Judgment of Shri M Manoj, Addl Sessions Judge, Kollam in Uttara murder case. A classic and must read judgment for law professionals and law students. Judgment having 452 pages with 369 paragraphs dealing with 286 documents for the prosecution (Exhibits P1 to P286), 24 documents for the defence (Exhibits D1 to D24), 87 witnesses for the prosecution (PW1 to PW87), 3 defence witnesses (PW1 to PW3) and 40 Material Objects
A Laborious, intensive and meticulous work of judgment in an alleged crime done with techniques and tools so far unheard of and perplexing dimensions.
ನಟ ಶ್ರೀ. ಅನ0ತನಾಗ್ ನಟಿಸಿದ ‘ಗೋದಿ ಬಣ್ಣ ಸಾದಾರಣ ಮೈಕಟ್ಟು‘ ಚಿತ್ರ ವೃದ್ಯಾಪ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಅಲ್ಜೈಮರ್ ಖಾಯಿಲೆಯಿ0ದ ಬಳಲುವ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳ ಜೀವನವನ್ನು ಅತ್ಯ0ತ ಮಾರ್ಮಿಕವಾಗಿ ವಿವರಿಸುತ್ತದೆ.
ಅಲ್ಜೈಮರ್ ಒ0ದು ಮೆದುಳಿನ ಅಸ್ವಸ್ಥತೆಯಾಗಿದ್ದು ಅದು ನಿಧಾನವಾಗಿ ಜ್ನಾಪನೆ ಮತ್ತು ಆಲೋಚನಾ ಕೌಶಲ್ಯವನ್ನು ನಾಶಪಡಿಸುತ್ತದೆ ಮತ್ತು ಅಂತಿಮವಾಗಿ, ಸರಳವಾದ ಕಾರ್ಯಗಳನ್ನು ನಿರ್ವಹಿಸುವ ಸಾಮರ್ಥ್ಯವನ್ನೂ ಕಳೆಯುತ್ತದೆ.
ಈ ಖಾಯಿಲೆ ವಯಸ್ಸಾದವರಲ್ಲಿ ಬುದ್ಧಿಮಾಂದ್ಯತೆಗೆ ಅತ್ಯಂತ ಸಾಮಾನ್ಯ ಕಾರಣವಾಗಿದೆ. ಆಲೋಚನೆ, ನೆನಪಿನ ಶಕ್ತಿ, ತಾರ್ಕಿಕತೆ, ದೈನಂದಿನ ಜೀವನ ಮತ್ತು ಚಟುವಟಿಕೆಗಳಿಗೆ ಈ ಖಾಯಿಲೆ ಅಡ್ಡಿಪಡಿಸುತ್ತದೆ. ಅತ್ಯಂತ ತೀವ್ರವಾದ ಹಂತಕ್ಕೆ ಈ ಖಾಯಿಲೆ ತಲುಪಿದಾಗ, ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯು ದೈನಂದಿನ ಜೀವನದ ಮೂಲ ಚಟುವಟಿಕೆಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಸಹಾಯಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಸಂಪೂರ್ಣವಾಗಿ ಇತರರನ್ನು ಅವಲಂಬಿಸಬೇಕು.
ಒ0ದು ದಿನ ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ಬೆಳಗಿನ ವ್ಯಾಯಾಮನಡಿಗೆ ಮುಗಿಸಿ ಮನೆಗೆ ಹಿ0ತಿರುಗಿದಾಗ ಅವರ ಶ್ರೀಮತಿ, ಮನೆ ಮು0ದೆ ರಸ್ತೆ ಮದ್ಯೆದಲ್ಲಿ ನಿ0ತ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯೊಬ್ಬರನ್ನು ತೋರಿಸಿ ‘ಅವರು ಕಳೆದ ಹತ್ತು ನಿಮಿಷದಿ0ದಲೂ ರಸ್ತೆ ಮದ್ಯೆ ನಿ0ತಿದ್ದಾರೆ ವಾಹನಗಳು ಅವರ ಎಡಬಲದಲ್ಲಿ ಹಾದು ಹೋಗುತ್ತಿದ್ದರೂ ಅವರಿಗೆ ಅರಿವಿಲ್ಲ’ ಎ0ದು ತಿಳಿಸಿದರು.
ತಕ್ಷಣವೇ ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ತಮ್ಮ ಗನ್ ಮ್ಯಾನ್ ಹಾಗೂ ಚಾಲಕನ ಜೊತೆ ಆ ವೃದ್ದರನ್ನು ಕಾರಿನಲ್ಲಿ ಕೂರಿಸಿಕೊ0ಡು ಅಕ್ಕ ಪಕ್ಕದ ರಸ್ತೆಗಳಲ್ಲೆಲ್ಲಾ ವಿಚಾರಿಸಲು ಶುರುಮಾಡಿದರು. ಸುಮಾರು ಸಮಯದ ನ0ತರ ಒಬ್ಬ ರಸ್ತೆ ಬದಿ ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿ, ಈ ವೃದ್ದರ ಗುರುತು ಹಿಡಿದು ಅವರು ಇರುವ ಮನೆಯ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ವಿವರ ತಿಳಿಸಿದರು.
ವೃದ್ದರನ್ನು ಅವರ ಮನೆಗೆ ಜೋಪಾನವಾಗಿ ಸೇರಿಸಿದ ಈ ಘಟನೆಯ ವಿವರವನ್ನು ಕಳೆದ ವಾರ ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ಕಾನೂನು ನೆರವು ಕೇ0ದ್ರದ ಸಭೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ಹ0ಚಿಕೊ0ಡರು.
ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ಇವರು ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ರಾಜ್ಯ ಕಾನೂನು ನೆರವು ಕೇ0ದ್ರದ ಮುಖಾ0ತರ ಸಮಾಜಕ್ಕೆ ನೀಡಿದ ಕೊಡುಗೆ ಅಪಾರ. ಅತ್ಯ0ತ ಕಡುಬಡವರು, ಬೀದಿ ವ್ಯಾಪಾರಿಗಳ ಹಾಗೂ ಕಟ್ಟಡ ಕೆಲಸಗಾರರ ಮಕ್ಕಳು, ಅವಿದ್ಯಾವ0ತರು, ಬಡ ರೈತರು ಇವರುಗಳ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ಅವರಿಗೆ ವಿವರಿಸಿ, ಅವರ ಜೀವನವನ್ನು ಉತ್ತಮ ಪಡಿಸುವ ಕೆಲಸದಲ್ಲಿ ಅತ್ಯ0ತ ಮಹತ್ತರ ಪಾತ್ರ ವಹಿಸಿದ ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ಗುಜರಾತ್ ಉಚ್ಚನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ಮುಖ್ಯ ನ್ಯಾಯಾದೀಶರಾಗಿ ನೇಮಕಗೊ0ಡಿರುವುದು ಸ0ತಸದ ವಿಶಯ. ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ತಮ್ಮ ಸಾಮಾಜಿಕ ಕಳಕಳೆಯನ್ನು ಜೀವನದ ಉದ್ದಕ್ಕೂ ಮು0ದುವರೆಸಿಕೊ0ಡು ಹೋಗುವುದು ಖ0ಡಿತ.
ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿ ಅರವಿ0ದ್ ಕುಮಾರ್ ಕರ್ನಾಟಕದ ಎಲ್ಲ ವಕೀಲರ ಪರವಾಗಿ ಶುಭ ಹಾರೈಕೆ.
ನವದೆಹಲಿ: ಕರೋನವೈರಸ್ ಸಾಂಕ್ರಾಮಿಕ ರೋಗಕ್ಕೆ ಪ್ರತಿಕ್ರಿಯಿಸಿದಂತೆ ಬೇರೆ ಯಾವ ದೇಶವೂ ಭಾರತದಷ್ಟು ಸಾದನೆ ಮಾಡಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗಲಿಲ್ಲ ಎ0ದು ಸುಪ್ರೀಂ ಕೋರ್ಟ್ ಗುರುವಾರ ಸರ್ಕಾರಕ್ಕೆ ಭಾರೀ ಪ್ರಶಂಸೆ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಪಡಿಸಿದೆ.
ಕೋವಿಡ್ ನಿ0ದ ಸತ್ತವರಿಗೆ ರೂ 50,000 ಪರಿಹಾರವನ್ನು ನೀಡುವ ಪ್ರಕರಣದ ಆದೇಶವನ್ನು ನ್ಯಾಯಲಯ ಕಾಯ್ದಿರಿಸಿದೆ. “ಇಂದು ನಾವು ತುಂಬಾ ಸಂತೋಷವಾಗಿದ್ದೇವೆ. ತೊಂದರೆ ಅನುಭವಿಸಿದ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗಳಿಗೆ ಸ್ವಲ್ಪ ಸಾಂತ್ವನ ಸಿಗುತ್ತದೆ … ಸರ್ಕಾರ ನಡೆಸುತ್ತಿರುವ ಎಲ್ಲವು ಎರಡನೇ ತರಂಗಕ್ಕೆ ಸಿದ್ಧತೆಯ ಕೊರತೆ ಮತ್ತು ವೈದ್ಯಕೀಯ ಆಮ್ಲಜನಕದಂತಹ ಅಗತ್ಯತೆಗಳ ಕೊರತೆಯಿಂದಾಗಿ ಸಾವಿರಾರು ಸಾವುಗಳ ಮೇಲೆ ತೀವ್ರ ಪರಿಶೀಲನೆ ನಡೆಸಿದ ಕರೋನವೈರಸ್ ಸಾಂಕ್ರಾಮಿಕ ರೋಗಕ್ಕೆ ಭಾರತದ ಪ್ರತಿಕ್ರಿಯೆಯನ್ನು ನ್ಯಾಯಮೂರ್ತಿಗಳಾದ ಶಾ ಮತ್ತು ಎಎಸ್ ಬೋಪಣ್ಣ ಮೆಚ್ಚಿದ್ದಾರೆ.
“ನಮ್ಮ ಜನಸಂಖ್ಯೆಯ ಗಾತ್ರ, ಲಸಿಕೆ ವೆಚ್ಚಗಳು, ಆರ್ಥಿಕ ಪರಿಸ್ಥಿತಿ ಮತ್ತು ನಾವು ಎದುರಿಸಿದ ಪ್ರತಿಕೂಲ ಸನ್ನಿವೇಶಗಳನ್ನು ಗಮನಿಸಿದರೆ … ನಾವು ಅನುಕರಣೀಯ ಕ್ರಮಗಳನ್ನು ಕೈಗೊಂಡಿದ್ದೇವೆ … ಭಾರತ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದನ್ನು ಬೇರೆ ಯಾವ ದೇಶವೂ ಮಾಡಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗಲಿಲ್ಲ” ಎಂದು ನ್ಯಾಯಾಧೀಶರು ಹೇಳಿದರು.
ರಾಷ್ಟ್ರೀಯ ವಿಪತ್ತು ನಿರ್ವಹಣಾ ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ (NDMA) ಕೋವಿಡ್ -19 ನಿಂದ ಮೃತಪಟ್ಟವರ ಕುಟುಂಬಕ್ಕೆ ₹ 50,000 ನೀಡಬೇಕೆಂದು ಶಿಫಾರಸು ಮಾಡಿದೆ ಎಂದು ಕೇಂದ್ರವು ಬುಧವಾರ ಸುಪ್ರೀಂ ಕೋರ್ಟ್ಗೆ ತಿಳಿಸಿದೆ.
ವೈರಸ್ನಿಂದ ಸಾವನ್ನಪ್ಪಿದ ಮತ್ತು ಕೋವಿಡ್ -19 ಪರಿಹಾರ ಕಾರ್ಯಾಚರಣೆ ಅಥವಾ ಸಾಂಕ್ರಾಮಿಕ ರೋಗವನ್ನು ಎದುರಿಸಲು ಸನ್ನದ್ಧತೆಗೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಿಸಿದ ಚಟುವಟಿಕೆಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಭಾಗಿಯಾದವರ ಕುಟುಂಬಕ್ಕೆ ಪರಿಹಾರವನ್ನು ನೀಡಲಾಗುವುದು ಎಂದು ಅದು ಹೇಳಿದೆ. ಜೂನ್ 30 ರಂದು ನೀಡಲಾದ ಉನ್ನತ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ನಿರ್ದೇಶನಗಳನ್ನು ಅನುಸರಿಸಿ ಸೆಪ್ಟೆಂಬರ್ 11 ರಂದು ಎನ್ಡಿಎಂಎ ಮಾರ್ಗಸೂಚಿಗಳನ್ನು ಹೊರಡಿಸಿದೆ ಎಂದು ಸರ್ಕಾರ ಹೇಳಿದೆ, ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಹಣಕಾಸಿನ ಸಹಾಯಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಮಾರ್ಗಸೂಚಿಗಳನ್ನು ಶಿಫಾರಸು ಮಾಡಲು ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರಕ್ಕೆ ನಿರ್ದೇಶನ ನೀಡಿದೆ.
ಸಾಂಕ್ರಾಮಿಕ ರೋಗದ ಮೊದಲ ಮತ್ತು ಎರಡನೇ ತರಂಗದಲ್ಲಿ ಕೋವಿಡ್ -19 ಸಾವುಗಳಿಂದ ತೊಂದರೆಗೊಳಗಾದ ಕುಟುಂಬಗಳಿಗೆ ನೆರವು ಸೀಮಿತವಾಗಿರುವುದಿಲ್ಲ ಆದರೆ ಸಾಂಕ್ರಾಮಿಕ ರೋಗದ ಮುಂದಿನ ಹಂತಗಳಲ್ಲಿಯೂ ಮುಂದುವರಿಯುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂದು ಪ್ರಾಧಿಕಾರ ತಿಳಿಸಿದೆ.
