“Know Your Judge”. Justice T.G. Shivashakare Gowda. Karnataka High Court.

Justice T G Shivashankare Gowda celebrates his 61st birthday today.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Talkad Girigowda Shivashankare Gowda was born on 1:2:1963. Native of Talakad, T. Narasipura Taluk, Mysore District. Enrolled as Advocate and practiced at Srirangapatna. Appointed as Munsiff on 08.02.1995. Appointed as District Judge on 06.07.2009. Served as Prl. District & Sessions Judge at U.K. Karwar. Served as Central Project Co-ordinator (Computers), Registrar (Computers) and Registrar General at High Court of Karnataka. Sworn-in as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka on 16.08.2022.
Important judgments delivered by Mr. Justice T G Shivashankare Gowda.
”Speculative litigation causing huge loss of judicial time”. Karnataka High Court reverses specific performance judgement against Jamnalal Bajaj Seva Trust with exemplary costs.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/jLYqu3CwODYQ6yf2v4U0iM4yd
Education. Admission of students pursuant to interim order cannot be sustained if it results in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ZIbKGptLgjl3L1cxDSu6Q9Di3
Medical Colleges Regulation. Bar against conducting inspection two days before and after important religious and festival holidays under Regulation 8(3)(1) applies only to Government notified holidays. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/WF7ivbdtkFE1eZMuV812ifFAH
Motor Vehicles Act. Burden of proving that the deceased driver did not possess valid driving licence at the time of the accident is upon the Insurance Company. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/45cY1jA2dOzNQ7M2NB5RANC8n
Arbitrary action of the Karnataka Examination Authority in allotment of post graduate medical seat. Karnataka High Court imposes cost of Rs. 5 lakhs with a direction to allot the seat to the deserving candidate.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/qTXxKZWLrrWSrfxtcEMipSUEN
Motor Vehicle Cases. If accident aggravates already existing decease which results in death, claim petition cannot be rejected for want of nexus. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/LHwoPBiOSCFsmZ439BXkHVucc
Criminal trial. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence, motive plays a crucial role. Motive is a double-edged weapon, which will cut either side of the case. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ONEImVpFkuwTE0O7NE93h8sWK
“Case of the prosecution in entirety is found to be doubtful and is full of inconsistencies”. Karnataka High Court acquits the accused in RTI activist Lingaraju murder case.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7ESptiW1T0lwUWU2fELME2RFA
Criminal trial. Insistence of plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact will indirectly encourage subornation of witnesses. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/bzKnZ5IOekWAjffAPiAYxoFzN
MVC Case. Split multiplier. Higher multiplier for the salary component and lower multiplier for the pension component is justified when the person had no future prospect of re-employment. Karnataka High Court explains.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/rF9w2HacF7tOstqC4XzSmHFCN
Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. Mobile phone chargers sold along with mobile phone in a composite pack attracts tax at the same rate as applicable to mobile phones and cannot be taxed at higher rate as unscheduled goods. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7CfyFm9UZudtXoWZKRRqaHsmz
Central Goods and Services Tax Act. Pre-paid Payment Instruments of Gift Vouchers, Cash Back Vouchers and E-Vouchers do not fall under the category of goods and services and they are exempted from levy of tax. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/aDZVW79JQIjtSznmLBt2vtWCC
Insurance against acts of fraud or dishonesty committed by agent. Issuance of a fake bank guarantee by agent is a dishonest act and hence covered under the Insurance Policy. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Mt2HKTYvVEmunM3nvEQrp9bcd
“Interest of the child is paramount in cases under the POCSO Act and the Court cannot appreciate the evidence on sentimental values.” Karnataka High Court sets aside the acquittal of the sexual offender.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/v4DaRpswmkujb2pDOyNZZ4abK
“Removing minor girl from the lawful custody of parents is clear case of kidnap”. Karnataka High Court convicts the accused while confirming his acquittal for the offence under the POCSO Act.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/z9lwayrdyWmzkfEGYLRyu9IPZ
Summary suit based on written contract. There is no requirement that the written contract should be signed by both the parties. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/zlfc7hBTG1YjEbEgb78yK5ZnM
‘’Mother is more concerned about her career prospects than the welfare of the child’’. Karnataka High Court extensively interacts with the child and grants custody to the father with visitation rights to the mother.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/kEhkwmQwodDfmj3GCmad3Xwki

New Criminal Laws. Provisions regarding private complaints unworkable.

B.V. Acharya, Senior Advocate.

Section 223 of the Bharathiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhitha 2023 ( for short  “ Sanhitha” ) corresponds to Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 ( for short “ Code” ). The said provision deals with the procedure to be followed when a private complaint is filed before a Magistrate. While Section 200 of the Code contains only one section without any subsections, Section 223 of the Sanhitha consists of two clauses ( 1) & (2).

The present subsection (1) of Section 223 of the Sanhitha is almost verbatim identical to S.200 of the Code with addition of a proviso which reads as follows:

“Provided that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard ”. 

The scheme of the Code as can be seen from S.200 to 204 does not contemplate presence of the accused and hence the accused has no role to play at all till the stage of S.204 which provides that if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, then only he issues process for the attendance of the accused. (This could be either  summons or warrant ). It is only thereafter the accused appears before the court and takes part in further proceedings as provided in the Code. It is settled law that an accused person has no right to insist on his presence and have any say in the matter, even if he voluntarily appears and seeks to participate in proceedings before reaching the stage of S.204 when process is issued.

Same is the position even under the scheme of Sanhitha embodied in S.223 to 227 (Corresponding to S.200 to 204 of the Code). Under the Sanhitha also as can be seen from S.227 for the first time provision for issue of process to the accused is contemplated after the Magistrate forms the opinion that there is sufficient ground to proceed.

Thus, both the Code as well as the Sanhitha do not contemplate or permit presence of the accused till he is summoned by the Magistrate. (This is under S.204 of the Code and S.227 of the Sanhitha).   

However, the provisions of the Sanhitha, make important departure from the above settled position by inserting the proviso quoted above, which mandates that the Magistrate cannot take cognizance of an offence “without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard”.    

Necessarily the accused has to be present at that stage because it is impossible for the Magistrate to afford such opportunity without his presence. Thus the procedure under the Sanhitha imposes an obligation on the Magistrate to do something impossible i.e., to say before taking cognizance he has to give opportunity to the accused  who is not before the court at that stage.There is no provision enabling the Magistrate to summon the accused prior to S.227 stage.

Even if it is assumed that the provision for affording opportunity of hearing empowers the Magistrate to summon him for that purpose, it means that the Magistrate even before forming an opinion contemplated by S.227 has to issue summons to the accused.

The net result is according to the procedure in the Sanhitha when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the complaint, he has to secure the presence of the accused by summoning or otherwise even before taking cognizance for affording the accused  an opportunity of being heard. This procedure on the face of it looks ridiculous and absurd. How can the accused be given an opportunity even before the complainant and his witnesses are examined on oath, which can be done only after taking cognizance?

According to the procedure contemplated in the Sanhitha, the accused will be present at the time of examination of the complainant and his witnesses, as this follows taking cognizance. Can the accused at that stage have an opportunity to cross examine them?

If as explained above, upon filing of complaint, immediately the Magistrate is required to issue summons to all the accused to secure their presence, same will result in chaos. It is opposed to all cannons of justice to provide for presence of the accused, even before the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence and the statement of the complainant and his witnesses are recorded.

Hence aforesaid provision providing for giving the accused an opportunity of  being heard even before taking cognizance is most unreasonable and totally unworkable. This provision appears to have been inserted even without elementary consideration of its futility and disastrous consequences.

While the statement of object and reasons of the Sanhita says that focus is on simplifying legal procedure and providing speedy justice to the common man, above provision definitely and without doubt ensures exactly the opposite. Instead of providing speedy justice, it enables protracting the proceedings. The procedure of summoning the accused even before taking cognizance will amount to total harassment of the accused, satisfying the unscrupulous complainant’s sadistic pleasure.      

