019.pdf

Relevant paragraphs. 10. …….the proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act having been originally initiated by the appellant and the sixth respondent in the year 2007, the same was dismissed by the Assistant Commissioner. The appeal filed before the Deputy Commissioner was dismissed as withdrawn.pursuant to a memo ….under which, the appellant and the sixth respondent have unconditionally withdrew the appeal. Under these circumstances, having unconditionally withdrawn the appeal as well as the earlier proceedings initiated by them, the appellant and the sixth respondent could not have  initiated the fresh proceedings once again for a second time under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act on the same set of facts and on the same cause of action in respect of the same subject matter, i.e., the schedule property.

11. In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts and circumstances, we are of the view that once the proceedings under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act are filed/initiated   and the same are either withdrawn or dismissed on merits, a fresh petition/second petition on the same cause of action  and the same subject matter under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The second petition is  clearly barred by the principles of estoppel, acquiescence, abandonment and waiver. Accordingly, though a finding in this regard has not been recorded by either the learned Single Judge or the authorities, having regard to the undisputed material on record, a second petition under Sections 4 and 5 of the PTCL Act would not be maintainable and the same is liable to be rejected on this ground alone.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.

Narayanaswamy vs The District Commissioner and others. Writ Appeal 3855/2019 decided on 6 November 2020. Chief Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/303237/1/WA3855-19-06-11-2019.pdf

Relevant paragraphs. Judgments in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy (2003) 7 SCC 667, Situ Sahu & Others vs. State of Jharkahnd & Others (2004) 8 SCC 340, Joint  Collector  Ranga Reddy District & another vs. D.Narsing Rao & Others (2015) 3 SCC 695, Chhedi Lal Yadav & Others vs. Hari  Kishore  Yadav (dead) through L.Rs. & Others  (2018) 12 SCC 527, Nikkanti Rama Laxmi vs. State of Karnataka & Another 2017 SCC Online SC 1862, Vivek M. Hinduja & Others vs. M.Ashwatha & Others 2017 SCC online SC 1858 referred to.

17. It is relevant to state that the aforesaid judgments were not rendered with reference to the provisions and proceedings of the PTCL Act. However, in the case of Nikkanti Rama Laxmi vs. State of Karnataka & Another 2017 SCC Online SC 1862, the Apex Court applied the well settled principles governing the initiation of proceedings after an unreasonably long period to the proceedings under the PTCL Act and consequently held as under:-

9. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application  for  having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does  it  prescribe   the   period   within   which suo  motu action  may  be  taken.  This  Court  in  the  case  of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr.  Lrs.,   2017  (6)  SCALE  459  and  also  in  the  case   of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a  period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers  which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1^st January, 1939 to 31^st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years  and was allowed.  It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka  High   Court,   namely, R. Rudrappa v.Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law  Journal,  303 and G. Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga, 2000 (2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled.

18. Subsequently, the aforesaid Judgment in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav’s case and Nekkanti Rama  Lakshmi’s case were followed and reaffirmed  by  the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja & Others vs. M.Ashwatha & Others, 2017 SCC online SC 1858which is held as under:-

4. Arguments have been addressed before us at length on whether the present appellants had perfected their titles on the date of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs., and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this Court has held that the authorities entrusted with the power to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application, or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act.

In the present cases, it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases.

Relying on some  observations  in  the  case  of Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (1984) 3 SCC 301 and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka (2009) 12 SCC 193, Shri Sunil Fernandes, learned counsel on the respondents’ side submitted that the outer limit for initiating action should be 30 years.

We, however, find that the observations in those cases are not apposite and are made with reference to the period of prescription in respect of Government properties under the Limitation Act, 1963. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents  that  Section  4 of   the   Karnataka   Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. This Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v. Hargovind Jasra (2013) 3 SCC 182 reiterated the necessity of an order of a competent Court or Tribunal before which the impugned order can be declared as null and void. The Court relied on the oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888, which reads as under:

“…An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ (Smith Case, AC pp.769-70)

This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out(sic) repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy council without distinction between patent and latent defects (Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn.1994.”