ಪರಿಹಾರವನ್ನು ರಾಜ್ಯಗಳು ರಾಜ್ಯ ವಿಪತ್ತು ಪ್ರತಿಕ್ರಿಯೆ ನಿಧಿಯಿಂದ (SDRF) ಒದಗಿಸುತ್ತವೆ ಮತ್ತು ಎಲ್ಲಾ ದಾಖಲೆಗಳನ್ನು ಅಗತ್ಯ ದಾಖಲೆಗಳನ್ನು ಸಲ್ಲಿಸಿದ 30 ದಿನಗಳೊಳಗೆ ಇತ್ಯರ್ಥಗೊಳಿಸಲಾಗುತ್ತದೆ ಮತ್ತು ಆಧಾರ್ ಲಿಂಕ್ಡ್ ಡೈರೆಕ್ಟ್ ಬೆನಿಫಿಟ್ ಟ್ರಾನ್ಸ್ಫರ್ ಪ್ರಕ್ರಿಯೆಗಳ ಮೂಲಕ ವಿತರಿಸಲಾಗುತ್ತದೆ.
ಕೋವಿಡ್ -19 ಸಂತ್ರಸ್ತರ ಕುಟುಂಬ ಸದಸ್ಯರಿಗೆ ಪರಿಹಾರವನ್ನು ಕೋರಿ ವಕೀಲರಾದ ಗೌರವ್ ಬನ್ಸಾಲ್ ಮತ್ತು ವಕೀಲ ಸುಮೀರ್ ಸೋಧಿ ಪ್ರತಿನಿಧಿಸಿದ ಮಧ್ಯಸ್ಥಿಕೆದಾರರು ಸಲ್ಲಿಸಿದ ಮನವಿಗಳ ಮೇಲೆ ಕೇಂದ್ರದ ಪ್ರತಿಕ್ರಿಯೆ ಬಂದಿತು.
R.D.Vijay Anand vs The Secretary, The Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. Writ Petition 29258 of 2013 decided on 21 November 2013. Justice K.K. Sasidharan
1. Whether the State Bar Council is vested with the power to suspend an Advocate on its rolls from practising the profession of law pending disposal of suo-motu disciplinary proceedings taken by the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu is the core issue that arises for consideration in this writ petition at the instance of a lawyer from Coimbatore, who was suspended, as an interim measure for passing an illegal arbitration award without authority.
Brief facts:
2. The petitioner was enrolled as an Advocate on the Rolls of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu on 20 December 2002 (Enrollment No. 2115 of 2002). The petitioner is a member of Coimbatore Bar. The petitioner is stated to be a busy legal practitioner in Civil, Criminal and other branches of law.
3. While so, the petitioner received a notice dated 15 October 2013 from the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu to show cause as to why proceedings under Section 35 of the Advocates Act 1961 should not be taken against him for professional misconduct. The show cause notice was followed by an interim order of suspension dated 17 October 2013 pending disposal of the disciplinary proceedings.
4. According to the petitioner, the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu (hereinafter referred to as ‘Bar Council’) in its resolution and notices indicated that he illegally acted as an arbitrator and passed an award dated 16 October 2008. It was the contention of the petitioner that the award was passed only by Mr. R. Vijay Anand, Advocate and as such, Bar Council was not correct in taking action against him.
5. The Bar Council in its counter affidavit contended that several complaints were received from Coimbatore with regard to the functioning of certain Advocates as Arbitral Tribunals, calling people to appear without any authority, passing awards, and executing such awards by various means. The Bar Council took suo motu proceedings against five advocates including the petitioner. Since the Bar Council is of the view that public interest would suffer in case those Advocates are allowed to practice pending disposal of disciplinary proceedings, they were suspended. Accordingly Bar Council justified the impugned order.
Submissions:
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the compliant preferred by the Coimbatore Bar Association and the award dated 16 October 2008 contain the name of Sri. R. Vijay Anand, Advocate. The petitioner is R.D. Vijay Anand and he is a very busy legal practitioner and a very successful defence lawyer. The petitioner used to send atleast five sessions cases every week to his counter part at Madras High Court. Such a famous lawyer would not indulge in holding illegal arbitration proceedings. The learned counsel further contended that the Bar Council has no right to suspend a lawyer from practice pending initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
7. The learned Standing Counsel for Bar Council by producing the file, the award and acknowledgement card which contain the signature of the petitioner submitted that the signature in the acknowledgement card and the signature in the award are one and the same. The Enrollment papers also contain the very same signature. Therefore it is clear that R. Vijay Anand is none other then the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the Bar Council possess the inherent power to suspend the Advocates pending disposal of disciplinary proceedings.
Analysis:
8. The petitioner challenges the interim order of suspension primarily on the ground that the Bar Council has no power under the Advocates Act to suspend a legal practitioner pending disposal of proceedings for misconduct. The other contention relates to the identity of the person involved in the misconduct.
9. The Coimbatore Bar Association preferred a complaint dated 27 August 2013 to the Bar Council stating that Thiru P.R. Shanmgam and eight others including the petitioner are conducting illegal arbitral proceedings. The Bar Council on a careful consideration of the complaint resolved to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the concerned advocates. Since the Bar Council wanted these advocates not to do the very same illegal activities pending disposal of proceedings for misconduct, passed an interim order of suspension.
10. The petitioner is one among such Advocates. According to the Bar Council, in the interest of public and in order to maintain dignity, decorum and to uphold the professional etiquette of the legal profession, the Council took this decision invoking the power under Section 6(1)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Identity of the author of award:
11. According to the petitioner, he is R.D. Vijay Anand and he has nothing to do with the illegal award passed by R. Vijay Anand. The contention would be attractive at first blush. However, its fallacy would be proved by a mere comparison of the signature of the arbitrator as found in the award and the admitted signature of the petitioner in the acknowledgement card evidencing service of suspension order and his application for enrolment.
12. We are now concerned only with the prima facie case. In case the available materials prima facie indicates the role of the petitioner as the author of the illegal award, the same would be sufficient to initiate disciplinary proceedings. It is open to the Advocate to produce materials to prove his defense that it was the work of another Advocate and he was not responsible for such illegal Act. Merely because the award contain the name of R. Vijay Anand and the complaint of Bar Association, Coimbatore also refers to the name of R. Vijay Anand, it cannot be said it was made only by another lawyer. The Coimbatore Bar Association referred to the names of advocates on the basis of the names contained in the respective awards.
13. The leader of the parallel court is stated to be one Thiru Shanmugam. He adopted a modus operandi of conducing parallel courts and arbitral proceedings by adopting the name “P.R. Shanmugam” not withstanding the fact that the name recorded in his enrolment certificate was R. Shanmugam. In the subject case, the Bar Council has taken up a contention that though the name of the petitioner is R.D. Vijay Anand, in order to appear as if the author of the award is a different person, he has put it in the name of R. Vijay Anand. This contention appears to be prima facie correct on account of the documents produced by the Bar Council.
14. The petitioner was suspended on 17 October 2013. The very fact that the Coimbatore Bar supported this move and the further fact that not even a single lawyer from Coimbatore has so far expressed protest on the ground of action being taken against an innocent lawyer also supports the prima facie finding recorded by the Bar Council.