Important Judgements on the Negotiable Instruments Act.

1. Cheque Bounce cases. Moratorium contained in Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code applies only to Corporate Debtors. Directors are liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/D5BdzfNtpM2bRwkavFCeKoy3v

2. Interim compensation in cheque bounce cases. Magistrate can award compensation ranging from 1% to 20% in a cautious manner and after recording the reasons. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/eWqznVn3UfXEai9UqAbWemPFp

3. Cheque bounce cases. While considering application for grant of interim compensation, conduct of the accused is relevant. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/RQFNw9kyhigDPUNg96cvHXIqB

4. Debt or other liability under N. I. Act includes dues from any other person and not confined to debt or liability of the drawer himself.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/llvcAymD0xNVyI6Oxp3waOflW

5. Magistrate can convert trial of complaint under Section 138 only into a summons triable case and not a warrant case.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ZBaIBBzKxUaq8cSnuXwdTXDUP

6. Gaps are permitted to be filled by the drawee on the cheque so long as it does not cause prejudice to the drawer or amount to material alteration.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/OI9XMtEe0aNjwZKJWD0Hwun6q

7. Interim compensation. Section is not retrospective. Applicable only to offences committed after its insertion.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/0EFrxltQAlkwSBvGaoxOpveRK

8. Even a blank cheque leaf voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused towards some payment would attract the Section unless contrary is proved. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/pPkTuCll86tosFvtt1LTkzihs

9. Even a blank cheque leaf voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused towards some payment would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/NIzbgetdJ54bLLBxjVn1WDSm5

10. Whether a cheque is issued in respect of a time barred debt is a matter for trial. Proceedings cannot be quashed on this ground. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7bphhFPLCyWieyTYZBh9CjXY7

11. Lok Adalat award in respect of cheque bounce case. Amount can be recovered by Fine Levy Warrant under Section 421 Cr.P.C. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7MvnKohB6twQdFnx5soDk5xw8

12. When cheque is delivered for collection within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court where the payee maintains the account, proceedings cannot be initiated in other place. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ESSCuN0zqriQ0coMIe4zq6joZ

13. Accused can be convicted even when the legally enforceable debt is less than the amount mentioned in the cheque. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/iRevKhgtZJbeq3RFO1lh23WHC

14. Proceedings under Sections 138 and 141 cannot be initiated against Corporate debtor during the moratorium period under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/W7PQ2dZCwStxuCSsmTuJtvy3Q

15. Accused only a partner of the firm which issued cheque. Neither responsible for business conduct nor has power to open or operate bank account. Accused did not sign cheque. Proceedings liable to be quashed. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/EOkZeDYIYGyu0e0FkTjdbfFAz

16. Recording of sworn statement before taking cognizance is mandatory in cases other than complaints under Section 138 read with Section 145 Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/GVQK0qjAwwLUnA4mxYe2AJLSI

17. Imprisonment ordered in default of fine in different and independent transactions. Sentence will run consecutively and NOT concurrently. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/QGrJExDOxydA37BfhSNfphOWr

18. There is NO requirement of sending notice under Certificate of Posting once the notice is sent by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/uDq69hFhR7VxsJj7mwqXGq7YF

19. When there is delay in filing complaint and application under Section 142B is filed, magistrate can NOT straightaway take cognizance without issuing notice on the application. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/402pUHQke5Wak6Dx3rI0yrlFg

20. Complaint under Section 138 is not an Encyclopedia. The complainant is required to plead basic particulars to disclose commission of the offence. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ZoV6ivb6WXCVjoJgivFN5p5Xu

21. Alteration of cheque date. If alteration is made when cheque is issued or made later with privity of parties and in the absence of any fraud, the cheque is valid and enforceable. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/FNJpXuUuJc8eMa4wrFndOohRD

22. Sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the guilt. It must not be either exorbitant or for namesake. Karnataka High Court cancels exorbitant sentence imposed on the accused.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/00FnGMxzeH42jWPY0hxZAhTJ1

23. Notice demanding lesser amount than the cheque amount, after giving deduction to part payment, is NOT a defective notice. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/FQ7ALto65kqwMAAt2aPVdBiN8

24. Against the order of acquittal passed by the first appellate court, appeal to High Court under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C is maintainable. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/aVozOBbe9iHM7zs1Z9FMdzr1g

25. Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act without signature of the complainant is maintainable provided the complaint is verified before the Magistrate. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/y06pmo3f4s3GsHdMkVJECXVzn

26. Dishonour of cheque on the ground that the ”signatures do not match” or that the ”image is not found” would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 of N.I. Act when the cheque amount is not paid despite notice. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/1WlxemMpUnIt3LK07qHb9FzL7

27. Prosecution for dishonour of cheque issued towards time barred debt is permissible when cheque was issued under a subsequent written agreement between the parties. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/fjHyJBCNCuyfvj24ZFWHCJxn8

28. Grant of interim compensation under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act is NOT mandatory. Court must apply its mind and record reasons to grant interim compensation. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/2q0lVtxWmlf6Cfs4VDkx9YEIN

29. The fact that the body of cheque was not filled up by accused himself-is no defence in itself when signature on the cheque is not disputed. Punjab High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/2YPG7FXSTfCKqW9N71rHLO5g0

30. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings is maintainable even at the stage of framing charges if the Company is not made an accused. Chhattisgarh High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/soWI6GhIe7OyEvdQXIUPUKGNo

31. Complaint u/s 138 N.I. Act filed without application to condone delay. Limitation issue raised for the first time in appeal. Appellate Court can send matter back to trial court by permitting complainant to file necessary application. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/qZCAffwdcFDU3U8aYxQgqWYnS

32. All the offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable and the parties can compound subject to payment of graded cost. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/4IfAEzY283mth5WU5Zb8rbTKi

33. Interim compensation in cheque bounce cases. Magistrate can award compensation ranging from 1% to 20% in a cautious manner and after recording the reasons. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/eWqznVn3UfXEai9UqAbWemPFp

34. Negotiable Instruments Act. Directors of a company cannot be held vicariously guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 when the company is not arrayed as an accused in the complaint. Karnataka High Court reiterates.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/WHoWFICspEWTW6pstF6BMiiz2

35. Cheque bounce case. Directors/Chairman of a company cannot claim that they are not privy to the transaction between the accused and the complainant when the complaint clearly narrates their role in the transaction. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/GudwNeB6sfBo2i8T71uyGNtDc

36. Cheque bounce case. Taking sworn statement first then taking cognizance and issuing summons would not vitiate the proceedings. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/2OebM5gXMY9TxvLK6Kk2I9vAn

37. Special Power of Attorney holder who is aware of the transaction can initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/sqsjTZ2baQSvT0u7O2G3ztabc

38. Presentation of undated cheque after three years from the date of the transaction by adding the date. Proceeding under Section 138 NI Act will be clearly barred by limitation. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/p92RNehbaj4FcwTvBLmbkS7ee

39. Persons who had ceased to be directors of company cannot be arrayed as accused in proceedings under the NI Act in respect of cheque issued by the Company. Karnataka High Court reiterates.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/D9lXfgi4nQ5IfWE2yKMlululc

40. Cheque dishonour cases. Standard of proof for accused to rebut presumption is that of ‘preponderance of probabilities’. Jharkhand High Court

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/YI1rLKHQ2jjMja35dUJSnXOQG

41. Cheque bounce case. Dishonor of cheque due to stop payment, account closed and signature mismatch would attract the penal provision. High Court of Jammu and Kashmir.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/VReS6QpSkTIY6B6pgoGoPZgHU

42. Cheque bounce case. Unless accused introduces a specific defence questioning financial capacity of complainant, Court cannot go into this question on its own and give a finding. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/O9HMqO2wIJGCtnqIpWNYPa53h

43. Cheque bounce case. Payment of interim compensation applies only in respect of offences committed after Section 143(A) of N.I.Act came into force in the statutory book. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7e7dwYqBTENTpmAt4bFbc66IA

