Specific Performance. In case of immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract. However, Court can infer essence of time in certain cases. Supreme Court

Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, (1993) 1 SCC 519. (Constitution Bench)

Paragraph 19. It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the essence of the contract. This principle is not in any way different from that obtainable in England. Under the law of equity which governs the rights of the parties in the case of specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It has to be ascertained whether under the terms of the contract the parties named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance it was intended that it should be completed within a reasonable time. An intention to make time the essence of the contract must be expressed in unequivocal language.

25. From an analysis of the case-law it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: (1) From the express terms of the contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.

Cases relied on:

1 (1967) 1 SCR 227 : AIR 1967 SC 868
2 (1979) 2 SCC 70 : (1979) 2 SCR 1147
3 AIR 1915 PC 83
4 (1969) 3 SCC 120 : (1970) 2 SCR 854
5 ILR 40 Bom 289
6 (1867) 3 Ch App 61
7 (1853) 3 De GM &G 284
8 (1977) 2 SCC 539
9 (1849) 3 Exch 283, 308
10 (1870) LR 10 Eq 281
11 (1950) 1 KB 616
12 (1988) 2 SCC 488 : AIR 1988 SC 1074

Compiled by S. Basavaraj, Advocate, Daksha Legal.