15. The available materials are sufficient to arrive at a prima facie finding that it was only the petitioner, who was instrumental in making the illegal award without any authority. Therefore, I reject the contention with regard to identity.
Power of the Bar Council to order interim suspension:
16. The substantial question raised in the writ petition relates to the authority of the Bar Council to order interim suspension pending disposal of disciplinary proceedings.
17. The Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils are statutory bodies entrusted with the task of safeguarding the rights, privileges and interest of the Advocates. These Apex bodies are equally concerned with the professional conduct of the legal practitioners. The legal profession???d as a noble profession, ordains a very high level of ethics, moral standard and ??? life. The legal profession plays a ??? the administration of justice. The Lawyers act as a catalyst. The lawyer owes ??? to the Court, to his client and even ??? his opponent while discharging his role. The Advocate acts both as an officer of court as well as an ambassador of his client.
The Statute:
18. The Advocates Act contains detailed provisions dealing with the functions, powers and duties of the Bar Council of India and the State Bar Councils. The State Bar Council constituted under Section 3 of the Advocates Act is a body corporate.
19. Section 6 of the Act indicates the functions of Bar Councils. It reads as under: Functions of the State Bar Councils:—
(1) The functions of the State Bar Councils shall be-
(a) to admit persons as advocates on its roll;
(b) to prepare and maintain such roll;
(c) to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll;
(d) to safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of advocates on its roll;
{(dd) to promote the growth of Bar Associations for the purposes of effective implementation of the welfare schemes referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of this section and clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 7;)
(e) to promote and support law reforms;
(f) {(ee) to conduct seminars and organise talks on legal topics by eminent jurists and publish journals and paper of legal interest; (eee) to organise legal aid to the poor in the prescribed manner;)
(f) to manage and invest the funds of the Bar Council;
(g) to provide for the election of its members;
{(gg) to visit and inspect Universities in accordance with the directions given under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 7;)
(h) to perform all other functions conferred on it by or under this Act;
(i) to do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions.”
20. Section 9 provides for constitution of disciplinary committee.
21. Chapter V deals with conduct of Advocates. Section 35 provides for the reference of complaints against Advocates to the disciplinary committee.
22. The disciplinary committee of the Bar Council initiates proceedings for misconduct upon a reference by the State Bar Council. The Bar Council on receipt of a complaint must examine the complaint to decide as to whether a prima facie case of misconduct has been made out to refer the matter to the disciplinary committee. It is only for this purpose the Bar Council issues notice to the concerned Advocate on receipt of a complaint alleging professional misconduct. The Bar Council on receipt of the reply from the Advocate is expected to function as the Screening Authority and only those cases certified by the Council to be of worth reference alone will be forwarded to the Disciplinary committee.
23. The question therefore is, while taking a decision to refer a complaint to the disciplinary committee for initiating disciplinary proceedings, whether it is open to the Bar Council to pass an interim order of suspension.
24. Section 2(1)(a) defines “Advocate” as an Advocate entered in any roll under the provisions of Advocates Act.
25. The registration before the Bar Council is a mandatory requirement for practising the profession of law. The incidental question is whether the authority empowered to register an Advocate and permit him to practice, got the right to suspend him from practice, pending disciplinary proceedings.
26. Section 6(1)(c) enjoins the State Bar Councils to entertain and determine cases of misconduct against Advocates. Similarly Section 6(1)(i) of the Act enables the Bar Councils to do all other things necessary for discharging the aforesaid functions. Since the Bar Council is the authority to register the Advocates and to maintain their rolls, Section 6 has to be read as the power of the State Bar Council, rather than functions. When it is clear that the Bar Council can entertain complaints and determine cases of misconduct against Advocates on its roll and the incidental right to do all other things necessary for discharging the functions, it is essentially a power and not a function alone. Power to appoint – includes power to suspend/dismiss:
27. Section 16 of the General clauses Act provides that the power to appoint would include the power to suspend or dismiss. The issue whether Section 16 as such would apply to a Bar Council or the Advocates registering their names on the rolls of the council are larger questions, but the General Doctrine underlying this provision can very well be made applicable to a case of this nature. The power to pass an interim order of suspension pending disposal of disciplinary proceedings therefore is a necessary adjunct of the power of registration of an Advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council, which is a pre-requirement for practising law.
28. The complaint received by the Bar Council after initiation, scrutiny and examination, if found to be of substance would be referred to the disciplinary committee. The maximum time for disposal of complaint by the disciplinary committee is indicated as one year. Then there is a provision for appeal to the Bar Council of India under Section 37 of the Act. The order passed by the Bar Council of India is appealable before the Supreme Court under Section 38 of the Act. The power to stay the order passed by the Disciplinary committee is given initially to the Disciplinary Committee and thereafter to the appellate authority. This is often a time consuming process. Even though the Bar Council has found a prima facie case of professional misconduct for the purpose of reference to the Disciplinary Committee, the punishment would come only after the disposal of the appellate proceedings under Section 37 or 38 of the Act.
29. The difficulty would arise in case the Bar Council is of the view that it would not be in public interest to permit the Advocate to practice during the currency of statutory proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee, as otherwise it would adversely affect the dignity, decorum and professional ethics. It is not possible to entertain an argument that the State Bar Council has no power to order interim suspension in such grave cases and should await the ultimate finding given by the disciplinary committee. The parliament while giving disciplinary powers to the Bar Council and Bar Council of India appears to have not contemplated such a helpless situation.
30. The provisions of a statute must be given meaningful interpretation. It is true that courts cannot add something to the statute which was not contemplated by the legislature. However, the approach should be to give a workable interpretation to translate the wishes of the legislature into action.
31. There is no dispute that a law student after graduation is entitled to practice the profession of law on the strength of his enrollment and registration on the rolls of the Bar Council of the State. The only authority empowered under the Advocates Act, 1961 to grant the licence to practice the profession of law is the State Bar Council. The power to revoke the licence permanently or to suspend it for a prescribed period vests in the statutory body. This power would also include, in appropriate cases, to suspend the practice pending disposal of a complaint referred to the disciplinary authority of the concerned Bar Council.
Decisions of Supreme Court in relation to legal profession:
32. The role of Bar Council to preserve the purity and dignity of legal profession was indicated by the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702. The Supreme Court observed that the role of Bar Council under the Advocates Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics.
“30. The interest of the Bar Council is to uphold standards of professional conduct and etiquette in the profession, which is founded upon integrity and mutual trust. The Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession. The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. If any decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India is according to the State Bar Council such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession, the State Bar Council is an aggrieved person to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar.”
33. The Supreme Court in Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, indicated the exclusive jurisdiction of Bar Council to suspend the licence to practice.
“71. Thus, after the coming into force of the Advocates Act, 1961 with effect from 19-5-1961, matters connected with the enrolment of advocates as also their punishment for professional misconduct is governed by the provisions of that Act only. Since, the jurisdiction to grant licence to a law graduate to practise as an advocate vests exclusively in the Bar Council of the State concerned, the jurisdiction to suspend his licence for a specified term or to revoke it also vests in the same body.”