44. A proprietary concern is not required to be arrayed as a separate party in a proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/d9UvCQ78agpSgKW0UWzT2XTfE

45. Cheque bounce case. Payment of interim compensation applies only in respect of offenses committed after Section 143(A) of N.I.Act came into force in the statutory book. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/gT4K6EBZvciSqyFu8fa6s6DM3

46. Cheque bounce case. Complainant is not expected to appear on every date of hearing and the Court cannot dismiss the complaint for default on that ground. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/KGqfPftJkB8oyevEyMmAlhDr4

47. Cheque bounce case. Partnership firm cannot be held liable for dishonour of the cheque issued by a partner in his individual capacity. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7JAONypVR8L6iMXI4CQGskK2f

48. Wife cannot be held liable under the N.I Act for dishonour of the cheque issued by her husband though the loan transaction is joint. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/NXZQdnu9usb20xbkfvcWDDBrP

49. Violation of the Income Tax Act in monetary transaction cannot be a defence in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/clU7K2ymkWsjGEFL1m4JIGy6z

50. Where there are clear averments in statutory notice and complaint about the role of the directors and their responsibility, proceedings cannot be quashed merely on the plea that they had no direct role in the transaction. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Gzhnnysvgb1C2sJHiQBdMYdS2

51. Director of a company is not liable for prosecution under Section 138 of NI Act without the company being arraigned as an accused. Supreme Court reiterates.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/GBsFa6mijxSRJHZVqERDUiyP3

52. Though accused are to be acquitted in cheque bounce case on technical ground, the complainant is entitled to receive the amount deposited in the court. Kerala High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ReS8Bz3LfyvKSkSVw2aGOnjtW

53. In the case of a proprietorship concern, only the proprietor can be held liable under Section 138 of the Act. No need to array the Firm since the proprietorship concern and the proprietor are one and the same. Punjab and Haryana High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/0uRiX4sfM6sTjT79R7hT449ZM

54. Failure to reach out of court settlement cannot be a ground to order conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/TdgQvQMZ9kjPbOhXjO8gB2xLE

55. Negotiable Instruments Act. Cheque issued on the account of Co-Operative Society. Complaint filed against the officers without making Co-Operative society a party. Proceedings are liable to be quashed. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7vfz5mkNq4OXy1HQr57i593Op

56. Conviction under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be questioned under Section 482 Cr.P.C when appeal remedy is available. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/PykvUfZDymcfFrzBaqgLBAT4p

57. Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 138. Once NBW is issued against accused, the complainant need NOT take any further steps till NBW is executed or returned. Complaint can NOT be dismissed for not taking steps. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/rFB9jsyXzIEPZSEAw836bcs3t

58. Negotiable Instruments Act. Dishonour of cheque issued by outgoing/retired partner does NOT bind the partnership firm or other partners. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/jLd4Lidz1LZbSMbqMhr3wsa68

59. Cheque bounce cases. While considering application for grant of interim compensation, conduct of the accused is relevant. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/RQFNw9kyhigDPUNg96cvHXIqB

60. Court cannot place accused exparte in cheque bounce cases and proceed with the trial. Court must secure presence of the accused if he does not appear despite service of summons. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/uDR1b4mRA4vZklQQt1YFB5Y0M

61. Dissolution of Company under the IBC will not exonerate liability of directors under Section 138 of the NI Act when proceedings under the NI Act had already commenced with the Magistrate taking cognizance. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Z8h0kabHgtepoprFNihL9kh08

62. Negotiable Instruments Act. When accused is convicted and in appeal deposits 20% of the cheque amount as per the Court direction, the complainant is entitled for release of the amount in his favour. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/kU5iQE7c4gHiOm0XHAFjVSB53

63. Negotiable Instruments. If the payee or holder of the cheque made alteration with the consent of drawer on cheque, such alteration cannot be a ground to resist right of payee or holder thereof. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/kH1vqCHqMdMAlj6SfSaNprNaX

64. Cheque bounce cases. Trial Courts shall verify papers before taking cognizance and provide opportunity to complainant to rectify the mistakes due to inadvertence, ignorance or negligence. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/8a9HdPQTAWkvLN63ceWybFpaZ

65. Cheque Bounce Cases. When the complaint does not disclose the date of service of statutory notice, Court can rely on the date of reply notice to consider limitation aspect. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/HnBAK1EQBbVLlqGbQVLAHdLjX

66. Complaint under Section 138 NI Act cannot be dismissed for default for a single non-appearance of the complainant especially when the accused failed to deposit the interim amount. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/lZFTmDEwQWygGF6wyqHoeUkb2

67. Cheque Bounce cases. Moratorium contained in Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code applies only to Corporate Debtors. Directors are liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/D5BdzfNtpM2bRwkavFCeKoy3v

68. Cheque bounce case. An independent non-executive director, who is not aware of day-to-day affairs of the company, cannot be held liable under the N.I. Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/jXZVPuPEgT17syyhIYnT5Yq4S

69. Negotiable Instruments Act. When the cheque issued by partnership firm is dishonoured, criminal proceeding under Section 138 without impleading the firm is not maintainable. Kerala High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ZAZa5XyfSOSg7CMzfplt5h7Xy

70. Cheque Dishonour. When the signatory to the cheque was a sole proprietor of a firm, on his death, the liability would not move upon the legal heirs of such sole proprietor. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/QEg0oSO3J2yqpQzf6cblQNwWi

71. Cheque dishonour. Cheque issued by Secretary on behalf of Trust. Complaint is not maintainable without making the Trust a party to the proceedings. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/9jnNNK0bti8807EqiNPE011PW

72. Proceeding under Section 138 NI Act before a particular Court when the transaction having happened in a different place is not maintainable. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/J8poU3HVoXkpielYP8lRs9lHc

73. Dishonour of cheque issued towards time-barred debt/transaction cannot attract the provisions of Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/LkQPfegqazddmbDA6OlacVNQl

74. Negotiable Instruments Act. A cheque cannot be considered as time barred when it was issued within the time stipulated for repayment. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/g2y7GMDLTX6NRaSookSOWgK4K

75. NI Act. Only that person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible for conduct of business of company, as well as the company alone be guilty of the offence. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/VSBfs1DOKsCoBVClYUwzSnyHE

76. NI Act. Merely because somebody is managing affairs of the company he would not become in charge of the conduct of the business of the company or the person responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Supreme Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ZN8M4sWeieRG82Ab3KvI4qcJg

77. Negotiable Instruments Act. Death of the drawer of the cheque cannot and will not efface the offence when the cheque is issued on behalf of the Company. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/vDBsVBtOmitXCl0Uxjp7TAAs3

78. Cheque dishonour. Accused issuing signed blank cheque gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to fill the details. Such act on the part of the holder does not amount to material alteration of the cheque. Karnataka High Court.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/EIh7IXtXRFEjUF9O2IuT55VQW

Inter-country Adoption. Authoritative Judgment of the Karnataka High Court.

U. Ajay Kumar and others Vs The Union of India.
Writ Petition 16681 of 2023 decided on 23 January 2024.
Justice M. Nagaprasanna.

Discussion and the declaration of Law: The petitioners, husband and wife are before this Court seeking a direction by issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus to consider their representation dated 20-06-2023 made for the purpose of issuance No Objection Certificate (‘NOC’) and Conformity Certificate in favour of their adopted child in terms of Adoption Regulations, 2022 for Inter-Country Relative Adoption.

