Narayanaswamy vs The District Commissioner and others. Writ Appeal 3855/2019 decided on 6 November 2020. Chief Justice Abhay S Oka and Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar.
Judgment Link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/303237/1/WA3855-19-06-11-2019.pdf
Relevant paragraphs. Judgments in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy (2003) 7 SCC 667, Situ Sahu & Others vs. State of Jharkahnd & Others (2004) 8 SCC 340, Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District & another vs. D.Narsing Rao & Others (2015) 3 SCC 695, Chhedi Lal Yadav & Others vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (dead) through L.Rs. & Others (2018) 12 SCC 527, Nikkanti Rama Laxmi vs. State of Karnataka & Another 2017 SCC Online SC 1862, Vivek M. Hinduja & Others vs. M.Ashwatha & Others 2017 SCC online SC 1858 referred to.
17. It is relevant to state that the aforesaid judgments were not rendered with reference to the provisions and proceedings of the PTCL Act. However, in the case of Nikkanti Rama Laxmi vs. State of Karnataka & Another 2017 SCC Online SC 1862, the Apex Court applied the well settled principles governing the initiation of proceedings after an unreasonably long period to the proceedings under the PTCL Act and consequently held as under:-
9. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs., 2017 (6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v.Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda v. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga, 2000 (2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled.
18. Subsequently, the aforesaid Judgment in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav’s case and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi’s case were followed and reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek M. Hinduja & Others vs. M.Ashwatha & Others, 2017 SCC online SC 1858which is held as under:-
4. Arguments have been addressed before us at length on whether the present appellants had perfected their titles on the date of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. We are not inclined to go into this question because the instant matters can be decided on an aspect settled by this Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs., and Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka. In these two decisions, one of which arose under the Karnataka Act, this Court has held that the authorities entrusted with the power to annul proceedings purported to have been made by the original grantees, must exercise their powers to do so, whether on an application, or suo motu, within a reasonable time since no time is prescribed by law for taking such action. In the decided cases, action had been initiated after about 20 to 25 years of the coming into force of the Karnataka Act.
In the present cases, it is undisputed that the action had been initiated after almost 20 years from the coming into force of the Karnataka Act. In principle, we do not see any reason why the delay in the present cases should be considered to be reasonable. There is no material difference between the period of delay in the present cases and he decided cases.
Relying on some observations in the case of Manchegowda v. State of Karnataka (1984) 3 SCC 301 and Sunkara Rajayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka (2009) 12 SCC 193, Shri Sunil Fernandes, learned counsel on the respondents’ side submitted that the outer limit for initiating action should be 30 years.
We, however, find that the observations in those cases are not apposite and are made with reference to the period of prescription in respect of Government properties under the Limitation Act, 1963. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that Section 4 of the Karnataka Act proprio vigore annuls a transfer made in contravention of itself. Therefore, it makes no difference if the proceedings are initiated even after 20 to 25 years. We do not find it possible to accede to this submission. This Court in the case of Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v. Hargovind Jasra (2013) 3 SCC 182 reiterated the necessity of an order of a competent Court or Tribunal before which the impugned order can be declared as null and void. The Court relied on the oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council 1956 AC 736: (1956) 2 WLR 888, which reads as under:
“…An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.’ (Smith Case, AC pp.769-70)
This must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the court has been pointed out(sic) repeatedly in the House of Lords and Privy council without distinction between patent and latent defects (Ed. Wade and Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn.1994.”
In the case of Pune Municipal Corporation v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 211, this court reproduced the following observations with regard to the declaration of orders beyond the period of limitation as invalid:
“39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the courts and referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach the court for declaration that the order against him was inoperative, he must come before the court within the period prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration sought for’.”
We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations. It is, however, necessary to add that where limitation is not prescribed, the party ought to approach the competent Court or authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief can be granted. As decided earlier, this principle would apply even to suo motu actions.
20. Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the instant case, we are of the considered view that the proceedings initiated by the appellant along with sixth respondent in the year 2015 were not maintainable on account of long, unreasonable and inordinate delay and lapse of time and that the same were initiated after an unreasonably long period of thirty years after the PTCL Act came into force and about fifty years from the date of alienation.
Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Daksha Legal.
Daksha Legal 
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