34. Mr Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in His Lordship’s concurring judgement in M.V. Dabholkar observed:
“52. The Bar is not a private guild, like that of ‘barbers, butchers and candlestick-makers’ but, by bold contrast, a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service. The grant of a monopoly licence to practice law is based on three assumptions: (1) There is a socially useful function for the lawyer to perform, (2) The lawyer is a professional person who will perform that function, and (3) His performance as a professional person is regulated by himself not more formally, by the profession as a whole. The central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice.”
35. In M.V. Dabholkar, while interpreting the word “person aggrieved” the Supreme Court observed.
“31. The Bar Council is ‘a person aggrieved’ for these reasons. First, the words ‘person aggrieved’ in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute. In disciplinary proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee there is no Us and there are no parties. Therefore, the word ‘person’ will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State. Second, the Bar Council is ‘a person aggrieved’ because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Third, the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates is when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a Disciplinary Committee is entrusted with such inquiry. Once an inquiry starts, the Bar Council has no control over its decision. The Bar Council may entrust it to another Disciplinary Committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India. This indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. Fourth, a decision of a Disciplinary Committee can only be corrected by appeals as provided under the Act. When the Bar Council initiates proceedings by referring cases of misconduct to Disciplinary Committee, the Bar Council in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the ‘task of seeing that the advocates’ maintain the proper standards and etiquette of the profession. Fifth, the Bar Council is vitally’ concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council. The Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics.”
36. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1976) 2 SCC 291 Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, speaking for the four judges Bench observed:
“15. Now to the legal issue bearing on canons of professional conduct. The rule of law cannot be built on the ruins of democracy, for where law ends tyranny begins. If such be the keynote thought for the very survival of our Republic, the integral bond between the lawyer and the public is unbreakable. And the vital role of the lawyer depends upon his probity and professional lifestyle. Be it remembered that the central function of the legal profession is to promote the administration of justice. If the practice of law is thus a public utility of great implications and a monopoly is statutorily granted by the nation, it obligates the lawyer to observe scrupulously those norms which make him worthy of the confidence of the community in him as a vehicle of justice – social justice. The Bar cannot behave with doubtful scruples or strive to thrive on litigation. Canons of conduct cannot be crystallised into rigid rules but felt by the collective conscience of the practitioners as right.”
37. The Supreme Court in R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106, while expressing the hope that Bar Council will sit up and pay proper attention to the restoration of the high professional standards among lawyers worthy of their position in the judicial system and in the society observed:
“333. We express our concern on the falling professional norms among the lawyers with considerable pain because we strongly feel that unless the trend is immediately arrested and reversed, it will have very deleterious consequences for the administration of justice in the country. No judicial system in a democratic society can work satisfactorily unless it is supported by a Bar that enjoys the unqualified trust and confidence of the people, that shares the aspirations, hopes and the ideals of the people and whose members are monetarily accessible and affordable to the people.” 38. The Supreme Court in R.K. Anand recognised the power of courts to prohibit an Advocate convicted of criminal contempt, from appearing in Court for a specified period. The Supreme Court held:
“238 We may respectfully add that in a given case a direction disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in court may not only be a measure to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self-protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of court proceedings. Let us, for example, take the case where an advocate is shown to have accepted money in the name of a judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or where an advocate is found tampering with the court’s record; or where an advocate is found actively taking part in faking court orders (fake bail orders are not unknown in several High Courts!); or where an advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and abuse judges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a case transferred from an ‘inconvenient’ court; or where an advocate is found to be in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiated allegation petitions against judicial officers and judges to the superior courts. Unfortunately these examples are not from imagination. These things are happening more frequently than we care to acknowledge.
239. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustive but there may be other ways in which a malefactor’s conduct and actions may pose a real and imminent threat to the purity of court proceedings, cardinal to any court’s functioning, apart from constituting a substantive offence and contempt of court and professional misconduct. In such a situation the court does not only have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon it to protect itself and save the purity of its proceedings from being polluted in any way and to that end bar the malefactor from appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.”
Note of caution – Interim suspension should be in rarest of rare cases.
39. The power to suspend the Advocate pending initiation and disposal of disciplinary proceedings must be in larger public interest. There should be an overwhelming public interest in such cases. The Bar Council must arrive at a clear finding that permitting the Advocate who is accused of a grave misconduct, pending disciplinary proceedings would seriously affect the dignity and decorum of the profession. The order should contain adequate materials justified such suspension. The interim suspension must be an exceptional action on account of the exigency of situation and gravity of the misconduct. There should be primary materials warranting such extreme action. It should not be as a matter of course. The interim suspension should therefore be in rarest of rare cases. The Bar Council in such cases must ensure disposal of disciplinary proceedings within the statutory period. The prolonged suspension without showing any progress in the disciplinary proceedings would give a cause of action to the Advocate to challenge the action.
40. The next question is whether the allegations against the petitioner would be sufficient to suspend him temporarily pending disposal of the disciplinary proceedings.
41. The proceedings of the meeting of the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry held on 5 October 2013 contain the basic materials constituting the grave charges and the circumstances under which the Bar Council has taken a decision to restrain five Advocates including the petitioner from practising the profession of law till the disposal of suo motu disciplinary proceedings initiated against them.
42. The string of materials available on record would make the position very clear that the petitioner along with other Advocates indulged in illegal and unethical practices and their actions tarnished the image of this noble profession. Those materials are sufficient to pass an order of interim suspension pending disposal of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. The disciplinary committee must take earnest efforts to dispose of the suo motu disciplinary proceedings, as expeditiously as possible, uninfluenced by the above observation based on tentative findings and prima facie case.
Conclusion:
43.Therefore I hold that the power of Bar Council to revoke the licence to practice permanently or suspend it for a fixed term would include the incidental power of interim suspension pending disposal of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct.
44. In the upshot, I dismiss the writ petition. Consequently, the connected MP is closed. No costs.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Petition No.5609/2017 by which the High Court has allowed the said Writ Petition preferred by the respondent herein and has quashed and set aside the order dated 09.12.2015 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal, Bengaluru in Application No.6396 of 2015 and consequently has directed the appellants herein to consider the application of the respondent herein – original writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as ‘original petitioner’) for grant of compassionate appointment, the original respondent has preferred the present appeal.
8.1 From the aforesaid rules it can be seen that only ‘unmarried daughter’ and ‘widowed daughter’ who were dependent upon the deceased female Government servant at the time of her death and living with her can be said to be ‘dependent’ of a deceased Government servant and that ‘an unmarried daughter’ and ‘widowed daughter’ only can be said to be eligible for appointment on compassionate ground in the case of death of the female Government servant. Rule 2 and Rule 3 reproduced hereinabove do not include ‘divorced daughter’ as eligible for appointment on compassionate ground and even as ‘dependent’. As observed hereinabove and even as held by this Court in the case of N.C. Santhosh (Supra), the norms prevailing on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis of consideration of claim for compassionate appointment. The word ‘divorced daughter’ has been added subsequently by Amendment, 2021. Therefore, at the relevant time when the deceased employee died and when the original writ petitioner – respondent herein made an application for appointment on compassionate ground the ‘divorced daughter’ were not eligible for appointment on compassionate ground and the ‘divorced daughter’ was not within the definition of ‘dependent.’