2. The facts, adumbrated, are as follows:-

The petitioners are husband and wife. The 1st petitioner/ husband is presently employed in Frankfurt, Germany and the wife is a resident of this nation – Bengaluru. Both the petitioners are citizens of India. Owing to the desire of adopting a child, as the petitioners did not have any issue from the wedlock for long years, the couple adopted a girl child of one Smt. S.Rashmi in the presence of relatives and friends. Smt. S. Rashmi gave her child in adoption by executing an adoption deed on 29-03-2023 before the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Chikkaballapura as the child was born in Chikkaballapura and the mother of the child was a resident of Chikkaballapura. Upon registration of adoption deed, as required in law, verification was done by the Deputy Commissioner and a certificate of verification was also issued along with the recommendation that adoption of the child being valid necessary action be taken upon the said adoption. The petitioners then seek issuance of an NOC and a conformity certificate in favour of adoption of the child by presenting it before the District Child Protection Unit. The District Child Protection Unit has not considered the request and has not issued an NOC as also conformity certificate of adoption. The petitioners have sent plethora of emails seeking issuance of NOC and conformity certificate. It is, therefore, the petitioners are before this Court seeking a direction for their issuance.

6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. In furtherance whereof what requires to be considered is,

“Whether the petitioners are entitled to a NOC and conformity certificate of the kind of adoption under the Act?”

7. It is not in dispute that the subject adoption is an intercountry adoption. Inter-country adoption was prohibited till 1993 and the children so adopted were left high and dry. It is, therefore, a convention on protection of children and cooperation in respect of inter-country adoption was envisaged at Hague. Several countries, including India, participated in the said Hague convention. The convention was to recognize that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding. The convention further recognized that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin. It, therefore, in the best interest of the child with respect to the fundamental rights of the child and to prevent abduction, sale, trafficking of children, articles of convention were drawn in the nature of declaration on social and legal principles relating to protection and welfare of children, with reference to foster placement and adoption Nationally and Internationally. The Hague convention was concluded on 29-05-1993.

8. Pursuant to Hague convention, certain regulations are promulgated by Government of India by a notification issued on 23-09-2022 in exercise of powers conferred under clause (c) of Section 68 read with clause (3) of Section 2 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and protection of Children) Act, 2015. It is these Regulations that are in force as on today. Therefore, all adoptions would be governed by these Regulations. These regulations are called the Adoption Regulations, 2022 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulations’ for short).

Sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 2 defines an ‘adoption committee’ comprising of certain officers appointed which will be chaired by the District Child Protection Officer. Sub-regulation (15) defines ‘incountry adoption’ which would mean adoption of a child by a citizen of India residing in India. The Regulations do not define in-country adoption. Sub-regulation (17) defines a No Objection Certificate which would mean that the certificate issued by the Authority for permitting the child to be placed in adoption with foreign or Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder or even a non-resident Indian prospective adoptive parents. Therefore, the petitioners would come within the definition of non-resident prospective adoptive parents. Regulation 58 deals with ‘No Objection Certificate’ to be issued by the Authority and reads as follows:

“(58) No Objection Certificate of Authority.- In case of all inter-country adoptions, the Authority shall issue No Objection Certificate in favour of the adoption of the child within ten days from the date of receipt of certificate issued under Article 5 or 17 of the Hague Adoption Convention from receiving country and a copy of the same shall be forwarded to the Authorized Foreign Adoption Agency or Central Authority concerned.”

Regulation 58 mandates that the Authority shall issue a NOC in favour of adoption of a child within 10 days from the date of a certificate issued under Article 5 or 17 of Hague Adoption Convention from the receiving country and a copy of that shall be forwarded to the authorized foreign Adoption Agency. Regulation 68 mandates that any Hindu prospective adoptive parents habitually residing abroad may contact the authorized foreign adoption agency in case of Hague ratified countries and the Government Department in case of non-Hague ratified countries to follow a standard common procedure for all inter-country adoptions under the Act who would take the child for adoption from India to a nation outside India. Regulation 69 deals with ‘Adoption process’ and reads as follows:

“69. Adoption process. – (1) The parties to an adoption concluded under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956) shall jointly present the deed of adoption to the Sub-Registrar’s office in the district with copy to District Magistrate.

(2) Based on such copy of the deed, the District Magistrate shall conduct such inquiry, as he may deem fit, to satisfy that all the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), and the stipulations under the regulations have been followed and such inquiry shall be completed within a period of thirty days.

(3) In case the District Magistrate fails to complete the inquiry within thirty days, he shall be bound to give reasons along with verification certificate for failing to provide the inquiry report within thirty days and the parties may register the adoption deed with the Sub-Registrar concerned under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), indicating the details of application made and that inquiry from District Magistrate has not been received within the stipulated time referred to in sub-regulation (2).

(4) The District Magistrate shall thereafter forward the verification certificate in the format in Schedule XXXV along with the checklist provided in Schedule XXXVI to the Central Adoption Resource Authority certifying the following that –

(a) the adoption recorded in the deed of adoption has been made in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), including the sourcing of the child, the eligibility and suitability of the adoptive parents;

(b) the adopted child or the biological parents are not under any duress while giving the child in adoption.

(c) the adoption has been concluded with mutual consent of all parties concerned.

(d) there has been no monetary consideration involved in the adoption process and the adoption is in the best interest of the child.”

Parties to the adoption concluded under the Act should jointly present a deed of adoption to the District Magistrate. Based upon it, the procedure commences. The petitioners have done what is prescribed under Regulation 69. Regulation 70 deals with issue of No Objection Certificate and Conformity certificate and reads as follows:

“70. Issue of No Objection Certificate and Conformity Certificate.-

(1) On receipt of verification certificate from the District Magistrate, on the registered adoption deed and necessary permission under Articles 5 or 17 from the receiving country as provided in the Hague Adoption Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of Intercountry Adoption, the Central Adoption Resource Authority shall issue No Objection Certificate for Hague ratified countries under Article 17(c) and Conformity certificate under Article 23 of the Convention.”

It is here lies the choke to the petitioners as the certificate is yet to be issued. Issuance of NOC under the Regulation 70 mandates that on receipt of verification certificate from the District Magistrate necessary permission under Article 5 or 17 from the receiving country as provided under the Hague Adoption Convention (supra) in respect of inter-country adoption, the Central Adoption Resource Authority shall issue NOC in conformity with Article 23 of the Convention.

9. On a conjoint reading of the Regulations quoted supra what would unmistakably emerge is that on receipt of verification certificate by the District Magistrate on the adoption deed and necessary permission from the receiving country, the receiving country in the case at hand is Germany, issuance of NOC and conformity certificate is to be from India. The process is under Regulations 68 and 69 of the Regulations. It is on the bedrock of the aforesaid Regulations the case at hand requires consideration. The Regulations have come into effect from 23-09-2022 and therefore, adoptions taking place after the said date would be governed under the said Regulations

10. Here, it becomes apposite to refer to a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of THE TEMPLE OF HEALING v. UNION OF INDIA1 – W.P.No.(Civil) 1003/2021 wherein the Apex Court in terms of its order dated 20-11-2023 considering an identical circumstance has held as follows:

“20. As regards HAMA, during the course of hearing, both Ms Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General and Dr Jagannath Pati, Director CARA have categorically stated before the Court that the process of adoption under HAMA is independent of the Regulations of 2022 which have been framed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. It has been stated that CARA intervenes only when an adoption certificate is required by the adoptive parents in order to facilitate the travel of the adopted child to a country outside India. CARA has stated in its note submitted to this Court that based on the fact that HAMA is a statute governing the personal law for Hindus, the Ministry of Women and Child Development has issued a notification on 17 September 2021 entrusting CARA with the duty of issuing documents for inter-country adoption concluded under HAMA wherein NonResident Indians/Overseas Citizens of India Card Holder parents desire to relocate the adopted child abroad. The note submitted before the Court also indicates that a central challenge is to ensure that HAMA adoptions align with international adoption conventions, such as the 1993 Hague Inter-country Adoption Convention. It has been stated that although CARA has been processing adoption cases of NRI/OCI PAPs, the receiving countries do not necessarily consider HAMA to be in conformity with the Hague Convention procedure. CARA has thus far issued adoption support letters to NRI/OCI PAPs in 66 cases since May 2022.

