SHANTI DEVI ALIAS SHANTI MISHRA vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS. CIVIL APPEAL NO.3630 of 2020 decided on 5 November 2020
Judgment Link: https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/25048/25048_2018_34_1501_24598_Judgement_05-Nov-2020.pdf
- Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure while
commenting on Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code
defined cause of action in following words:-
“The expression ’cause of action’ has
acquired a judicially settled meaning. In
the restricted sense ’cause of action’
means the circumstances forming the
infraction of the right or the immediate
occasion for the action. In the wider
sense, it means the necessary conditions
for the maintenance of the suit, including
not only the infraction of the right, but
the infraction coupled with the right
itself. Compendiously the expression means
every fact by which it would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
in order to support his right to the
judgment of the Court……………….” - P. Ramanatha Aiyar in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd
Edition, Volume 1, has defined the cause of action in
following words:-
“’Cause of action’ has been defined as
meaning simply a factual situation the
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existence of which entitles one person to
obtain from the Court a remedy against
another person. The phrase has been held
from earliest time to include every fact
which is material to be proved to entitle
the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact
which a defendant would have a right to
traverse. “Cause of action” has also been
taken to mean that particular act on the
part of the defendant which gives the
plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the
subject matter of the grievance founding
the action, not merely the technical cause
of action.” - Black’s Law Dictionary defines the cause of
action in following words:-
“A group of operative facts giving rise to
one or more bases for suing; a factual
situation that entitles one person to
obtain a remedy in court from another
person…………” - This Court had occasion to consider the cause of
action in context of Article 266 of the Constitution
and has explained the expression “cause of action” in
large number of cases. We may refer to a Three Judge
Bench judgment of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., (1994) 4
SCC 711 where in paragraphs 5 and 6 following has
been laid down:-
“5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with
a non obstante clause — notwithstanding
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anything in Article 32 — and provides that
every High Court shall have power
“throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue
to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, “within
those territories” directions, orders or
writs, for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by Part III or for any
other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article
226 the High Court may exercise its power
conferred by clause (1) if the cause of
action, wholly or in part, had arisen
within the territory over which it
exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person
is not within those territories. On a
plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses
of Article 226 of the Constitution it
becomes clear that a High Court can
exercise the power to issue directions,
orders or writs for the enforcement of any
of the fundamental rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution or for any
other purpose if the cause of action,
wholly or in part, had arisen within the
territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding
that the seat of the Government or
authority or the residence of the person
against whom the direction, order or writ
is issued is not within the said
territories. In order to confer
jurisdiction on the High Court of
Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a
part of the cause of action had arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of
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that Court. That is at best its case in
the writ petition. - It is well settled that the expression
“cause of action” means that bundle of
facts which the petitioner must prove, if
traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in
his favour by the Court. In Chand
Kour v. Partab Singh [ILR (1889) 16 Cal
98, 102 : 15 IA 156] Lord Watson said:
“… the cause of action has no
relation whatever to the defence
which may be set up by the
defendant, nor does it depend upon
the character of the relief prayed
for by the plaintiff. It refers
entirely to the ground set forth
in the plaint as the cause of
action, or, in other words, to the
media upon which the plaintiff
asks the Court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour.”
Therefore, in determining the objection of
lack of territorial jurisdiction the court
must take all the facts pleaded in support
of the cause of action into consideration
albeit without embarking upon an enquiry
as to the correctness or otherwise of the
said facts. In other words the question
whether a High Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
must be answered on the basis of the
averments made in the petition, the truth
or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To
put it differently, the question of
territorial jurisdiction must be decided
on the facts pleaded in the petition.