In  the   case   of Pune   Municipal Corporation v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 211, this court reproduced the following observations with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid:

“39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.”

We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this principle would apply even to suo motu actions.

20. Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the instant case, we are of the considered view that the proceedings initiated by the appellant along with sixth respondent in the year 2015 were not maintainable on account of long, unreasonable and inordinate delay  and lapse of time and that the same were initiated after an unreasonably long period of thirty years after the PTCL Act came into force and about fifty years from the date of alienation.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.

Kashibai vs Hanamavva and others. Writ Petition 148540/2020 decided on 26 November 2020.

Judgement Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351330/1/WP148540-20-26-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 6. The petitioner has filed a suit for partition and separate possession. In the said suit the petitioner has clearly admitted that deceased Nimbavva is the wife of deceased Krishnegowda.  Now, by virtue of proposed amendment, the petitioner wants to withdraw the admission made by her in the

plaint. A categorical admission made in the pleading cannot be permitted to be withdrawn by the parties. In this circumstance, I would like to place reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of NAGINDAS RAMDAS VS. DALPATRAM ICHHARAM ALIAS BRIJRAM & OTHERS (1974) 1 SCC 242 where it is held as under:

“27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act,  made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”

In view of the law laid down in the above said decision, I am of the considered view that the petitioner cannot be permitted to withdraw the admission made in the pleading. Petition dismissed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj and Kriti Taggarse, Daksha Legal.

Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax and another vs M/s. Wipro Limited. Income Tax Appeal 462/2017 decided on 30 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/351234/1/ITA462-17-30-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 6. The constitution bench of the Supreme Court in SARDAR AMRJIT  SING  KALARA  VS.  PRAMOD GUPTA, (2003) 3 SCC 272 has held  that  procedural laws have always been viewed as handmaid of justice and not to hamper the cause of justice. It has further been held that technical objection which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and delay substantial and effective justice should be viewed strictly for being discouraged except when mandate of law inevitably necessitates it. (ALSO SEE: SAMBHAJI VS. GANGABAI, (2008) 17 SCC 117, RAJENDRA PRASAD GUPTA VS. PRAKASH CHANDRA MISHRA (2011) 11 SCALE 469 and RAMJI GUPTA AND ORS. VS. GOPI KRISHAN AGRAWAL (D) AND ORS. AIR 2013 SC 3099). In STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. VS. BIHAR   RAJYA   BHOOMI   VIKAS   BANK SAMITHI, (2018) 9 SCC 472, it has been held that if infraction of procedural provision does not provide for any consequences, such a provision has to be construed as directory.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj and Kriti Taggarse Daksha Legal

Nithin Basavaraj

Facebook is a social networking platform launched in February 4, 2004. As of the year 2020 more than 3 billion people use Facebook and Facebook owned services and is valued at nearly 800 billion Dollars and profited more than 15 billion dollars in the year 2019.  Facebook is now under the radar of the govt over misconduct of antitrust policy.  

This is not the first time Facebook is under scrutiny. Other big Tech giants like Apple, Google Amazon and Facebook took a brutal political lashing on July 2020 as the Democrats and Republicans of the United States of America confronted the CEO’s for pushing their market power to crush the competitors in the market space. This hearing took place for over six hours and the result of the hearing was that it showed that the tech sector had become too big and powerful, threatening rivals to competitors and to consumers and, in some cases, even democracy itself.

Amazon, meanwhile, faced scrutiny over allegations that it may have misled the consumer’s and its competitors. The e-commerce giant previously told lawmakers that it does not tap data from third-party sellers to boost sales of its own products. But Democratic representative in the hearing brought up the public reports that indicated Amazon did do so by pushing sales of its amazon basics products instead of other competitor’s products. And there was evidence that amazon did not acknowledge small book writers to promote their book sales through amazon and they only promoted giant book writers and vendors.