21. In order to provide to this Court adequate data on the number and extent of HAMA adoptions, we direct that all States and Union Territories shall compile and submit to the Director CARA, the annual data pertaining to HAMA adoptions for 2021, 2022 and 2023 within each of their respective territories as on 15 January 2024. This data shall be submitted to the Director CARA by 31 January 2024.

22. The data which has been directed to be submitted before this Court shall be compiled and placed on the record by 10 February 2024. CARA shall issue directions to all authorities governed by the Regulations of 2022 to ensure due observance of the timelines which are indicated so that the process of adoptions is streamlined and expedited. The updated statistics for the period ending 31 January 2024 along with an updated status report shall be placed on the record together with the compilation.”

The Apex Court (supra) directs that adoptions under the Act align with the international adoption conventions as in certain cases processing adoption of NRI/OCI, the receiving countries do not necessarily consider adoption under the Act. Therefore, in order to provide adequate data, it has been directed that all States and Union Territories have to comply and submit to the competent authority of Hindu adoptions within each of their respective territories within a time frame. This was to streamline and expedite the rights of adopted children in signatory nations to the Hague convention.

11. In yet another order, prior to the one quoted hereinabove, the Apex Court in the case of KARINA JANE CREED v. UNION OF INDIA – S.L.P.(C) No.13627 of 2019 decided on 10-06-2019, noticing inter-country adoption under the Hague convention has observed as follows: 

“4. Both India and Australia are signatories to the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Inter-Country Adoption held in Hague in 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “Hague Convention”). Article 5 of the Hague Convention provides:— 

5. Inter-country adoption requires a certification with regard to suitability of the adoptive parents to adopt the child, counselling of the prospective adoptive parents and authorization of the child to enter and reside in the receiving State.

6. In India all inter-country adoptions are governed by the provisions of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘JJ Act’)

8. A foreigner living abroad if interested to adopt an orphan or abandoned or surrendered child from India might apply to an authorized foreign adoption agency, or Central Authority or a concerned Government department in their country of habitual residence, in the manner as provided in the adoption regulations framed by the CARA as provided in Section 59(3).

9. The authorized foreign adoption agency, or Central Authority, or concerned Government department, of the foreign country has to prepare a home study report of the prospective adoptive parents and upon finding them eligible sponsor their application to CARA for adoption of a child from India.

10. A foreigner or a person of Indian origin or an overseas citizen of India who has habitual residence in India can apply for adoption of a child from India to CARA along with No Objection Certificate from the diplomatic mission of his country in India. 

12. In view of the statutory provisions of the JJ Act and in particular Section 59(12) thereof the relief prayed for in the writ petition cannot be granted. The writ Court could not have waived the statutory requirement of Section 59(12) of the JJ Act. As observed by learned Single Bench of Delhi High Court, there is little doubt that the petitioner would have brought up the children well, with love and affection and the children too would have been lucky to have the petitioner as an adoptive parent. We have every sympathy for the petitioner but regret our inability to help her.”

The Apex Court observed that a foreigner or a person of Indian origin or an Overseas Citizen of India can apply for adoption of a child from India to the Authority with NOC from the diplomatic mission of his country in India. The Apex Court quotes Section 59 of the Juvenile Justice Act and observes that statutory requirement in cases of adoption cannot be deviated by the writ Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court holds that the Delhi High Court has erred in granting such relief de hors observance of following of procedure. It is not in dispute that Germany is also a signatory to the Hague Convention like India. Germany has also put in place a Federal Central Authority of Germany depicting the norms for inter-country adoption.

ORDER

(i) Writ Petition is disposed of

“Know Your Judge”. Justice C. M. Joshi. Karnataka High Court.

Justice Chandarashekar Mrutyunjaya Joshi celebrates his 60th birthday today. Justice C.M.Joshi was born on 24.01.1964. He is native of Hubballi. He enrolled as Advocate and practiced at Hubballi. He was appointed as Munsiff on 08.02.1995. He was appointed as District Judge on 06.07.2009.

Justice Joshi served as Deputy Secretary, Karnataka State Legal Services Authority, Central Project Co-ordinator (Computers), Registrar (Computers) at High Court of Karnataka and as Prl. District & Sessions Judge, Udupi, Belagavi & Prl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. He was sworn-in as Additional Judge of the High Court of Karnataka on 16.08.2022.
Important judgments delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice C M Joshi.
Criminal law. Call records regarding conversation between accused and deceased are inadmissible in evidence unless the Certificate required under Section 65B of the Evidence Act is produced. Karnataka High Court. (DB)
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/sRsc59ZvrxNYUfN0wMgVfjdmw
Motor Vehicle Act. When a claim petition is filed under Section 163A and the evidence on record shows the income is above Rs.40,000/- p.a, the claim petition is liable to be rejected, unless it is converted to one under Section 166. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/M3DQf8Bqn8yuh7DRlj9iiwWfQ
Disciplinary proceedings against daily wage employee can be initiated under the Karnataka Daily Wage Employees Welfare Act, 2012 only if his name is notified by the State Government as daily wage employee. Karnataka High Court. (DB)
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/188NQJk9eEuJbsxbjZ1mXccjN
An order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and hence the Appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/JKErAZPwa2A80zeZY6IJ8YYtf
Property allotted to a female in family partition between herself and her father is her absolute property and does not revert to heirs of her father under Section 15 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/0GSAvqWzFvg7BQeuJtMe8MXPE
Service benefits do not form bequeathable estate of Government Servant. Family pension does not form part of the estate of the deceased and as such it cannot be disposed off during lifetime by testamentary disposition. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/nkq4qgzHH8eQerJub77MJieWi
Grant of Succession Certificate will not determine rights of parties since it merely identifies the hands in which death benefits be given and it does not entitle such person to appropriate such benefits to himself. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/FpGy47XzWhxSr6A2u19MQ6ok6
Adopted son becomes a coparcener in the adoptor’s family and cannot claim right in his genitive family properties. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/VsbGFAze5zHsxbp8uhudbl7bR
In case of ‘Act Only Policy’ which does not cover pillion rider with extra premium, liability cannot be fastened on the insurance company. Even the principle of ‘pay and recover‘ does not apply in such cases. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/gPDsYnJA9UmTVCcx6qtpnVtVo
When ‘package/comprehensive’ policy is issued, it covers all including the occupant, driver, pillion rider and the owner. Premium paid is irrelevant. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/lPPuQpPRt0cLfNpjy7NqzLbQP

Advocates Association takes strong exception to Senior Judge’s comments on Junior Judges.

The office bearers of the Advocates Association Bangalore today appeared before a senior Judge of the Karnataka High Court and apart from expressing concern over listing of the matters, took strong exception to the regular comments being made by the Judge against two junior Judges who handled the roster matters.

While requesting the senior Judge to accept physical memos from the advocates, President of the Advocates Association Mr. Vivek Reddy, Secretary Mr. T.G. Ravi and Treasurer Mr. Harish M T took exception to the manner in which comments were made by the judge against junior judges who “liberally granted interim orders.” The office bearers requested the Judge to consider the requests by the junior advocates for posting sympathetically.

(As told by Mr. Vivek Reddy, President, Advocates Association, Bangalore to Mr. S. Basavaraj, Member, Karnataka State Bar Council)

Commenting on brother Judges -Striking at the foundation of Judicial institution.

S. Basavaraj, Senior Advocate and Member, Karnataka State Bar Council

Today, while waiting for my matter in a Court Hall, I heard the learned Judge making open and repeated comments (atleast four times) “ಕಣ್ಣು ಮುಚ್ಕ0ಡು ಸ್ಟೇ ಕೊಟ್ಟ್ರೆ ಹಿ0ಗೇ ಹಾಗೋದು” (this is what happens if stay orders are granted blindfolded). Obviously the Judge was referring to the liberal interim orders granted by Judges who dealt with matters before the roaster was changed.