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Therefore, the question whether in the
instant case the Calcutta High Court had
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
writ petition in question even on the
facts alleged must depend upon whether the
averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22,
26 and 43 are sufficient in law to
establish that a part of the cause of
action had arisen within the jurisdiction
of the Calcutta High Court.” - This Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia Vs. State
of Maharashtra and Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 640 had
occasion to consider territorial jurisdiction of High
Court under Article 226(2). Dealing with
constitutional amendment made in Article 226(2), this
Court laid down following in paragraph 37:-
“37. The object of the amendment by
inserting clause (2) in the article was to
supersede the decision of the Supreme
Court in Election Commission v. Saka
Venkata Subba Rao [AIR 1953 SC 210] and to
restore the view held by the High Courts
in the decisions cited above. Thus the
power conferred on the High Courts under
Article 226 could as well be exercised by
any High Court exercising jurisdiction in
relation to the territories within which
“the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises” and it is no matter that the seat
of the authority concerned is outside the
territorial limits of the jurisdiction of
that High Court. The amendment is thus
aimed at widening the width of the area
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for reaching the writs issued by different
High Courts.” - It was further held that the collocation of the
words “cause of action, wholly or in part, arises”
seems to have been lifted from Section 20 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. This Court also quoted the
definition of “cause of action” given by Lord Esher
in Read Vs. Brown in paragraph 39. In paragraphs 38,
39 and 41, following was laid down:-
“38. “Cause of action” is a phenomenon
well understood in legal parlance.
Mohapatra, J. has well delineated the
import of the said expression by referring
to the celebrated lexicographies. The
collocation of the words “cause of action,
wholly or in part, arises” seems to have
been lifted from Section 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, which section also deals
with the jurisdictional aspect of the
courts. As per that section the suit could
be instituted in a court within the legal
limits of whose jurisdiction the “cause of
action wholly or in part arises”. Judicial
pronouncements have accorded almost a
uniform interpretation to the said
compendious expression even prior to the
Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution as
to mean “the bundle of facts which would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,
if traversed, in order to support his
right to the judgment of the court”.
24 - In Read v. Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 :
58 LJQB 120 : 60 LT 250 (CA)] Lord Esher,
M.R., adopted the definition for the
phrase “cause of action” that it meant
“every fact which it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to
prove, if traversed, in order to
support his right to the judgment
of the court. It does not
comprise every piece of evidence
which is necessary to prove each
fact, but every fact which is
necessary to be proved”. - Even in the context of Article 226(2)
of the Constitution this Court adopted the
same interpretation to the expression
“cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises” vide State of Rajasthan v. Swaika
Properties [(1985) 3 SCC 217] . A threeJudge Bench of this Court in Oil and
Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar
Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711] observed that it
is well settled that the expression “cause
of action” means that bundle of facts
which the petitioner must prove, if
traversed to entitle him to a judgment in
his favour. Having given such a wide
interpretation to the expression Ahmadi,
J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
speaking for M.N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and
B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J., utilised the
opportunity to caution the High Courts
against transgressing into the
jurisdiction of the other High Courts
merely on the ground of some insignificant
event connected with the cause of action
taking place within the territorial limits
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of the High Court to which the litigant
approaches at his own choice or
convenience. The following are such
observations. (SCC p. 722, para 12)
“If an impression gains ground
that even in cases which fall
outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, certain
members of the court would be
willing to exercise jurisdiction
on the plea that some event,
however trivial and unconnected
with the cause of action had
occurred within the jurisdiction
of the said court, litigants would
seek to abuse the process by
carrying the cause before such
members giving rise to avoidable
suspicion. That would lower the
dignity of the institution and put
the entire system to ridicule. We
are greatly pained to say so but
if we do not strongly deprecate
the growing tendency we will, we
are afraid, be failing in our duty
to the institution and the system
of administration of justice. We
do hope that we will not have
another occasion to deal with such
a situation.” - In Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair Vs. Narayanan Nair
and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 277, this Court explained the
expression “cause of action” and has quoted with
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approval the cause of action as defined by Halsbury’s
Laws of England in paragraph 16 and 17:-
“16. The expression “cause of action” has
acquired a judicially settled meaning. In
the restricted sense cause of action means
the circumstances forming the infraction
of the right or the immediate occasion for
the action. In the wider sense, it means
the necessary conditions for the
maintenance of the suit, including not
only the infraction of the right, but the
infraction coupled with the right itself.