Example: Amazon manufactures its own cables (Lightening, Micro USB, Type C), its own battery cell for remotes, keyboard and mouses and they do push these in their website as a price reduction program and on the home page boarder content leaving out competitors to look for some revenue for amazon.

Apple being an iconic famous consumer electronics brand and a luxury brand was under scrutiny as a study by Analysis group showed that the 30 percent commission it charges many apps for the right to appear on iPhones, iPad and MacBook is close to what other platforms charge for distribution. The study left out that Apple helped popularize that 30 percent standard across the industry. The study also reviewed that Apple used to ignore app approval requests from other developers messaging sharing platforms (Other than Facebook owned apps) to promote their own famous messaging platform called the iMessage. 

Example: Apple charge 30 percent commission to other app developers upon approval but charges less than 30 percentage for amazon owned entertainment streaming service called Amazon Prime Video.

Google was also under scrutiny for dominating search engines and SEO. Google is also the default web browser, mail and maps on any consumer electronic products be it Apple, Google Pixel, Google Chromebook, Samsung and other Chinese owned brands of smartphones except Huawei which is out of the googles contract for violating terms and condition to breaching of data of its consumers.

Example: Google dominated search engines and never gave a chance to other search engines like bingo and duck duck go. This domination has made people addicted and to prefer google services and that it would be scary to imagine a world without these services. 

Facebook was in heavy scrutiny as it has also dominated social network platform by not giving anyone a fair competition in the market. It is undeniable that Facebook was the reason why Donald Trump won the election as Facebook pushed campaign of Donald trump based on the analysis of the consumer daily video watching behaviour and also political behaviour on Facebook.

This time December 2020, Facebook alone is once again under the scrutiny by a lawsuit filed on the company by FTC and the US Government for creating a monopoly environment and succeeded in doing so for nearly a decade. The reason for this is because Facebook nearly for a decade has been following ‘Buy or Bury’ approach to potential competitors in the market space.

Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg) decided that in order to have full control over the market the best way to eliminate any competition is to follow the buy approach.

In the year 2012 Instagram a social network had picked up a positive growth in the market. Seeing this, Facebook saw this a threat to them as Instagram would be the reason for Facebook to go bankrupt. To eliminate the competition from Instagram, Facebook decided to buy Instagram by offering a good deal of money i.e. 1 billion dollars to them and this resulted in a monopoly action as they never gave a chance to any rivals to threaten them openly in the business market.

In 2014, the company WhatsApp being a popular social messaging platform also decided to gain a substantial positive growth in the market. Facebook saw this as a threat to them and they decided to follow the same action or process they followed in 2012 by buying them too. Finally, in the same year 2014 Facebook also purchased WhatsApp for a good deal of money and eliminated any competition from them, which resulted in monopoly action. FTC (Federal Trade Commission) focuses on these two successful buying of the company which started a huge wave of monopoly for Facebook.

The legal filings cite internal messages from Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, such as one 2008 email that said it was “better to buy than compete”.

It’s quite hard sometimes to comprehend just how massive Facebook is. Facebook, Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp and Instagram all owned by Facebook all have more than a billion monthly users. Facebook and WhatsApp alone have more than two billion users a day.

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is arguing is that there’s a reason why Facebook came to dominate this highly lucrative sector because it acquired the competition illegally.

Both of those acquisitions were previously looked by the FTC and were approved.

Facebook’s argument that they bought these companies when they were much smaller and there was nothing to do about their success.

In other words, “don’t punish Facebook for building strong American companies” CEO of Facebook Mark Zuckerberg

Whether Instagram and WhatsApp will be broken off from Facebook will now be decided in the courts and these antitrust lawsuits will take more time.