Every Judge has his own notions about civil or criminal jurisprudence. Some judges may feel the oppressed class of tenants or workmen need extra protection; some judges may feel slapping of FIRs by the Police at the drop of the hat has to be prevented. When the roaster is changed, the new Judge may vacate the interim orders or even dismiss the cases which do not warrant interference by the Court.

While doing so, commenting on the judicial approach of the earlier Judge/Judges or casting aspersions on the brother Judges is, in my humble opinion, not proper. Judges have taken oath under the Constitution of India and they discharge their duties within the legal/constitutional framework. Judges do not/cannot have personal interest in the matter. They just do their job and move on.

Even while considering an appeal arising out of lower court proceedings, it must be noted that what is before the higher courts or the larger bench is the judgement under challenge and not the judge who delivered the judgement. A judgment under challenge can be supported by the respondent. However if a comment/observation is made on the Judge who delivered the judgement, there is no one to defend the judge.

The Supreme Court in Rama Dayal Markarah vs State of Madhya Pradesh (1978) 2 SCC 630 observed that “..ordinarily, the judgment itself will be the subject matter of criticism and not the judge”. The Madras High Court in Abdul Sathar vs The Principal Secretary to Government (2013 SCC OnLine Mad 1932) observed that “The judgement should speak and not the judge”.

A judge who is imbibed with traditional values might find it difficult to interfere with few matters involving crime, corruption, domestic violence etc. But he is at complete liberty to decide the matters according to his convictions. Commenting upon the manner in which similar matters have been dealt with by brother Judges is not correct.

To conclude, the practice of commenting on the brother Judges who adorned the bench on the same roaster runs counter to the judicial institution and the values it stands for.

Important Judgments on ”Partition under the Hindu Law”.

1. Whether plaint can be amended at the instance of defendant in a partition suit to include property. Karnataka and Madras High Courts take different views.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/natSxzJ7W8zO9pW6GdP85I0P3
2. Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Ancestral property partitioned and sold prior to 2005 amendment. Suit for partition by daughter is maintainable under the 1994 Karnataka amendment. Plaint cannot be rejected.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/lbmbNrvwKN8j3BijpRs3AfViX
3. Hindu Succession Act. Section 14. Life interest created to wife under Will beyond her share in a notional partition is not a pre-existing right. Bequeath is only life interest. Wife will not get absolute right. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/s3By08wWSkDhYnWeNIZ9jzX0K
4. Suit for declaration. If the plaintiff is not entitled for whole of the property Court can pass a decree for partition of his share without driving him to file another suit for partition. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Xn4iOKjiGbmuSr3FZx6BSO1dl
5. Hindu Succession Act. Amended Section 6. Plea of prior partition. Mere partition decree will not sever joint family status. Until final decree is passed and allottees of shares are put in possession – there is no partition. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/cVSv4aF0KiIjrAxeB849GREtT
6. Property purchased in the name of minor is his absolute property unless there is evidence to show it was also joint family property- (see the Note). Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Gh5utSCuXgY73R7Wyjo3a6p4I
7. Doctrine of ouster. Applicability in case of co-owner and in a suit for partition. Explained. Supreme Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/y50Dd4jkOKiJh3Y1vAvwcpymo
8. Separated son has NO right in ancestral property left by kartha. He can claim share as Class-I heir after death of Kartha in notional partition. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/O48Ush1dCXcJfD5NS6zxFN2du
9. Suit for partition. Limitation Act, Section 110. The period of limitation does NOT start where there is no specific demand for partition of share in the property and no refusal or denial by defendant. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/fw5LGY5WlFLFnzdrAUmpy05ks
10. Suit for partition. Appellate court can grant relief even to non-appealing parties/plaintiffs since a defendant can ask the Court to transpose him as a plaintiff and a plaintiff can ask for being transposed as a defendant. Supreme Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/rOCQqam2SJpmWl1XtkyaqNAEL
11. Plaint in a suit for partition based on amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is liable to be rejected if there is clear admission in the plaint about registered partition of ancestral properties prior to the amendment. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/AqiH79AYRqh6uAL1goeyPue3D
12. Family settlement arrived as oral partition and later put into writing for the purpose of information is not required to be compulsorily registered, and stamp duty need not be paid in respect of the same. Delhi High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/hqQBLOlJzpn933P4nud8TU0fD
13. In a suit for partition, defendant can seek direction to plaintiff to include certain properties in the plaint schedule and seek partition of the same. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ILh8GtkO4hA7IEoFpjKnVRvuI
14. Where property is sold under the Partition Act 1893, provisions of Order 21 Rules 84 & 85 CPC regarding mandatory deposit of entire balance sale price within 15 days do not apply. Court can extend time for such payment. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ftBEuUrvqx3sHe2V7cFsYvxKY
15. Plaint in a suit for a primary relief of partition and separate possession cannot be rejected on the ground of limitation though the secondary prayer is barred by time especially when both the prayers are interconnected. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/LRuLLzFwNONqG4BNWN5GpNeNF
16. Acceptance of lesser share by father in ancestral properties in family partition will not prevent his son from claiming actual/correct share in the properties. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/lH8UX2ApuNy7StVQeKgv4g366
17. Suit for partition. Défense of prior partition becomes weak when revenue entries do not stand separately and exclusively in the name of the family members. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Vau54IxDF81BKpQE2MXKSVuBq
18. A co-owner cannot seek temporary injunction against another co-owner on the ground of adverse possession unless there is a partition of the property by metes and bounds. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/xDbapeyzt9Dx35Aq4Ywhvqcup
19. Suit for partition. Plea of exclusive possession by the purchaser of coparcenery property is NOT a conclusive factor to determine court fee payable by the plaintiff. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Zr3dnpFd2lwm8d0XTm0P94ccv
20. In a suit for partition filed by woman against her father/brother based on amended Section 6 Hindu Succession Act, joint family properties given to her husband as dowry can also be included. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/yac9TIe4JwB5vLqBYkQQGcIny
21. Suit for partition. A person who is not a party to alienation of coparcenery property need NOT seek cancellation of sale deed or a declaration that he is not bound by the alienation. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/0jpPcSN2LoiHu6PkaVTZpyWwl
22. Suit for partition by woman coparcener is not maintainable if the ancestral property was sold before coming into force of the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/P2MxaZz15WlWu4IzMoyjPRtLJ
23. Suit for partition by daughters based on the amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Properties sold prior to 20 December 2004 are not available for partition. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/0R1Rtm7hRxWDaySPGxTf9Bh2e
24. Property allotted to a female in family partition between herself and her father is her absolute property and does not revert to heirs of her father under Section 15 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/0GSAvqWzFvg7BQeuJtMe8MXPE
25. Cause of action in a partition suit is a recurring action. Dismissal of earlier suit for non-prosecution will not be a bar for filing a second suit for partition. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/JovsgCgK3bGQnz5i0jOqFo4xM
26. Hindu Succession Act. Partition of properties inherited under Section 8 will not change the nature of the properties to coparcenary. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/7WkHgBZXZWIZPMLmRL8htCCb5
27. Partition Act. Party who applies for sale of the property under Section 2 cannot opt for purchase of the share of the other parties under Section 3. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/AyJ2wImDu5VSceufc4MgIGEqY
28. Inclusion of properties already partitioned in a suit for partition amounts to vexatious and scandalous litigation. Court can order deleting the properties from the plaint under Order 6 Rule 16 of CPC. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/oarJCd8AcDey37g4CGwf297ze
29. Suit for partition filed several years after the property was sold by the karta or the mother is hit by the doctrine of acquiescence and the same is liable to be dismissed. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/XGUr2e0ZtuvnX4nzP7z8jKFFG
30. Law of Limitation. Suit challenging the earlier partition, filed several decades after the partition deed, is liable to be dismissed by rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11. Supreme Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/8naEvmw7Le6F3oYCLecNEptOf
31. Unconditional allotment of property under a partition will not attract the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/IcElYDIkll3PY6rsAHzIlWsI8
32. Ancestral property fallen to the share of father in a family partition among his father and brothers cannot be claimed by his son since the property so allocated to his share becomes his exclusive property. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/HbotLMcNTO8Wp0nICcnKwmELb
33. Suit for partition filed three years after the minor coparcener attaining majority merely pleading that alienation of ancestral properties by karta is not binding on him is barred by law of limitation. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/l8o5RTOBOhfBXLpztTaknOuwM
34. Suit for partition. Once a Plaintiff contends that he has separated from the joint family, properties bought subsequent to the said separation cannot be included in the suit for partition filed subsequently. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/PlRAY4tSkUxJgSCmDcrmBR3zi
35. Non-alienating member of joint family can maintain a suit for partition and separate possession in the event of alienation by other members and there is no need to challenge the sale deed. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Rn7scoU25OuEaCN69czGsSUir
36. Suit for partition. Appointment of court commissioner during the proceedings to find out the existence of building etc would be unnecessary since such an exercise can be undertaken at the time of final decree proceedings. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Gv6nzDwCjONuIEab4W705csLn
37. Unregistered relinquishment deed can be relied on for the collateral purpose of proving earlier partition and division of joint family status as recited in the deed. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/knY7JAseZj4F0bjklQM9h5doq
38. Suit for partition. Inclusion of properties in the plaint schedule cannot be questioned by purchaser of property since he has no say in the suit to dictate how the suit has to be proceeded with. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/jKhJe9KORA1aSGS0sPSiYEc7E
39. Suit for partition based on amended Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Plaint can be rejected in respect of a particular item of property which was already sold prior to coming into force of the amendment. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/4bxoXdtBsWCPhQ5AEo3IPDnM1
40. Preventing bank from exercising its right under the SARFAESI Act in the guise of partition suit among family members with prayer for injunction is hit by Sections 35 and 36. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/qnQEJz65yYylguhyuVQzPN4JE
41. Second suit for partition, instead of enforcing the earlier decree for partition within the period of limitation, is not maintainable. Plaint is liable to be rejected. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Dhc1sRdwlSF9rEkwZLQetsBCv
42. In case of notional partition, shares of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life-time of the deceased. Supreme Court explains.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/8BPKx50SQqubSZb8nQKMN8ohF
43. Court can grant relief of partition and separate possession of a portion even though prayer is for relief of declaration of title to the entire property. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/s93RJ6TgD67HtKh2NJbpr274h
44. When there is a doubt as to whether an unregistered document is partition deed or relinquishment deed, it can be adjudicated only during the trial. Trial Court cannot refuse to accept it in evidence by conducting a mini trial. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/hL2lFEsRmdTNXpHxndLZDJySO
45. A registered partition acts as complete disruption of the joint family status. Son born subsequent to the partition cannot seek reopening of the partition unless the partition was within his own family. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/QKLSyVmASOGJcRlSDxp2rIiBp
46. Native Christians of Coorg province. Pending suit for partition based on the Shasthric Hindu Law is not maintainable after the issuance of 2015 notification making Indian Succession Applicable to them. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/LRb4Ivbd1DV1vGyiqf1w9FLEF
47. Question of limitation in a suit for partition arises only if defendants prove ouster of plaintiff from the joint family properties. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/eKWE0e5fGBDeR6MKN58wlVCmv
48. Suit for partition. Mere purchase of property in the name of co-sharer does not prove self acquisition when there is joint family nucleus and when independent income is not proved. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/Tw9oVZkpfhVfGIURUrkenLnkv
49. Suit for partition. When one co-sharer is in possession of the properties, all other co-sharers are presumed to be in possession on the basis of joint title. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/n2oo8U8EiWNNe1AIDzGXYYxlz
50. When decree for declaration of title cannot be granted, the court can grant a decree for partition of the properties. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/hi9B0gvtzsEqkDMCQpa3e2qpM
51. Hindu Succession Act. Failure on the part of daughters to claim share in house property in a family partition does not amount to abandonment of claim under the unamended Section 23. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/shiM2xZRtU9qKOzSvxZjs1vCT
52. Award passed by the Lok Adalath cannot be questioned by a separate suit though termed as suit for partition in view of the bar under the Legal Services Authority Act. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/rZGdWNwkc6KxmE0m2T0kLer8X
53. Amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act applies even to final decree proceedings arising out of the suit for partition filed prior to the amendment. Authoritative judgement of the Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/ALutGUzqWrRBUowoFsU7tvnhG
54. Partition. Though filing of partition suit brings about severance of status of jointness, legislative amendment or subsequent event will have to be taken into consideration and given effect to in passing the final decree. Supreme Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/TrQ22I70GMchDL1VqR6v5Rgsa
55. Execution proceedings in suit for partition. Person claiming under joint family member who suffered decree cannot maintain application Order 21 Rule 97 of CPC. Karnataka High Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/07jntkBSQJI6V41hiJtrB27va
56. In a suit for partition of joint family property, a decree by consent amongst only some of the parties cannot be passed. Supreme Court.
https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/9bl8TMlD1yjFuFkJgdabtmatR

