Limitation Act. Section 5. ‘Sufficient Cause’. Order of dismissal from service deprives right to livelihood. Courts have to apply the provision in a meaningful manner to subserve ends of justice. Karnataka High Court.

Suresh H.L vs The Management Sarvodaya Vidhyavardhaka and another Writ Petition 46435/2017 (S-Dis) decided on 4 November.

Judgement link: http://judgmenthck.kar.nic.in/judgmentsdsp/bitstream/123456789/347715/1/WP46435-17-04-11-2020.pdf

Relevant paragraphs: 8. Condonation of delay is discretion of the Court. Sufficient cause depends on the facts of each case. Sufficient cause means adequate cause. The party who seeks conduction of delay shall demonstrate  that  there  was no negligence, or there was no inactiveness  on  his part. The reasons for condonation of delay must be bonafide and reasonable. Sufficient case (sufficient cause) is to be given liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done. An order of dismissal from service will have far reaching civil consequences on the petitioner, as the order of dismissal virtually amounts to deprivation of right to livelihood. In that circumstances, the Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it.

The  Hon’ble  Apex  Court  in  the  case  of  M/s.  Katiji  and others cited supra while considering Section 5 of the Limitation Act has held that “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the  ends  of  justice.    Further  the  Hon’ble  Apex  Court  has observed that while condoning the delay liberal approach is to be adopted keeping in mind the following principles:-

(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. Asagainst which when delay is condoned the  highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

(3) ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

(4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

(6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.”

Judgments in G.    RAME   GOWDA   AND    OTHERS    Vs.    SPECIAL    LAND ACQUISITION  OFFICER,  BANGALORE,  reported  in  (1988)  2SCC 142 and N.BALAKRISHNANVs.M.KRISHNAMURTHY   reported   in   (1998) 7 SCC 123 relied on.

10. The  cause  stated by the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case would constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay of 60 days in filing the appeal. The Tribunal failed  to  exercise its discretion judiciously while considering the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Writ Petition allowed.

Compiled by S. Basavaraj and Sreekriti Taggarse, Daksha Legal.

Published by rajdakshalegal

Senior Advocate, High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru

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