8.2 Apart from the above one additional aspect needs to be noticed, which the High Court has failed to consider. It is to be noted that the deceased employee died on 25.03.2012. The respondent herein – original writ petitioner at that time was a married daughter. Her marriage was subsisting on the date of the death of the deceased i.e. on 25.03.2012. Immediately on the death of the deceased employee, the respondent initiated the divorced proceedings under Section 13Bof the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 12.09.2012 for decree of divorce by mutual consent. By Judgment dated 20.03.2013, the Learned Principal Civil Judge, Mandya granted the decree of divorce by mutual consent. That immediately on the very next day i.e. on 21.03.2013, the respondent herein on the basis of the decree of divorce by mutual consent applied for appointment on compassionate ground. The aforesaid chronology of dates and events would suggest that only for the purpose of getting appointment on compassionate ground the decree of divorce by mutual consent has been obtained.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the appeal succeeds. The impugned common judgment and order 17 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.5609/2017 is hereby quashed and set aside. The Writ Petition before the High Court is dismissed accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
Six judges of the Karnataka High Court are sworn in as permanent judges pursuant to their appointment as such by the President of India under Article 217 of the Constitution of India. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, acting Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court administered the oath of office today 8 September 2021. The Hon’ble Judges who are sworn-in today are;
1) Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda.
2) Justice Jyothi Mulimani
3) Justice Rangasway Nataraj
4) Justice Hemant Chandangoudar
5) Justice Pradeep Singh Yerur
6) Justice Maheshan Nagaprasanna.
Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda
Justice Jyoti Mulimani
Justice Rangaswamy Nataraj
Justice Hemnt Chandangoudar
Justice Pradeep Singh yerur
Justice Maheshan Nagaprasanna
Justice N.S. Sanjay Gowda. Born on 15.02.1967. Enrolled as an Advocate on 31.08.1989. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka and taken oath on 11.11.2019.
Justice Jyoti Mulimani. Born on 15.08.1968. Enrolled as an Advocate on 31.07.1992.Handled all types of Civil Cases. Hindu Law, Probate, Company, Arbitration. Constitutional, Tax & Tariff. Electricity, Education, Service, Motor Vehicles, and Excise matters.Served as a Mediator and Trainer in Bengaluru Mediation Centre for 12 years. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka and taken oath on 11.11.2019.
Justice Rangaswamy Nataraj. Born on 14.03.1970. Enrolled as an Advocate on 08.09.1992. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka and taken oath on 11.11.2019.
Justice Hemant Chandangoudar. Born on 28.09.1969. Enrolled as an Advocate on 11.02.1994. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka and taken oath on 11.11.2019.
Justice Pradeep Singh Yerur. Born on 21.06.1970. Enrolled as an Advocate on 30.05.1997. Practiced in the field of Constitutional law, Labour Laws, Company Laws, Intellectual Property, Penal Laws, Banking Laws, Negotiable Instrument Laws, Property Laws, Consumer Protection Laws, Service law, House Rent Laws, Family Laws, Land Acquisition, Economic Offence Laws, Education Law before High Court of Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana High Court and Supreme Court of India. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka and taken oath on 11.11.2019.
Justice Maheshan Nagaprasanna. Born on 23.03.1971. Appointed as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka and taken oath on 26.11.2019.
(Profile as published on the website of High Court of Karnataka)
Indus Trust and Indus International School Private Limited vs State of Karnataka and another. Writ Petition 16323 of 2021. Order dated 7 September 2021. Writ Petition draft below:
MEMORANDUM OF WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
The Petitioner above named humbly submits as follows:
In the present Writ Petition, the petitioner who has established an educational institution in the rural area challenges the action of the second respondent in imposing the property tax on the petitioner educational institution. The factual antecedents leading to the presentation of the Writ Petitions is stated as hereunder.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The petitioner is a Trust registered under the Indian Trust Act. A true copy of the original and amended trust deeds of the petitioner dated 13:06:2001 and 25:08:2011 are produced herewith marked Annexure-A and Annexure-B respectively for the kind perusal of this Hon’ble court. The petitioner has established the following educational institutions in the rural area and outside the jurisdiction of the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palikein.
Permissions no objection certificate granted by the authorities concerned to establish the educational institutions dated 24:01:2003 and certificate dated 27:09:2018 issued by the government of Karnataka are produced herewith marked Annexure-C and Annexure-D respectively. It is submitted that the petitioner has established the educational institutions in the rural area with the intention of eradicating illiteracy in the rural areas of the State. The petitioner also provides free education / education at concessional fee to hundreds of children studying in the educational institutions run by the petitioner. Every year the Management Board of the educational institutions selects the students from economically weaker sections from its management quota and imparts education.
Under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act (hereinafter, KMC Act), the educational institutions are exempted from payment of property tax. Relevant portion of Section 110 of the KMC Act reads as here under.
General exemptions.- (1)1 The following buildings and lands shall be exempted from the property tax:- (i) building or lands exclusively used for,- (a) students hostels which are not established or conducted for profit; (b) educational purposes by recognised educational institutions;
(2) Notwithstanding the exemptions granted under this section it shall be open to the corporation to collect service charges for providing civic amenities and for general or special services rendered at such rates as may be prescribed.
The legislative intendment granting exemption is quite understandable. Imparting Education has always been treated as a religious obligation. It is considered as a charity. Even the judicial pronouncements have recognised and reiterated this facet. Much before the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481and P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537 this Hon’ble Court in BapujiEducational Association vs State of Karnataka recognized the fundamental right of the educational institutions to establish the institutions. The Hon’ble Court observed that “There can be no two opinions as to the yeoman service rendered by all those who have devoted their energy, mind and money with an intense desire to provide higher educational facilities mainly for the benefit of the needy students belonging to a specified backward region or caste or community and through it the society for whose benefit persons with higher technical education would be available.”
This Hon’ble Court in The Town Municipal Council, Mulki vs Vijay College, Mulki = Writ Petition 5381/1979 decided on 13:12:1985 considered the question as to whether the buildings which are exclusively used for education could be subjected to building tax under Section 94 of the Town Municipality Act. Answering the question in the negative, this Hon’ble Court held that levy of property tax by the Town Municipal Council on the buildings belonging to the education institution should be struck down and ordered accordingly. A true copy of the said judgment is produced herewith marked Annexure-E.