ಒಮ್ಮೆ ಭೂಮಿ ಪರಿವರ್ತನೆ ಆದ ನ0ತರ ಪರಿವರ್ತನ ಆದೇಶವನ್ನು ಪರಿಶೀಲಿಸಲು, ಹಿಂತೆಗೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳಲು ಅಥವಾ ರದ್ದುಗೊಳಿಸಲು ಜಿಲ್ಲಾದಿಕಾರಿಗೆ ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ಭೂ ಕಂದಾಯ ಕಾಯಿದೆ ಅಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಅವಕಾಶವಿಲ್ಲ. ಕರ್ನಾಟಕ ಉಚ್ಚ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯ.

ಆಂಗ್ಲ ಭಾಷೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ನ್ಯಾಯಾಲಯದ ತೀರ್ಪಿನ ವಿವರ ಹಾಗೂ ತೀರ್ಪನ್ನು ನೋಡಲು ಈ ಲಿಂಕ್ ಬಳಸಿ.

https://www.dakshalegal.com/judgements/actionView/17IvwbW4KMEHEXXypTxDY53Ce

“Even the men deserve equal opportunity.” Karnataka High Court declares 100% reservation to women in Indian military nursing services as unconstitutional

Sanjay M Peerapur and others Vs The Union of India and others.

Writ Petition 62966 of 2011 decided on 5 January 2024.

Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde.

2. Be that as it may, the Constitution of India which embodies egalitarian principles at its core recognises both men and women as equal. At the same time, the framers of the Constitution being conscious of historical oppression and exploitation suffered by women devised constitutional measures to achieve the constitutional goal of equality by enabling the State to make special provisions for women, under Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.

3. Yes, we agree that the State is enabled to make special provisions treating women as a ‘separate class’. Yet Article 15 (3) cannot override constitutional guarantee under Article 16(2), in the matter of employment under the State. Assuming that Article 15(3) controls Article 16(2), the State cannot provide a hundred percent reservation for women in employment under the State, is the contention of the petitioners. Thus, the challenge to the vires of Section 6 of the Indian Military Nursing Services Ordinance, 1943 (for short ‘Ordinance, 1943’) in so far as providing hundred percent reservation for women in the cadre of ‘nursing officers’.

4. Section 6 of the Ordinance 1943 reads as under.

6. Eligibility for appointment -(1) Any citizen of India, if a woman and above the age of 21, shall be eligible for appointment as an officer in the Indian Military Nursing Services, and, if she satisfies the prescribed conditions, may be appointed thereto in the manner laid down in section 5.

9. The questions that need to be answered are;

(a) Whether Section 6 of the Indian Military, Nursing Services Ordinance, 1943, reserving the post of ‘nursing officers’ en bloc for women, violates the rights guaranteed under Articles 14,16,19 and 21 of the Constitution of India

(b) Whether the impugned provision is protected under Articles 15(3) and 33 of the Constitution of India. 

15. The scope of Articles 15 (3) and 16 (2) was also considered in Indra Sawhney supra. At this juncture, it is relevant to quote para No.514 in Indra Sawhney.