Nithin Basavaraj, student of MBA, Greenwich University. UK

Mauna vs K.G.Mahesh Murthy. Criminal Petition 101295/2017 decided on 26 November 2020. Justice H.B. Prabhakara Sastry

Judgment Link: Microsoft Word – CRL.P. No.101295.2017.doc (kar.nic.in)

Relevant paragraphs: It is …the case of the complainant in the trial Court that the petitioner herein in her cross- examination in the complaint filed by her under D.V.  Act, made a statement that her father through her friends secured liquor for the consumption of the complainant, the present respondent. She admitted that Ex.P.68 is with respect to purchase made in a Military Canteen.

The point to be considered which is of most importance in the matter is what made the petitioner to make that statement. Admittedly, the said statement which is alleged to be defamatory has not been made by the petitioner on her own. Nowhere in  the examination-in-chief she has referred that her father-in-law is in the habit of consuming liquor. The very father-in-law as the complainant in the trial Court himself in his complaint has stated that no allegation against him was made in the complaint filed by his daughter-in-law alleging domestic violence….the said alleged statement of defamation was elicited from the complainant in the said complaint under D.V. Act only in her cross-examination. That means, it was not a statement voluntarily made by her but she was  put with some questions, for which, as an answer she has made that statement.

It cannot be said that it was a statement made voluntarily and willfully by the witness with an intention to defame the reputation of the present respondent, as such, in order to avoid abuse of the process of law in the trial Court, interference of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is warranted. .Proceedings against the petitioner quashed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj and Kriti Taggarse Daksha Legal.

Election Petition. Person disqualified from contesting the elections can not maintain an election petition as  “a candidate  at   such  election”

Saritha S Nair vs Hibi Eden. Special Leave Petition (Civil) 10678/2020 decided on 9 December 2020.

Judgment Link:

https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/4203/4203_2020_31_1501_25128_Judgement_09-Dec-2020.pdf

Relevant para: CONCLUSION 62. Therefore, in fine, we hold that the petitioner was disqualified from contesting the elections in terms of Section 8(3) of the Act. In such circumstances, she could not have maintained an election petition as  “a   candidate  at   such  election”  in terms of Section 81(1). Therefore, the High Court was right in not venturing into an exercise   in   futility,   by   taking   up   the   election   petition   for   trial. 

Chandrakant vs Karnataka State Bar Council and others. Writ Appeal 100141/2020 decided on 30 November 2020.

Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/352210/1/WA100141-20-30-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraph : 36. The observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the various High Courts in the long line of rulings narrated supra, obviates any detail discussion with regard to the maintainability of a writ petition against the Bar Association invoking the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That apart, as detailed supra, some of the obligation, the 3rd respondent has cast upon itself, bears a  public  character.  The Advocates are not mere arbiters but officers of the court who assist the Court in the running of the justice  delivery system and it is such officers of the court who constitute the 3rd respondent Society. That the constituents of the 3rd respondent Society are answerable to the Court and to the 1st respondent with regard to their conduct in the discharge of their professional duties. Both the 1st respondent and the Court can by no stretch of imagination be described as private entities. That apart, if the objects of the 3rd respondent Society are juxtaposed with the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dwarkanath Vs. Income Tax Officer 1965 (3) SCR 536 and Supreme Court Bar Association and othersvs.B.D.Kaushik   (2011)13SCC774 case, it is apparent that the 3rd respondent discharges obligations of a public character. Hence, the writ petition invoking the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a relief as against the 3rd respondent is required to be held as maintainable.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.

Saritha S Nair vs Hibi Eden. Special Leave Petition (Civil) 10678/2020 decided on 9 December 2020.

Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/4203/4203_2020_31_1501_25128_Judgement_09-Dec-2020.pdf

Relevant para: 43. The upshot of the above discussion is that defective verification is a curable defect. An election petition cannot be thrown out in limine, on the ground that the verification is defective.

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Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.