The Constitution bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481,recognized the right to establish & run the educational institutions as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the establishment and running of an educational institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or administrative staff, and an activity is carried on that results in the imparting of knowledge to the students, must necessarily be regarded as an occupation. Education, per se, fall under Article 19(1)(g) “Occupation”. Occupation is an activity of a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. The right to establish and maintain educational institutions is also sourced to Article 26(a), which grants, in positive terms, the right to every religious denomination or any section thereof to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes. Education is a recognized head of charity. Therefore, religious denominations or sections thereof, which do not fall within the special categories carved out in Article 29(1) and 30(1), have the right to establish and maintain religious and educational institutions. This would allow members belonging to any religious denomination, including the majority religious community, to set up an educational institution. Given this, the phrase “private educational institution” would include not only those educational institutions set up by the secular persons or bodies, but also educational institutions set up by religious denominations. Education used to be charity or philanthropy in good old times and the tradition continues. Even now, imparting education has come to be a mission in life for some altruists. This declaration is followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537.
It is with laudable backdrop that the Legislative intendment has to be construed in exempting the educational institutions from the property tax considering the yeoman service being rendered by these institutions. This character has not changed and imparting education continues to be a charity. There is no changed scenario to make a departure from the legislative intendment to strip the holy garb from the educational institutions and treat them as commercial entities.
Referring to the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, Section 199 of the Act controls the levy of taxes, rate etc., by Gram Panchayats. Sub-section (1) states that the manner and subject to such exemptions, as may be prescribed, the Gram Panchayat could levy taxes not exceeding the maximum rate specified in Schedule IV, upon buildings and lands not subject to agricultural assessment within the limits of the Panchayat area. Schedule IV to the Act at Sl. No. 1 states that tax on building shall be at the maximum rate of 10% of the annual value (per annum) and the explanation states that the word ‘annual letting value’ means the annual rent for which any building or land, exclusive of furniture or machinery contained or situated therein or thereon, might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year.
It is submitted that the State Government, in exercise of the power conferred under Sections 199, 200 and 201 framed Taxation Rules’ which came into force in the year 1995. Rule 3 under Chapter II provides for procedure to levy tax on building and land. Sub-rule (1) states that every Gram Panchayat shall, before levying taxes on buildings and lands under Sub-section (1) of the Section 199, pass a resolution to levy the taxes; publish a notice of such resolution by affixing copies thereof on the notice board of the office of the Gram Panchayat and at other conspicuous places in the panchayat area, specifying therein, the rate of tax and the date not earlier than thirty days from the date of such publication, with effect from which, the said taxes shall be levied and also announce by beat of drum in the Panchayat area the fact of such publication. Sub-rule (2) provides that the taxes under Sub-rule (1) shall be levied for any year or part thereof and shall be paid for every quarter commencing from the 1st day of April, 1st day of July, 1st day of October, and 1st day of January of the year. Rule 5 provides for rate of tax to be levied on the building at 10% of the annual letting value of such building, per annum; while Rule 6 provides for exemptions.
Sub-rule (c) of Rule 6 provides exemption for buildings and lands used solely for charitable or public religious purposes and not let out for rent, under Sub-section (1) of Section 199.
It is the submission of the petitioner that the second respondent Gram Panchayat is not competent to levy any tax on buildings which are exclusively used for charitable purposes and in this case, education. The petitioners submit that this Hon’ble Court in Writ Petition 5381/1979 decided on 13th December 1985 held that education as a charitable purpose. This Hon’ble Court relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SidhrajbhaiSabbai v. State of Gujarat, (1963) 3 SCR 837 and AIR 1976 S.C. 10 The Sole Trustee Lokashikshana Trust vs The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore where the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the interpretation of ‘education’ occurring in Section 2(15) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961. Under that definition, ‘charitable purpose’ includes, relief to the poor, education, medical relief and the advancement of any other general public utility not involving the carrying of any activity. The Hon’ble Court held, that the term, ‘education’ as used in Section 2(15) of the Act has a wider and more comprehensive meaning than education through educational institutions, such as, universities, whose income is exempted from income-tax under Section 10 of the Act. The question that arose in that case was: whether the appellant-trust was entitled to exemption? The sole trustee, the appellant, before the Supreme Court, had claimed that the publication of a newspaper cannot be treated as solely an activity for profit, but the publication of news and the dissemination of the information should be construed as predominantly for educational purpose in its ordinary and usual sense.
This Hon’ble Court framed the following question for consideration;
a) Whether the buildings which are exclusively used by the respondent institution for education could be subjected to building tax under Section 94 of the Town Municipality Act? This Hon’ble Court ultimately held that the levy of property tax by the Town Municipal Council, Mulki, on the buildings belonging to the respondent-institution should be struck down.
When the things stood thus, the second respondent Gram Panchayat issued a letter dated 01:03:2019 and a demand notice dated 07:03:2019. A true copies of the said letter dated 01:03:2019 and notice dated 07:03:2019 are produced herewith marked as Annexure-F and Annexure-G respectively. The petitioner submitted a reply on 07:03:2019 to the 2nd respondent seeking exemption from payment of property tax since the buildings are exclusively used for educational purposes. The petitioner institution replied to the demand notice by letter dated 22:03:2019 and paid a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) under protest. A true copy of the letter dated 22:03:2021 is herewith marked and produced as Annexure- H.
The petitioner is aggrieved by the imposition of property tax on educational institutions run by the petitioner. The imposition of property tax on the educational institutions which are run on no-profit basis is highly illegal. In the absence of alternative, efficacious remedy left open for the redressal of their grievances, the petitioners have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The following grounds are stated in support of the writ petition.
GROUNDS
That the 2nd Respondent has no power, competence or jurisdiction to impose the property tax on the educational institutions. This is so having regard to the judgment of this Hon’ble Court mentioned above. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its latest judgment in Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1, at page 28 held that an educational institution is charitable and that advancement of education is a recognized head of charity. Imparting education cannot be compared to any other commercial activity which attracts payment of tax. This is the main reason why a specific provision is made under the KMC Act.
It is settled that establishing and administering of an educational institution for imparting knowledge to students is an occupation, protected by Article 19(1)(g) and additionally by Article 26(a), if there is no element of profit generation. As of now, imparting education has come to be a means of livelihood for some professionals and a mission in life for some altruists. The submission is that education is a recognised head of charity. The object of establishing an educational institution is not to make profit. Imparting education is essentially charitable in nature. The charitable nature of the occupation of establishing and running an educational institution has been recognised in Pai Foundation. Therefore, all restrictions, which are permissible under Article 19(6) in case of other kinds of professions and occupations, cannot apply to educational activities. It is submitted that restrictions imposed should satisfy the requirements of Article 30 and not only of Article 19(6).
InT.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that article 19(1)(g) employs four expressions viz. profession, occupation, trade and business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does have a content of its own. Education is per se regarded as an activity that is charitable in nature. Education has so far not been regarded as a trade or business where profit is the motive.
In view of the above settled legal position, the impugned demand of the second respondent is illegal, without jurisdiction and wholly unconstitutional and the same is liable to be quashed.
That the Petitioners have not approached this Hon’ble high Court earlier or any other forum challenging the impugned orders that is under challenge in the above Writ Petition.
GROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF INTERIM PRAYER
The statement of facts made above and the legal grounds urged demonstrate that the imposition of property tax under the impugned demand notice and the Circular is prima facie illegal and unconstitutional. The petitioners’ only source of revenue is the fee being collected from the students. The additional huge burden cannot be shifted on the students at this juncture. The 2nd respondent has threatened legal action against the petitioner if the demand is not complied with. If the respondents were to take coercive action against the petitioner, great hardship would be caused to the petitioner. Hence, it is just and proper that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass appropriate interim order as prayed for, in the interest of justice and equity.
P R A Y E R
The petitioners pray for appropriate writ order or direction;
i) Quashing the demands for property tax made on the petitioner by the 2ndrespondent by its letters dated 9:5:2017 and 13:9:2017 copies produced at Annexure-F and Annexure-G respectively;
ii) Quashing the Circular dated 19:11:2016 bearing no GraAaPa 939 Pra Pam Aa 2016(1) issued by the first respondent copy produced and marked Annexure-J in so far as it imposes property tax on the educational institutions falling within Gram Panchayat area AND
iii) Pass such and further relief/s as this Hon’ble Court may deem just and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity.
INTERIM PRAYER Pending the adjudication of the present writ petition, the Petitioners pray that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to stay
(i) the demands for property tax made on the petitioner by the 2nd respondent by its letters dated 01:03:2021 and 07:3:2019 copies produced at Annexure-F and Annexure-G respectively
(ii) Circular dated 19:11:2016 bearing no GraAaPa 939 Pra Pam Aa 2016(1) issued by the first respondent copy produced and marked Annexure-K in so far as it imposes property tax on the educational institutions falling within Gram Panchayat areain the interest of justice and equity.
ಡ್ರೋನ್ ನಿಯಮಗಳು, 2021 ಈಗ ಅನುಮೋದನೆಗೊ0ಡು ಜಾರಿಗೆ ಬ0ದಿವೆ. ಈ ನಿಯಮಗಳ ಅಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ 500 ಕಿಲೋಗ್ರಾ0 ವರೆಗೆ ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಗಳಿಗೆ ಅನುಮತಿ ನೀಡಲಾಗಿದೆ.
ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಹಾರಾಟಕ್ಕೆ ಸ0ಬ0ದಿಸಿದ0ತೆ ಮೂರು ವಲಯಗಳನ್ನು ಮಾಡಲಾಗಿದೆ. ಹಸಿರು, ಹಳದಿ ಹಾಗೂ ಕೆ0ಪು ವಲಯಗಳು. ಹಸಿರು ವಲಯದಲ್ಲಿ 400 ಅಡಿವರೆಗೆ ಯಾವುದೇ ಅನುಮತಿ ಇಲ್ಲದೆ ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಹಾರಾಟ ನಡೆಸಬಹುದು. ಹಳದಿ ವಲಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಅನುಮತಿ ಪಡೆದು ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಹಾರಾಟ ಮಾಡಬಹುದು. ಕೆ0ಪು ವಲಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಬಳಕೆ ಸ0ಪೂರ್ಣ ನಿಷಿದ್ದ.
ನಿಯಮ 44 ರ ಅಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಹಾರಾಟಕ್ಕೆ ಮೂರನೆ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯ ವಿಮೆ ಅನ್ವಯಿಸುತ್ತದೆ. ಹಾಗು ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಅಪಘಾತಕ್ಕೆ ಸ0ಬ0ದಿಸಿದ0ತೆ ಮೋಟಾರ್ ವಾಹನ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ, 1988 ಅನ್ವಯವಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಹಾರಾಟದ ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಮಾನವ ಜೀವಹಾನಿ ಮತ್ತು ಆಸ್ತಿಹಾನಿ ಉ0ಟಾದ ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಮೋಟಾರ್ ವಾಹನ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ, 1988 ಅಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಪರಿಹಾರ ಪಡೆಯಬಹುದು.
ಆದರೆ ನ್ಯಾನೋ ಡ್ರೋನ್ ಗಳಿಗೆ ವಿಮೆ ಅಗತ್ಯವಿರುವುದಿಲ್ಲ.
ಡ್ರೊನ್ ಹಾರಾಟ ಮಾಡುವ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯು ಈ ವಿಶಯಕ್ಕೆ ಸ0ಬ0ದಿಸಿದ ಪ್ರತ್ಯೇಕ ವಿಮೆ ಪಡೆಯಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಈ ಸ0ಬ0ದ ಇನ್ಸೂರೆನ್ಸ್ ರೆಗ್ಯೂಲೇಟರಿ ಮತ್ತು ಡೆವೆಲಪ್ಮೆ0ಟ್ ಅಥಾರಿಟಿ ಆಫ಼್ ಇ0ಡಿಯಾ ಇವರು ನಿಗಧಿಪಡಿಸಿದ ವಿಮೆಯನ್ನು ಪಡೆಯಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ.
The notification of the Additional Secretary to the Government of India reads;
“In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 223 of the Constitution of India, the President is pleased to appoint Shri Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, senior-most Judge of Kamataka High Court, to perform the duties of the office of the Chief Justice of that High Court with effect from the date Shri Justice Abhay Shreeniwas Oka relinquishes the charge as Chief Justice of the Kamataka High Court consequent upon his appointment as Judge of the Supreme Court of India.”
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma: Born on 30 th November, 1961 at Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Father, Mr. Dr. B. N. Sharma apart from being known as a well established agriculturalist was also a renowned professor of Jabalpur University and subsequently the Vice Chancellor of Barkatullah University, Bhopal. Mother Smt. Shanti Sharma was a Principal in Maharani Lakshmibai Higher Secondary School and also worked as District Education Officer at Jabalpur before retirement. Started schooling from Christ Church Boys Higher Secondary School and passed 10 th standard and 12 th standard from Central School, Jabalpur. Enrolled as a student of Bachelor of Science in 1979 at Dr. Hari Singh Gour University, Sagar. Secured degree of Bachelor of Science in the year 1981 with distinction in three subjects. Awarded National Merit Scholarship for Post Graduate Studies. Enrolled as a student of law in Dr. Hari Singh Gour University, Sagar in 1981. Graduated on top of the class and obtained LL.B. degree in 1984 with three university Gold Medals. Enrolled as an advocate on 01-09- 1984. Practiced in Constitutional, Service, Civil and Criminal matters before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. Was appointed Additional Central Government Counsel on 28-05- 1993 and was appointed senior panel counsel by Government of India on 28-06- 2004. In 2003 he was designated as a Senior Advocate by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at the young age of 42 being one of the youngest senior advocates of Madhya Pradesh High Court. Elevated as an Judge of Madhya Pradesh High Court on 18 th January 2008. Appointed as a Permanent Judge on 15 th January, 2010. Justice S. C. Sharma is an avid reader and is also known for his contributions to various Universities. He is associated with National Law universities. He is also on the Advisory Board of National Law Institute University Bhopal and has published numerous research articles and papers. On transfer to Karnataka High Court, His Lordship took oath as Judge of Karnataka High Court on 04.01.2021.
Daksha Legal 