“514. It is necessary to add here a word about reservations for women. Clause (2) of Article 16 bars reservation in services on the ground of sex. Article 15(3) cannot save the situation since all reservations in the services under the State can only be made under Article 16. Hence reservations for them on that ground would be fully justified, if they are kept in the quota of the respective class, as for other categories of persons, as explained above. If that is done, there is no need to keep a special quota for women as such, and whatever the percentage limit on the reservations under Article 16, need not be exceeded.”

16. On a reading of the above-mentioned paragraph, it is evident that in a matter relating to public employment, Article 16(2) governs the field, and Article 15(3) cannot override Article 16(2).

17. In addition, in Indra Sawhney, the Apex Court has held that reservation in public employment cannot exceed more than 50%. Though, said judgment is delivered interpreting Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India, the principle emanating from the said judgment in so far percentage of reservation has to be applied in the matters relating to employment under the State.

18. At this juncture, it is also relevant to state that there may be circumstances where the very nature or place of work, or the persons for whom the work is done require only women to be employed. For example, while recruiting employees in girls’ or ladies’ hostel, or any institution exclusively meant for women, then exclusive reservations in favour of women may find justification.

19. In the case on hand, no such justification is claimed. It is not the defence that the nursing officers appointed under Ordinance 1943, are required to discharge the duty in a hospital exclusively meant for omen or that the nature of work is such that it can be done by only women and not by men.

20. To the pointed question by the Court, whether the nursing officers recruited under Ordinance 1943 are made to work in hospitals where male nursing officers are not allowed, the learned Counsel on instructions submitted that women nursing officers employed under the Ordinance, 1943 are employed in the same or similar hospitals or where male nursing officers recruited under different recruitment provision are also working.

21. Validity of Section 6 of Ordinance, 1943 is also defended on the premise that there is one more law that exclusively provides reservation for men while recruiting nursing officers working under the armed forces, where women are not allowed to apply for the post. It is urged that because of the exclusive reservation provided for men, in practice gender equality is ensured. This contention is untenable. While recruiting under the Ordinance, 1943 where the employment is reserved exclusively for women, and in recruitment under any other Act which provides exclusive reservation for men, there is no guarantee that the recruitment will take place simultaneously. Not going for recruitment under one Ordinance or law, when the recruitment takes place under another Ordinance or law, and if a particular sex is a disqualification to apply for the post, then it results in denial of an equal opportunity in employment guaranteed under Article 16 of the Constitution. Thus, the contention that the violation complained in view of exclusive reservation for women in Ordinance, 1943 is compensated by exclusive reservations provided for men in another law, in practice, will not ensure equality under Article 14 as there is no mandate that the recruitments should take place simultaneously for both men and women.

29. Women are justifiably considered to be a separate class under the Constitution. However, it does not mean that there can be hundred percent reservations in employment for women to the exclusion of all others when the classification is solely based on the sex without having any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The law providing for exclusive reservations without any intelligible differentia having nexus to the object sought to be achieved violates the Constitutional guarantee under Article 14 and Article 16 (2) of the Constitution of India and is not saved by Article 15(3) of the Constitution.

30. In a recent judgement in ABHAY KUMAR KISPOTTA and others vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH and others in Writ Petition No.7183/2021, the Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court relying on Indra Sawhney’s case has held that hundred percent reservation for women in employment under the State is unconstitutional.

31. The next question that requires consideration is; whether the impugned Section 6 of Ordinance, 1943 is saved by Article 33 of the Constitution of India.

32. On a reading of Article 33, the following will emerge:

(a) The power is conferred only on the Parliament to make law, and to determine to what extent the rights conferred under Part III can be restricted; (b) The power to make law under Article 33 of the Constitution of India is confined to the subjects specified in the said Article.

(c) The law under Article 33 can be made only to ensure the proper discharge of the duties and maintenance of the discipline among the persons named in said Article. 

34. As already noticed Article 33 empowers the Parliament to make special provisions affecting rights conferred under Part–III. The power is given only to the Parliament and none other. Thus the question is,

“Whether the Ordinance, 1943 is promulgated by the Parliament”? The answer is “No”. 

Admittedly, the Ordinance, 1943 was promulgated by the then British Crown, and later, it was adapted under the adaptation laws, Orders 1950. The adaptation of laws, Orders 1950 is by the President in exercise of the power conferred under Clause-2 of Article 372 of the Constitution of India. 

The law adapted under Article 372(2) of the Constitution of India, cannot be equated with the law enacted by the Parliament under Article 33 of the Constitution of India. This question was settled as early as 1962 in DALBIR SINGH AND OTHERS vs STATE OF PUNJAB (AIR 1962 SC 1106). 

36. It is necessary to refer to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. In Hansraj Moolji, the Apex Court dealt with the effect of the Ordinance passed before the independence. The said judgment has no application to the present petition as the petitioners admit that the Ordinance was adapted in 1950 as provided under Article 372 (2) of the Constitution of India.

37. Much emphasis is laid on the judgment of the Apex Court in Jasbir Kaur vs. Union of India to contend that the Ordinance, 1943 is already declared as constitutional. In the said case, the validity of the Regulations made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 10 of the Ordinance, prescribing different kinds of uniforms to the employees was called into question. The said judgment cannot be said to be a judgment upholding the constitutional validity of impugned Section 6 of Ordinance, 1943. The Apex Court in the said judgment has only held that there is no scope for the application of Article 14 in a matter relating to uniforms prescribed for the employees of the Indian Military Nursing Service.

44. For the reasons already recorded, this Court is of the view that exclusive reservation conferred on women while recruiting “nursing officers” under Ordinance, 1943 does violate the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 16(2), and 21 of the Constitution of India as the classification does not qualify the twin test referred to above.

45. Though it is urged by respondents that the Ordinance, 1943 has been in force for over eight decades and several recruitments have taken place under the said Ordinance, 1943 and holding the said Ordinance as unconstitutional at this point in time leads to several complications in the matters concerning cadre, promotion, and hierarchy of officers, such a contention cannot have any place when the vires of a provision is questioned. The length of time for which the provision remained unchallenged and the rights and liabilities created under such provision is no defence to uphold the validity of a provision if it is otherwise ultra vires. Hence, the petition succeeds.

46. When the law is declared ultra vires, it is void from its inception. However, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that appointments have been made under the said provisions since 1943 and even during the pendency of this writ petition. The consequences that follow after declaring the expression “if a woman” in Section 6 of the Ordinance, 1943 as unconstitutional needs to be clarified to ensure complete justice to those who are not parties to the proceeding.

47. In a situation like the one on hand, a Court that declares a law as ultra-vires, in exercise of its plenary power under Article 226 of the Constitution, can save the rights accrued to the persons under the law which is now declared ultra-vires. Both justice and equity warrant the Court to exercise its plenary jurisdiction, to pass such order.

48. For the reasons recorded supra, this Judgment cannot be construed to hold a view that all appointments made under Ordinance, 1943 as void. Such an interpretation will have far-reaching, undesirable consequences and unsettle many things that have settled long back.

49. Since there is no challenge to the appointments made earlier and to the appointments which have taken place during the pendency of the petition, this Court is of the view that notwithstanding that provision is held to be ultra-vires, all appointments made hitherto under Ordinance, 1943 and consequences flowing from such appointments are required to be saved and hence saved.

ORDER

(i) The writ petition is allowed-in-part.
(ii) The expression “if woman” found in Section 6 of the Indian Military Nursing Services Ordinance, 1943 is struck down as unconstitutional.
(iii) Since, appointments have already taken place under the impugned notification dated 13.02.2010 at Annexure- B, during the pendency of the writ petition, the prayer to quash Annexure – B, the notification for recruiting ‘nursing officers’ is rejected.
(iv) In case petitioners No.1 and 2 apply for any posts under the Ordinance, 1943 in the future, while computing their age prescribed for applying to the  post, the time spent in prosecuting the petition shall be excluded