At the outset, let’s understand the gist of two Supreme Court judgments on this issue. (1) Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335. Held: Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 which debars a convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if convicted for contempt and (2) Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650. Held : Merely undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is not sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of the criminal contempt. Purging oneself of contempt can be only by regretting or apologising in the case of a completed action of criminal contempt. Unless a person purges himself of contempt or is permitted by the Court conviction results in debarring an advocate from appearing in court even in absence of suspension or termination of the licence to practice.
Dealing with the later judgment first, Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 reads thus;
24-A. Disqualification for enrolment.—(1) No person shall be admitted as an advocate on a State roll—
(a) if he is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude;
(b) if he is convicted of an offence under the provisions of the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955
(c) if he is dismissed or removed from employment or office under the State on any charge involving moral turpitude.
Explanation.—In this clause, the expression “State” shall have the meaning assigned to it under Article 12 of the Constitution:
Provided that the disqualification for enrolment as aforesaid shall cease to have effect after a period of two years has elapsed since his release or dismissal or, as the case may be, removal.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person who having been found guilty is dealt with under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958).
The question as to whether Section 24A applies to a practicing lawyer came up for consideration before a three judge bench of the Supreme Court in in Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335 (Justice Anil R Dave, Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel). Question 4.2(ii) framed by the Supreme Court reads thus “Whether on conviction for criminal contempt, the appellant can be allowed to practise?.”
The relevant discussions are extracted below. “32. In Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650 this Court held that an advocate found guilty of contempt cannot be allowed to act or plead in any court till he purges himself of contempt. This direction was issued having regard to Rule 11 of the Rules framed by the High Court of Kerala under Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act and also referring to the observations in para 80 of the judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409. It was explained that debarring a person from appearing in court was within the purview of the jurisdiction of the Court and was different from suspending or terminating the licence which could be done by the Bar Council and on failure of the Bar Council, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court.“
The Court answers question 4.2(ii) above in paragraph as follows. 49. In these circumstances, Section 24-A which debars a convicted person from being enrolled applies to an advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council for a period of two years, if convicted for contempt.
The Supreme Court in Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re, (1995) 2 SCC 584 suspended the contemnor lawyer from practising as an advocate for a period of three years. However, this judgement was overruled on this point in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 by holding that it is not permissible for the Supreme Court to “take over” the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and “perform” their functions and therefore not permissible for the Supreme Court to punish an advocate for “professional misconduct” in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by converting itself as the statutory body exercising “original jurisdiction”.
However, the Supreme Court in Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335 refers to paragraph 80 of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 which is extracted below;
80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record, this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-on-Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practice as an advocate in other courts or tribunals.
Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 33535 also refers to R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 to the effect “even if there was no rule framed under Section 34 of the Advocates Act disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt, is not only a measure to maintain dignity and orderly function of courts, it may become necessary for the protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of court proceedings. Thus, the court not only has a right but also an obligation to protect itself and save the purity of its proceedings from being polluted, by barring the advocate concerned from appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time. This Court noticed the observations about the decline of ethical and professional standards of the Bar, and the need to arrest such trend in the interests of administration of justice. It was observed that in the absence of unqualified trust and confidence of people in the Bar, the judicial system could not work satisfactorily. Further observations are that the performance of the Bar Councils in maintaining professional standards and enforcing discipline did not match its achievements in other areas. This Court expressed hope and expected that the Bar Council will take appropriate action for the restoration of high professional standards among the lawyers, working of their position in the judicial system and the society.” (emphasis supplied)
We must notice that barring an advocate from appearing before the court, the contempt of which is committed as held in Pravin C. Shah is different from statutory debarment under Section 24A of the Advocates Act, 1961 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mahipal Singh Rana. In the first case, the discretion is left to the court to permit the lawyer to appear. In the second case, the statute itself operates as a bar for a lawyer to practice.
This is clear from paragraph 50 of the judgment in Mahipal Singh Rana whih says that in addition to the said disqualification, in view the judgment in R.K. Anand, unless a person purges himself of contempt or is permitted by the court, conviction results in debarring an advocate from appearing in court even in the absence of suspension or termination of the licence to practise.
Purging the contempt: Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650 (Justice K.T.Thomas Jutice S.N. Variava) holds that merely undergoing the penalty imposed on a contemnor is not sufficient to complete the process of purging himself of the criminal contempt. Purging oneself of contempt can be only by regretting or apologising in the case of a completed action of criminal contempt. Unless a person purges himself of contempt or is permitted by the Court conviction results in debarring an advocate from appearing in court even in absence of suspension or termination of the licence to practice. How to purge the contempt is elaborately discussed in Pravin C. Shah . After stressing the need for an unconditional apology for his conduct, the Supreme Court says that a mere statement made by a contemnor before court that he apologises is hardly enough to amount to purging himself of the contempt. The court must be satisfied of the genuineness of the apology. If the court is so satisfied and on its basis accepts the apology as genuine the court has to make an order holding that the contemnor has purged himself of the contempt. (para 31)
Such drastic measure is needed, according to Supreme Court because …the very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of court on the previous hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or cross-examining a witness on the same day, unaffected by the contemptuous behaviour he hurled at the court, would erode the dignity of the court and even corrode the majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. (para 17Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali,)
The genus of Pravin C Shah is found in Harish Uppal (Ex-Capt.) v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45 where the Supreme Court says “Let the Bar take note that unless self-restraint is exercised, courts may now have to consider framing specific rules debarring advocates, guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or unbecoming conduct, from appearing before the courts.”
In my humble opinion, the judgments of the Supreme Court in Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650 and Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335 especially Pravin C Shah command absolute surrender of Advocates’ fraternity to Courts and strike at the very psyche of the Advocates. They need to be reviewed at the earliest, ofcourse with suitable modifications to safeguard the institution of judiciary from motivated, scurrilous and agenda ridden tirades.
S.Basavaraj, Advocate and Member, Karnataka State Bar Council. raj@dakshalegal.com 9845065416
Daksha Legal 
However there case of Prashant Bhushan is very different. How his conduct can be contemptuous, his right to criticize is not covered under Sec 24 of Advocate Act. Discretion of court has some limit, which should be exercised judiciously.
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