Compendiously the expression means every
fact which would be necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to the judgment of
the court. Every fact which is necessary
to be proved, as distinguished from every
piece of evidence which is necessary to
prove each fact, comprises in “cause of
action”. - In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th
Edn.) it has been stated as follows:
“‘Cause of action’ has been
defined as meaning simply a
factual situation the existence of
which entitles one person to
obtain from the court a remedy
against another person. The phrase
has been held from earliest time
to include every fact which is
material to be proved to entitle
the plaintiff to succeed, and
every fact which a defendant would
have a right to traverse. ‘Cause
27
of action’ has also been taken to
mean that particular act on the
part of the defendant which gives
the plaintiff his cause of
complaint, or the subject-matter
of grievance founding the action,
not merely the technical cause of
action.” - Another judgment which needs to be noticed is
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India and
Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 254 wherein this Court reiterated
the meaning of cause of action in paragraph 6. This
Court reiterated that even if a small fraction of
cause of action accrues within the jurisdiction of
the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the
matter. In paragraph 18, following was held:-
“18. The facts pleaded in the writ
petition must have a nexus on the basis
whereof a prayer can be granted. Those
facts which have nothing to do with the
prayer made therein cannot be said to give
rise to a cause of action which would
confer jurisdiction on the Court.” - Another judgment which has been relied by learned
counsel for the appellant is Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs.
Union of India and Ors., (2014) 9 SCC 329. In the
above case, the petitioner had filed a writ petition
seeking various reliefs including disability
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compensation and pecuniary damages. The petitioner
approached the Patna High Court for grant of various
reliefs. Although, he was declared unqualified by
orders issued by the Shipping Department, Government
of India, Mumbai. This Court held that Patna High
Court has a jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Following was laid down in paragraph 17:-
“17. We have perused the facts pleaded in
the writ petition and the documents relied
upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the
appellant reported sickness on account of
various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital.
Consequently, he was signed off for
further medical treatment. Finally, the
respondent permanently declared the
appellant unfit for sea service due to
dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle
disease). As a result, the Shipping
Department of the Government of India
issued an Order on 12-4-2011 cancelling
the registration of the appellant as a
seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to
the appellant at his native place in Bihar
where he was staying after he was found
medically unfit. It further appears that
the appellant sent a representation from
his home in the State of Bihar to the
respondent claiming disability
compensation. The said representation was
replied by the respondent, which was
addressed to him on his home address in
Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for
disability compensation. It is further
evident that when the appellant was signed
off and declared medically unfit, he
returned back to his home in the district
of Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made
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all claims and filed representation from
his home address at Gaya and those letters
and representations were entertained by
the respondents and replied and a decision
on those representations were communicated
to him on his home address in Bihar.
Admittedly, the appellant was suffering
from serious heart muscle disease (dilated
cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem
which forced him to stay in his native
place, wherefrom he had been making all
correspondence with regard to his
disability compensation. Prima facie,
therefore, considering all the facts
together, a part or fraction of cause of
action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Patna High Court where he received a
letter of refusal disentitling him from
disability compensation.” - Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed
reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Patna High
court in Saryu Singh Vs. The Union of India and Ors.,
2015(2) PLJR 256. The above was a case where the
petitioner had claimed the due pensionary benefits
whose grievance was that payment made to him was less
payment. In the above context, the Division Bench in
paragraphs 63, 64 and 66 laid down following:-
“63. Recently pointed out the Supreme
Court, in Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of
India, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329, that
the question, whether or not cause of
action, wholly or in part, has arisen
within the territorial limit of any High
Court, shall have to be decided in the
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light of the nature and character of the
proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In order to
maintain a writ petition, the petitioner
has to establish that a legal right
claimed by him has been infringed by the
respondents within the territorial limit
of the Court’s jurisdiction. - In the backdrop of the position of
law, as discussed above, it needs to be
noted that the writ petitioner was,
admittedly, an employee of Coal India
Limited and as per the terms and
conditions of his employment, the writ
petitioner, as an employee, is,
admittedly, required to be paid his
pension and pensionery benefits by his
employer at Patna. - If, therefore, the writ petitioner is
not paid the sum of money, which is due
and payable to him as pension and
pensionery benefits, at Patna, it becomes
obvious that his right to receive due and
payable pension and pensionery benefits,
at Patna, is being denied; consequently
the infringement of his right or his
sufferance of injury is at Patna.” - The above judgment of the same High Court was
relevant in the facts of the present case, which
judgment although was delivered prior in time, but
was not noticed by the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench.
Daksha Legal 